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ABSTRACT
“UNE RÉALITÉ PLUS RÉELLE QUE LE RÉEL”: THE PERSISTENCE OF MYTH IN
POSTWAR FRENCH AND ITALIAN FICTION
Alison Howard
Gerald Prince

Interwar Europe was enamored of myth: adaptations of classical tales proliferated,
anthropological research into so-called “primitive” mythology thrived, and movements
ranging from psychoanalysis to surrealism bore myth’s undeniable imprint. But its
reputation took a turn during World War II, and by the end of the war, myth had become
synonymous with irrationality, violence, barbarism, and (most damning of all) fascism.
At best, myth was dismissed as anachronistic or escapist; at worst, it was cited it as a
serious political threat. Thus, most postwar European writers, especially those claiming to
be politically “committed,” eschewed myth in order to avoid the threat of contamination.
However, there are exceptions to this rule—writers who strived to maintain connections
with past traditions, as myth once had, without falling victim to propaganda or neoromantic universalization. Taking as my starting point myth’s tremendous capacity to
facilitate social cohesion, I argue that it played a vital role in postwar French and Italian
fiction, providing readers with the tools needed to process the trauma of the war, combat
modern alienation and disenchantment, and engage with the sociopolitical exigencies of
the day. This dissertation thus re-inscribes myth in a tradition of political commitment,
tracing the (non-fascistic) political consequences of mythically inflected novels. This
v

rehabilitation of myth hinges on four authors—Georges Bataille and Claude Simon in
France, and Cesare Pavese and Elsa Morante in Italy—who mobilized myth as an
alternative to the dominant literary and political models operative in each country.
However, I do not merely demonstrate the persistence of mythological archetypes in the
postwar cultural landscape; rather, I articulate the precise ways in which such archetypes
interpenetrated the specificity of World War II and subverted traditional historiography.
Far from being a form of escapist fantasy, myth allowed writers and readers alike to
appropriate longstanding cultural traditions in order to circumscribe the otherwise
uncontrollable and unassimilable experiences of war. Though many intellectuals
advocated for myth’s outright demise, the authors considered here sought to recover
something from contaminated discourses, recognizing that total rupture from the past
would only exacerbate existing feelings of alienation, isolation, and despair.
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Introduction
Whatever Happened to Myth?
Every culture that has lost myth has lost, by the same token,
its natural, healthy creativity. Only a horizon ringed about
with myths can unify a culture. The forces of imagination
and of Apollonian dream are saved only by myth from
indiscriminate rambling. The images of myth must be the
daemonic guardians, ubiquitous but unnoticed, presiding
over the growth of the child’s mind and interpreting to the
mature man his life and struggles.
–Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy
…comme s’il avait abandonné, renoncé au spectacle de
ce monde pour retourner son regard, le concentrer sur une
vision intérieure plus reposante que l’incessante agitation
de la vie, une réalité plus réelle que le réel.
–Claude Simon, La Route des Flandres

The word “myth” boasts some serious baggage. Though it has inspired an eclectic
array of thinkers over the centuries, from medieval mystics to Renaissance painters to
Modernist novelists, European interest in myth reached a fever pitch during the interwar
period. In France, the resurgence of Greek mythology was in part an homage to the
classical tradition of the Grand Siècle, and in part a reminder of humanist traditions that
seemed in danger of extinction after World War I. Anthropological interest in nonWestern mythologies likewise flourished during this era, and European artists frequently
borrowed from these “irrational” and “primitive” traditions.1 Whether symbolizing order
or chaos, collective effervescence or the individual unconscious, myth was on everyone’s
1

The mythically inflected works produced during this period are far too numerous to name. However, to
cite merely a few examples, Cocteau, Gide, Giraudoux, Yourcenar, and Valéry all penned adaptations of
Greek myths. Inspired in part by the anthropological investigations of Durkheim and his inheritors, and in
part by psychoanalysis, painters like Dali, Ernst, and Masson included mythological archetypes in their
visual art. In Italy, the hermetic poetry of the 1920s and 30s, while rejecting complicated allusions to Greek
and Roman mythology, nonetheless found inspiration in mystical traditions.

1

mind. But World War II fundamentally altered the perception of myth: reduced to a
reviled tool of fascist manipulation, it more or less disappeared from the intellectual
landscape.
The links between Nazism and mythology have been well documented.2 Hitler
and Goebbels mobilized völkisch mysticism, folklore, and “organic” communities in
order to strengthen the Nazi Party’s popular support. Alfred Rosenberg, one of the party’s
principle ideologues, penned The Myth of the Twentieth Century in 1930, influenced by
the mythic theories of Friedrich Nietzsche, Richard Wager, Arthur Schopenhauer,
Meister Eckhart, and Georges Sorel, among others. In Italy, Mussolini went so far as to
establish a School of Fascist Mysticism, which embraced the non-rational elements of
fascism and positioned Mussolini has an infallible god-like figure. In a more general
sense, both Hitler and Mussolini leaned heavily on national myths to inspire their
adherents and glorify the notion of sacrificial death. Hitler relied on myths of racial
purity—with some theories even claiming the Germans were descended from Atlantis—
while Mussolini favored myths of the Roman Empire’s global domination, which he
promised to recreate.3 Key gestures and symbols—from the fascist salute to the
swastika—were borrowed from earlier mythological traditions.
Thus, by the end of World War II, myth was inextricably linked to fascist
ideology. It had been used to justify imperial expansion, racial exclusion, and patriarchal
social values, which in turn led many postwar European writers, especially those
2

See, for example, Jay W. Baird, The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda 1939-45 (1975).
To cite merely one example, Mussolini proclaimed in 1922: “Rome is our starting point and reference; it
is our symbol, or, if you will, our myth. We dream about the Roman Italy, that is, the wise and strong,
disciplined and imperial Italy. Much of what was the immortal spirit of Rome is reborn in fascism: the
lictor is Roman, our organization of combat is Roman, our pride and our courage are Roman: ‘Civis
romanus sum’” (qtd. Giardiana 57).
3

2

claiming to be politically “committed,” to steer clear of myth and its propagandistic
powers.4 “Myth” meant irrationality, violence, and barbarism. Among Marxist writers,
mythology was a particularly offensive concept, not only because of its fascist
connections, but also due to the belief that it was a tool of the bourgeoisie used to mask
the true conditions of labor.5 Between neorealist impulses in Italy, Sartre’s push for
littérature engagée in France, and growing resistance to “official” narratives of the war
(which often mythologized the role of resistance movements while ignoring the realities
of collaboration), the postwar period was indelibly marked by the project of
demythification.6 At best, myth was dismissed as anachronistic or escapist; at worst, it
was cited as a serious political threat.7
However, there are exceptions to this rule—writers who strived to create paths to
the past, as mythology once had, without falling victim to propaganda or neo-romantic
universalization (two indictments commonly leveled against myth). Taking as my starting

4

As David Gross laments in his defense of Georges Sorel’s writings on myth, “historical events since
Sorel’s time have made one think that any interest in myth or its psychological underpinnings must
necessarily have fascist overtones” (114).
5
Commodity fetishism, for example, is described by Marx in quasi-mythological terms. In Mythologies
(1957), Roland Barthes exposes numerous cultural myths, advertisements, and pop culture phenomena as
vehicles through which bourgeois society asserts its values.
6
In The Vichy Syndrome (1991), Henry Rousso defines “the myth of the Resistance,” or résistancialisme,
as a consciously cavalier interpretation of les années noires that dismissed Vichy as the creation of a small
group of misguided men, placed the blame for any war crimes solely on the Germans and on very small
bands of collaborationists, and exaggerated the level of resistance of the average Frenchman.
7
As is the case in any historical or literary investigation, the line separating the pro-myth period from the
anti-myth one is fuzzy. Jean Anouilh and Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, continued to use Greek mythology
as an allegory for contemporary political situations well into the 1940s, with Antigone and Les Mouches,
respectively. Jean Cocteau released his film Orphée in 1950 and Le Testament d’Orphée in 1960. However,
though myths continued to appear in art after the war, I maintain that the relationship between myth and
politics was nonetheless fundamentally altered. For example, the use of mythology during the Occupation
was seen as a necessary screen to avoid censorship, but did not play a central role in leftist ideology.
Cocteau’s cinematic adaptations of myth were praised for their aesthetic qualities, but were not considered
“politically engaged.” Furthermore, as I explain later in this introduction, I am less interested in specific
mythological traditions (e.g. Greek) than in a mythic literary methodology featured in certain postwar
novels.

3

point myth’s tremendous capacity to facilitate social cohesion, I argue that it played a
vital role in postwar French and Italian fiction, providing readers with the tools needed to
process the trauma of the war, combat modern alienation and disenchantment, and engage
with the sociopolitical exigencies of the day. To illustrate this theory, I rely on four case
studies: Georges Bataille and Claude Simon in France, and Cesare Pavese and Elsa
Morante in Italy. Though at first glance these authors represent wildly different aesthetic
and political commitments, I maintain that each ultimately mobilized myth as a (nonfascistic) form of political engagement and alternative to the dominant literary models
operative in each country.
One of the biggest challenges to such a rehabilitation is the tendency to read myth
in purely Manichean terms. In their introduction to the volume Re-enchantment of the
World, Joshua Landy and Michael Saler identity two main theoretical frameworks
through which enchantment has historically been read: a binary approach, which views
enchantment as a relic to be swept away by the superior tenets of Enlightenment
rationality, and a dialectical approach, which posits that modernity itself is enchanted,
unbeknown to its subjects, in a deceptive and dangerous way.8 However, they insist on
the existence of a third form that is neither escapist, nor irrational, nor reactionary.
According to this approach, which they term antinomial, enchantment is voluntary (rather
than insidiously imposed) and respectable (meaning compatible with secular rationality).
It “delights but does not delude” (3). I argue that it is this third form that is deployed by
Pavese, Bataille, Simon, and Morante.

8

For our purposes, we can consider enchantment to be a synonym for myth.

4

Joseph Mali posits a similar idea in his work on Walter Benjamin, referring to a
critical methodology whose main aim is to “counter both the ‘disenchantment’ of
mythology in modern scientific ideologies (e.g. futurism or Marxism) and the ‘reenchantment’ of mythology in neoromantic ideologies (e.g. surrealism or Fascism)”
(239). Myth is indeed susceptible to instrumentalization by both detractors and adherents.
For those opposed to myth, it can quickly become a symbol of all modern evil; for those
in favor, it can inspire naïve nostalgia for an idealized past. What Mali, Landy, and Saler
suggest, and what I will attempt to demonstrate, is that myth needn’t be reduced to such
simplistic, dichotomous terms. There’s another way.
Far from being a form of escapist fantasy, myth allows writers and readers alike
to appropriate longstanding cultural traditions in order to circumscribe the otherwise
uncontrollable and unassimilable experiences of World War II. Furthermore, myth, one
of whose primary functions has always been creating social cohesion, helps individuals to
reconnect with historical, cultural, and/or religious communities often thought lost
following the unprecedented rupture of World War II. Finally, given the alienation
characteristic of postwar industrialization, myth emerges as a means of resurrecting
forgotten lines of communication and thereby overcoming modernity’s hallmark
isolation. In short, myth combines the social investments of Marxism with a validation of
certain “anachronistic” aspects of prewar culture.
My goal is not simply to highlight the oft-overlooked persistence of mythological
archetypes in the postwar cultural landscape, but rather to reveal the precise ways in
which such archetypes interpenetrated the specificity of the experience of World War II
and were mobilized as a means of engaging with the sociopolitical exigencies of the
5

postwar period. All of the authors under consideration were marginalized in some way
due to their failure to adhere to dominant modes of political engagement, yet I argue that
theirs is simply an alternative means of engagement rather than an outright rejection of
political action. In this, I agree with Daniel Just’s assessment that the choice “between,
on the one hand, an engaged literature of density, concreteness, and representation, and,
on the other hand, a depoliticized and de-contextualized literature for its own sake” is a
false dilemma (16). The postwar literary landscape was more nuanced than many
scholars give it credit for. Critics accuse myth of being detached from political realities,
but, to quote Claude Simon, it may ultimately offer a reality more real than the real.
Before justifying my choice of myth as the operative word in this project (a
polemical choice, given its negative connotations), it is first necessary to take a brief
journey through the major literary and political trends of the postwar era. This is welltrodden territory, to be sure, but in order to understand the antagonistic reception of myth
during the time period I consider—roughly 1945-1975—as well as the mistrust of the
myth/politics pairing, we must situate myth in relation to the other theories, ideologies,
and artistic strategies advocated by prominent postwar French and Italian intellectuals.

Les trente glorieuses and il miracolo economico
At first glance, it would seem that France and Italy occupied very different
positions during World War II. After all, Italy was an Axis power, France an Ally. Italy
labored under the yoke of fascism for twenty years; France endured a mere four years of

6

occupation.9 And yet, towards the end of the war, their experiences began to converge.
The efforts of the Résistance were mimicked by the Italian partigiani; the demarcation
line separating occupied France from the zone libre was mirrored by the line dividing a
liberated Southern Italy (following the Allied landing in Sicily) from the north, still
controlled by the Republic of Salò. Simultaneously victor and vanquished, subjugator and
subjugated, France and Italy were forced to negotiate numerous conflicting identities,
which culminated in the impossible postwar task of separating collaborators from the
“true patriots.”
Without claiming any sort of false equivalency, France and Italy in many ways
followed similar trajectories after the war. Both nations, for example, sought to articulate
the ideal relationship between literature and politics, and to establish the role of
intellectuals within the political arena.10 The Communists—who, thanks in large part to
their role in resistance and partisan movements, enjoyed immense popularity in the
immediate postwar period—settled on a path right away: both the French and Italian
branches of the party fell in line with Soviet policy, as articulated by Central Committee
Secretary Andrei Zhdanov, which stated that art should be anti-bourgeois, antiindividualistic, and anti-formalistic. Lynn Higgins explains that, “a good communist

9

Graham Bartram reminds us of “a basic difference between the French and the Italian experiences of
Fascism. The Vichy regime, relatively short-lived and installed as a puppet of the Nazi occupiers, could,
with a modicum of plausibility, be construed after its demise as a brief and indeed ‘alien’ intrusion into the
continuity of la république française. Whilst Mussolini’s Salò Republic of 1943-45, against which the
partisans fought, had also been imposed by the Nazi invader, the preceding Fascist regime with which it
possessed an undeniable continuity was neither short-lived nor an alien intrusion. It was therefore much
harder to defend the lofty view, expressed by the liberal-humanist philosopher Benedetto Croce after 1945,
that Fascism had been a mere ‘parenthesis’ in Italian history” (23).
10

These debates, of course, predate World War II. However, the intensity of the postwar crisis brought
renewed urgency to the question of intellectuals’ ethical responsibilities.

7

writer was expected to write fiction that was clear and widely accessible; it should steer a
neat path amid the confusions of real life, aim for immediate and transparent political
efficacy and utility, and portray the Truth” (12). In practice, this doctrine often meant that
Communist writers were obliged to pen whatever the Soviet leadership decreed
necessary, placing them in the subservient position of propagandists. Of course, not every
leftist intellectual was a doting Communist; nonetheless, the overarching sentiment was
that committed intellectuals had a duty to use their literary works to guide the masses
toward revolution and social equality
Sartre was unquestionably the dominant intellectual voice in France in the decade
after the war; thanks to him, Marxism and existentialism became the leading philosophies
of the day. Dissatisfied with the tenets of Zhdanovism, Sartre imagined a different
(though equally “political”) role for the writer in Qu’est-ce que la littérature? (1947)
First published as a series of essays in Les Temps modernes, and later as a collected
volume, it is here that Sartre laid out his vision of the writer’s responsibility and
popularized the term littérature engagée. “Committed literature” is founded on a basic
existentialist tenet: that a person defines himself by consciously engaging in willed
action. As applied to literature, this means opposition to the creed of “art for art’s sake”
and a rejection of bourgeois writers, whose obligation is to their craft rather than their
audience. Though later critics sometimes interpreted littérature engagée as a dogmatic
demand for adherence to a particular political ideology, Sartre understood engagement as
an individual moral challenge to adapt freely made choices to socially useful ends. At its
core, the text merely communicates that artists can no longer in good conscience ignore
their historical situatedness. This vision of committed literature influenced a generation
8

of writers—even if very little actual “literature” was produced under the auspices of this
doctrine.11
In Italy, meanwhile, the late 1940s witnessed the end of philosopher Benedetto
Croce’s reign, while Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci came to the fore, particularly
following the publication of the first volume of his prison writings in 1947. Neorealism
dominated cinematic (and, to a slightly lesser extent, literary) production. Though the
movement was by no means homogenous, it was first and foremost invested in the notion
of impegno, or commitment, and sought to represent the harsh realities of poverty,
oppression, and injustice. During this period, debates regarding the role of the intellectual
centered around writer Elio Vittorini’s very public break with Communist leader Palmiro
Togliatti; while Togliatti followed the official Soviet party line, Vittorini refused to be a
piper of the revolution [“suonare il piffero della rivoluzione”]. He argued in favor of a
new culture, one capable of combatting and eventually eliminating suffering, rather than
playing a merely consolatory role.12 Like Sartre, he advanced these aims as editor of a
major journal (Il Politecnico) and was soon considered the standard-bearer of committed
literature in Italy.
Eager to prove their Resistance or partisan credentials—and feeling guilty,
perhaps, that they had not done more to oppose fascism during the war—these thinkers’
engagements with the literary world were not merely intellectual or aesthetic. On the
contrary, culture became the battleground for political dominance (especially after the
11

Instead, most of the more militantly political writers were busy publishing essays in journals—including
Les temps modernes—as a means of advancing their social and political agendas.
12
In the inaugural issue of Il Politecnico, he writes: “Non più una cultura che consoli nelle sofferenze ma
una cultura che protegga dalle sofferenze, che le combatta e le elimini.”

9

Communists were officially ousted from government in 1947). An obsession with
“commitment,” then, was the main determiner of literary production in the first decade
after the war. It probably goes without saying that myth, almost invariably coded as either
escapist or politically tainted, had a limited role to play in this committed realm.13
Paradoxically (given the insistence on antifascist credentials), this was also the
period of greatest amnesia regarding the war. Both France and Italy tried to enact
systematic purges of fascist collaborators in the wake of liberation, but a need for
national unity won out over the desire for vengeance, and many collaborators not only
went unpunished, but were soon back in government. Rather than dwelling on a traumatic
past, one of the primary coping mechanisms was to pursue a narrative of rupture: to avoid
the stain of fascism, everything after the war would be constructed in opposition to what
came before. In reality, there were numerous continuities between pre- and postwar
culture in both France and Italy.14 However, explicit evocations of the past were largely
avoided. For example, though some Resistance narratives found purchase, many
deportees struggled to secure publishers for their memoirs. Even Primo Levi’s Se questo

13

As if to reinforce leftist fears, when the word “myth” does appear in the political realm in this period, it is
almost always in speeches given by conservative leaders. Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, for example, a
Christian Democrat, had the following to say about myth in a speech to the Italian Senate: “…some said
that the European federation is a myth. It’s true, it is a myth in the Sorelian sense. And if you want there to
be a myth, then please tell us what myth we need to give to our youth concerning relations between one
state and another, the future of Europe, the future of the world, security, and peace, if not this effort toward
unification? Do you prefer the myth of dictatorship, the myth of power, the myth of one’s nation’s flag,
even if it is accompanied by heroism? But then, we would create once again that conflict that inevitably
leads to war. I tell you that this myth is a myth of peace” (qtd. Müller 88).
14
Nicholas Hewitt, for example, claims that, in the transition between the collapsing Vichy regime and the
France of the Provisional Government, extreme right wing ideologies actually flourished, thus troubling the
narrative promulgated by de Gaulle that all Frenchmen had opposed the Occupation. “In other words, there
was a general feeling that France had returned to the traditions of public life of the Third Republic, and the
Right, as an anti-parliamentary force, duly benefitted.” (53) Numerous scholars of Italian history, most
notably Ruth Ben-Ghiat, have likewise traced parallels between the culture, institutions, and politics of the
Ventennio and the ones of the new Republic.
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è un uomo, arguably one of the most famous accounts of the concentration camps, was
turned down by Einaudi. Giorgio Bassani, who penned numerous works about the
exclusion and deportation of Jews in Italy—and who was arrested for antifascism in
1943—was accused of “turning the Fascist period into nothing more than personal
memory, local colour, and historical background” (Gordon 205). Thus, victimization at
the hands of the fascists was a necessary but ultimately insufficient credential for postwar
writers. If some writers felt an ethical obligation to represent the atrocities of the war, the
desire to simply forget the past in the name of a revolutionary future won out.
By the late 1950s, the Communist Party was in crisis. The circulation of
Khrushchev’s secret speech criticizing Stalin, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and wellpublicized accounts of life in the gulags led many intellectuals in both France and Italy to
lose faith in the party. Concomitantly, both nations faced rapid industrialization and
Americanization, due in no small part to the Marshall Plan and the United States’ desire
to limit the power of the Communists in Western Europe. This in turn led to increased
tensions between rural and urban environments.15 Though suspicious of Stalin’s
increasingly totalitarian policies, most writers were equally dubious of the American push
toward empty consumerism. The Cold War powers thus emerged as a true Scylla and
Charybdis.
Furthermore, as faith in the Soviet Union (and its promised revolution) waned,
writers were forced to confront new forms of violence—in particular, the Algerian War,
which was both a decisive and a divisive event for the self-definition of many French
15
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intellectuals. Sartre mounted a vocal defense of Algerian independence; so devoted was
he to the cause that he abandoned his notion of littérature engagée in favor of more direct
political intervention, concluding that literature is ultimately an obstacle to action.
Camus, meanwhile, accused Sartre of blind, self-righteous activism driven by an abstract
notion of history. What Camus proposed instead was that writers remain in touch with the
era while simultaneously maintaining a certain distance from history. Other intellectuals
soon staked out their positions in relation to these two opposing figures—though again,
myth struggled to find purchase. It was somehow dismissed as both too proximate to, and
too distant from, history.
In terms of dominant theoretical paradigms, by the late 1950s, Marxism,
existentialism, and historicism had given way to structuralism, anthropology, and
psychoanalysis; Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Anthropologie structurale, for example, was
published in 1958, followed by a more fully articulated theory of structuralism in his
writings of the 1960s. Lévi-Strauss and his acolytes were, of course, deeply interested in
myth, but only in a strictly ethnographic sense. The myths they studied were of
indigenous peoples in far-off lands—not the myths that lingered in Western Europe.16
Another key deployment of the term “myth” in this period can be found in Roland
Barthes’ 1957 text Mythologies; in this collection of short essays analyzing the role of
consumer goods and popular entertainment, he defines myth as a type of speech that
distorts and impoverishes meanings by removing them from their historical context,
making things appear natural that are not. Thus, thanks to Barthes, myth came to be
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associated not only with fascist irrationality, but also with bourgeois manipulation. In
Italy, too, the late ‘50s and early ‘60s saw an opening out of intellectual horizons, with an
eclectic mix of phenomenology, structuralism, sociology, psychoanalysis, and
anthropology replacing the dominant Crocean or Gramscian philosophical idioms.
On the literary front, the late 1950s saw the birth of the nouveau roman and other
avant-garde movements; Nathalie Sarraute’s L’Ère du soupçon, often considered a sort of
“manifesto” of the nouveau roman, was published in 1956, followed by Robbe-Grillet’s
La Jalousie in 1957, while the experimental group Oulipo was founded in 1960. In Italy
as well, neorealism gave way to new forms—most notably Pasolini’s neosperimentalismo and the neoavanguardia. In general, the 1960s marked a turn towards
formal experimentation and theory, in part as a response to the aforementioned
commercialization of culture. Umberto Eco describes how, with the rise of consumerist
mass culture, leftist intellectuals were often pushed into one of two extreme responses:
either apocalyptic rejection or optimistic integration.17 Experimental writing represented
an effort to break free from the oppressive traditions of the past—to “kill the father” in
the pursuit of progress—without falling prey to the empty commercialization of
American culture. As Daniele Fioretti explains, neo-sperimentalismo represented “an
attempt to overcome the stalemate of the Italian culture. Only a true attempt to face the
economic and social reality of neocapitalism could bring Italian literature out of the
quagmire of naturalism” (9).
Sartre’s definition of littérature engagée sought to remove the indeterminacy of
language, encouraging utilitarian, denotative prose, but subsequent writers intentionally
17
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exacerbated linguistic ambiguity, viewing instability as its own kind of political tool.18
Fearing that the avant-garde had become the establishment, writers were pushed toward
ever-greater degrees of linguistic experimentation; the term nouveau nouveau roman, for
example, was first bandied around in 1971. Yet myth continued to be excluded from this
landscape; though its fascist reputation had faded slightly by the 1960s, the accusations of
anachronism persisted. Associated with long-dead epochs, myth was deemed unfit to
contend with modern cultural challenges.
1968, of course, was a watershed moment for politics. However, if the events of
May ‘68 ultimately had little political effect in France—the Gaullist party emerged
stronger than ever in the June elections—in Italy, the student and industrial unrest marked
the beginning of a decade of extremism, terrorism, and social reform known as the anni
di piombo, or Years of Lead. Between 1969 and 1981, nearly 2,000 murders were
attributed to political violence in the form of bombings, assassinations, and street warfare
between rival militant factions, culminating in the assassination of Prime Minister Aldo
Moro in 1978 by the Red Brigades. Just as the Algerian War had disinterred memories of
World War II for France—the use of torture against Algerian dissidents and de Gaulle’s
sudden return to power bore undeniable echoes of the Resistance years—so too did the
aftereffects of May ’68 involve the resurrection of partisan rhetoric.19 Some sessantottini,
including the Red Brigades, called themselves resistenti ad oltranza, or permanent
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partisans, and framed their violence as the fulfillment of the (unsuccessful) anti-fascist
battle that had begun some three decades earlier.
Indeed, the 1970s marked a renewal of interest in World War II, as well as a
reconsideration of the “official” narratives that had been promulgated in the previous
decades. Henry Rousso refers to this period in France as “the return of the repressed”—
an era of demythification, defined by the desire, particularly among second-generation
writers, to confront difficult truths about collaboration and complacency. Often grouped
together under the term la mode rétro, key texts of these era include Marcel Ophül’s Le
Chagrin et la pitié and the novels of Patrick Modiano. Opposition to résistancialisme,
though praised by some for revealing painful but necessary historical facts, was
dismissed by others as “fétichisme snob des effets de vieux (vêtements et décors) et
dérision de l’histoire” (Bonitzer and Toubiana 5). Michel Foucault, among others,
insisted that even if the idea of all Frenchmen participating in the Resistance was
inaccurate, the new claim that all were collaborators was equally fallacious.20 Italian
films like The Night Porter and Pasqualino Settebellezze likewise destabilized
established narratives of partisan heroism, inviting praise for their artistic merits but
condemnation for their exploitation of suffering. The incensed reactions elicited by these
texts suggest that fascism remained an open wound.21 Furthermore, the task of separating
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history from myth proved a Sisyphean one, which often resulted not in the elimination of
myth, but rather the creation of counter-myths.22
The vast majority of scholarship surveying the postwar period privileges the
aforementioned trends: in France, Sartrean-dominated littérature engagée and the
“experimental” writing of the nouveau roman, Oulipo, and later, Tel Quel; in Italy,
neorealism, followed by the neo-avant-garde (with the occasional bestseller, like
Lampedusa’s Il Gattopardo, thrown in for good measure). In both cases, leftist thinkers
played a decisive role in determining the trajectory of cultural trends and articulating the
ideal relationship between literature and politics.23 Though scholars acknowledge that
there were artists working outside of these well-known frameworks, the dominant
narratives nonetheless fail to account for alternative forms of committed literature, like
myth. What I propose is that Pavese, Bataille, Simon, and Morante turned to myth as a
means of pursuing leftist political ideals without jettisoning past traditions (as many
avant-garde writers were quick to do); they refused to throw away the baby with the
bathwater. In the ongoing battle between myth and reality, or myth and history, these
authors adopted the unorthodox view that myth was the more ethically valid position to
assume in relation to World War II.
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Qu’est-ce que le mythe?
One of the difficulties of writing about myth is that the term is applied to a
disturbingly wide swath of cultural attitudes and artifacts. The Greek word µῦθος
(mythos) is most often translated simply as “story” or “report,” though the term has
acquired an array of religious and social meanings over the millennia that far exceed such
a purely narrative description. Even if we limit ourselves to definitions provided by
relatively contemporary mythographers, contradictions emerge. For Lucien Lévy-Bruhl,
myths are sacred histories; for Bronislaw Malinowski, they are pragmatic stories; Mircea
Eliade calls them creation stories, while Claude Lévi-Strauss prefers the term “strongly
structured stories”; Roland Barthes sees myth as a language (and one of political
manipulation and propaganda), whereas Georges Sorel situates myth at the heart of
revolutionary action. Myths can be sacred, political, or both. They can represent order
and rationality, or chaos and violence. Perhaps most importantly, in common parlance the
word has come to be synonymous with fiction, as against anthropological definitions that
view myths as truthful accounts of events from the remote past.24
Then there’s the problem of adjectives. Does “mythical” mean the same thing as
“mythological”? What about “mythic”? In his seminal work Mythology in the Modern
Novel, J.J. White concludes that “mythical” usually refers to the presence of Jungian
archetypes, though it can also be used as a synonym for “fanciful,” with all its attendant
negative connotations. He views “mythic” (the term I favor in this project) as less
pejorative than other adjectival forms. In French, there’s a preference for “mythologique”
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over “mythique,” though it’s unclear which term refers to specific mythological traditions
and which to more general archetypes.
In order to clarify the particularities of my deployment of the word, it’s perhaps
most useful to begin by stating what myth is not. By myth, I do not mean any particular
mythological tradition—Greek, Roman, Sumerian, or otherwise. Nor do I refer to the
creation of a new set of “modern” myths. I do not use myth in the Barthesian sense, nor
in the anthropological sense of Lévi-Strauss or René Girard. And despite my investment
in World War II as an essential touchstone for postwar intellectuals, I also don’t use
“myth” as it was invoked during the demythification period: that is, to refer to the myth
of the Resistance or the myth of de Gaulle. In such iterations, myth again becomes a form
of propaganda, but one in service of the left rather than the right. In either case,
opposition to myth stems from the feeling that it creates dangerously tidy narratives that
ignore historical reality in favor of political expediency. However, as I explain in later
chapters, the authors under consideration here used myth precisely to undermine these
monolithic, collective memories of the war, drawing attention instead to marginalized
characters and peripheral stories. For the purposes of this project, then, myth is neither a
set of enduring archetypes, nor a collection of religious beliefs. Instead, I present myth as
a methodology; a mode of cognition; a sort of Weltanschauung connecting pre- and
postwar cultural experiences.
What my deployment of myth shares with the more dubious myth of the
Resistance is a belief in myth’s potential to facilitate social cohesion. The combination of
the war’s unprecedented destruction with rapid postwar modernization led to intense
feelings of dislocation, alienation, and, often, oppression. Myth was imagined as a way of
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helping alienated individuals reconnect with familiar traditions and carve out a space for
pre-war habits and beliefs within the landscape of postwar anxiety. In short, my
formulation of myth pushes back against the misconceptions and biases that have plagued
the word since the Second World War.
In the end, all definitions of myth are manufactured—prescriptive rather than
descriptive. There is no natural means of distinguishing between a myth and a mere story,
fable, or fairy tale. Though each of the aforementioned theorists has established rigorous
criteria by which he separates myth from other literary and religious creations, those
criteria are always at least partially arbitrary. Consequently, the definition of myth that I
have adopted is the result of bricolage (a key mythic strategy according to Lévi-Strauss),
with pieces taken from several of the prevailing definitions of the postwar era. I apply the
term “mythic” to works that exhibit the following formal and thematic features:

1. Non-linear temporality: This may assume a variety of forms: the superimposition
of past, present, and future into one eternal present; cyclical time; anachronism;
prophecy; nonsynchronism; atemporality; and temporal expansions or
contractions. Each of these temporalities rejects the Hegelian notion of history as
progress in favor of the rhythms that characterize nature and the cosmos.
However, repetition should not be equated with grim determinism; on the
contrary, the novels I consider feature repetition with a difference, creating
continuity with the past while carving out a space for a more utopian future.
Through this repetition with a difference, modern traumas are inscribed within a
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historical system while simultaneously undermining that system.25 Mythic
temporalities likewise reject the capitalist mandate to sacrifice present desires to
future concerns, instead validating the worth of present, nonproductive
expenditure.
2. Rejection of rationality: This does not necessarily signal an acceptance of
irrationality; rather it is an acknowledgment of the shortcomings of Enlightenment
rationality in the twentieth century, as articulated, for example, by Adorno and
Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947).26 Nor does it imply a
corresponding rejection of all order and structure. On the contrary, myth is often
defined by its highly structured nature (as Lévi-Strauss has stressed). I am
interested in the types of structures privileged by the texts under consideration and
the ways in which they invert or subvert rational bourgeois values. Furthermore,
the move away from rationality represents an effort to revise traditional
historiography in order to account for other kinds of historical experiences— for
example, those of women, children, the poor, and the illiterate, which are often
coded as irrational or affective. In short, the rejection of rationality is a rejection
of utilitarian thinking in favor of affect and imagination.
3. (Re)integration of the individual into the social: Nearly every definition
acknowledges myth as a cornerstone of social identity. According to Joseph
Campbell, one of the four essential functions of mythology is to integrate the
25
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individual organically with his group.27 Roger Caillois and René Girard discuss
myth’s ability to rejuvenate or exculpate troubled communities. Building on these
notions of integration and rejuvenation, I contend that myth seeks to overcome the
alienation so characteristic of modernity, to resurrect lines of communication, and
to rebuild communities following the profound rupture of national, religious, and
familial unity that occurred during World War II. If the modern era—and
capitalism in particular—is associated with the individual, myth foregrounds the
universal. And whereas more explicitly political intellectuals attempted to
construct unity through class consciousness, mythic writers turned to more
affective forms of community building.
4. Fusion: This refers to textual strategies in which the identity of the individual is
destabilized due to blurred boundaries between self and world, or self and other. It
often involves a mystical union with nature, human-animal hybridity, the
existence of a collective unconscious, and/or a neoromantic longing for
prelapsarian unity. Mythic fusion requires self-sacrifice, but this loss of self has
positive connotations; it is a liberating sacrifice that returns the individual to a sort
of primordial unity, as opposed to the negative iterations of sacrifice characteristic
of both totalitarian regimes and capitalist oppression. Thus, the aim of myth is not
only to reinscribe the individual into a community; it is also to facilitate other
forms of communion with both the physical and metaphysical realms. The fusion
depicted in the novels of Pavese, Bataille, Simon, and Morante is often grotesque,
and sometimes even terrifying, yet it ultimately gives way to a positive union that
27
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allows characters to overcome isolation and disconnection. Thus, fusion
represents another effort to combat the narratives of rupture and discontinuity that
defined the postwar period.
5. Bricolage: As aforementioned, Lévi-Strauss uses the term bricolage—a mode of
thinking which repurposes available materials to solve new problems—to
describe the characteristic patterns of mythological thought. The key difference
between the bricoleur and the engineer, both of whom assemble projects from
preexisting materials, is that the engineer proceeds from goals to means, while the
bricoleur does not decide ahead of time what he is creating; the process of
assemblage takes precedence over any preconceived message. Bricolage has no
telos, thus once again opposing notions of history as progress. Through a process
of decontextualization and recontextualization, familiar narratives are broken
apart and repurposed towards new and unexpected ends.
The authors discussed in this dissertation are all able bricoleurs, as
demonstrated by their ability to adapt historical detritus to address contemporary
political and social obstacles. Though Jacques Derrida extends the notion of
bricolage to any discourse, I will be looking at bricolage as a strategy that selfconsciously engages with cultural and historical myths (as opposed to the
unconscious influences or subtle allusions that might be found in any novel),
borrows anthropological terminology related to myth, and deliberately subverts
the efforts of many postwar writers to “abandon” history, instead piecing together
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ancient and modern sensibilities.28 As used by the authors in this project,
bricolage indicates an attempt to find value in the past without idealizing it—a
different sort of bricolage than the playful or satirical forms characteristic of the
postmodern novel. Martin Roberts writes that, “Implicit in bricolage are the
notions of diversion, deviation, digression, détournement, of leading astray, the
unexpected swerving away of something from its normal, proper, or intended
path. Bricolage diverts cultural signs and texts from their usual trajectories, using
them for purposes different from, and even contradicting, their previous ones”
(14). Thus, it’s a repurposing that not only resuscitates but also transforms older
traditions, thereby sidestepping the dangers of pure nostalgia for a lost (or
imaginary) past.

Taken alone, none of these features is particularly elucidating. Many of the characteristics
I associate with myth have been highlighted by other scholars working within other
theoretical frameworks. Kristin Ross, for example, in her excellent survey of postwar
French cultural history, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, lingers on the temporalities of postwar
life—in particular, repetition and the “eternal present”—but attributes them to the
realities of factory work and unceasing consumption. In my reading, these kinds of
repetitions have the potential to operate in a more constructive manner. Likewise, a
preference for community over the individual is characteristic of an immense array of
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ideologies, from Communism to National Socialism to Christian democracy. Thus, it is
only when these features are viewed in tandem that the particularity of myth emerges.

Mythistory
Viewing World War II through the lens of myth is challenging not only because
of the negative associations with fascism, but also because myth and history are often
presented as antithetical terms. This can be traced back as far as the ancient Greeks and
the debate between Herodotus and Thucydides as to whether myth has a place in
historiography. In the modern context, myth has been viewed as particularly dangerous to
Hegelian and Marxist notions of history. Hegelian history is a dialectical progression,
while the temporal structure of myth is one of repetition, eternal presence, and/or ahistoricity, thus challenging faith in the impending revolution.29 I push back against this
neat division between the two terms, though I do argue that myth subverts traditional
historiography insofar as it rejects grand narratives, instead shifting the focus to
marginalized figures. This may seem counterintuitive; after all, myth is often criticized
for its totalizing impulses. Yet the authors examined here view myth as a means of
communicating with and representing communities that lay beyond the boundaries of
official discourse. As Michael Rothberg writes, anachronisms (which are an example of
mythic temporality) “can be powerfully subversive and demystifying in the ways that
they expose the ideological assumptions of historicist categorization” (25). Though the
more devoted Communists retained their faith in historical progression even after World
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War II, many other intellectuals were unable to reconcile the destruction of the war and
lack of revolutionary change with pure Marxist theory. For Pavese, Bataille, Simon, and
Morante, then, myth becomes a tool for combatting the worst impulses of history without
ignoring historical realities entirely—a means of engaging with history without
submitting to a naïve vision of progress.30
Given all the cultural baggage—and given that this project doesn’t use the word
in any traditional sense—why bother with myth at all? Why not turn to a less maligned
synonym? J.J. White, for example, distinguishes between myths and archetypes, where
mythology signifies a set of myths bound to one particular society, while archetype
denotes a more general meaning—some primitive or typical recurrent pattern of human
behavior. “Archetype” is surely a less loaded term, for even if the kinds of archetypes
identified by Karl Jung or Northrop Frye have fallen out of favor, what literary critic
could deny the existence of archetypes in novels, modern or otherwise? However, the
polyvalence of “myth” and its historical uses and abuses are precisely the point. To
engage with myth after the war was an undeniably political decision, and for these four
authors to do so represents a conscious decision to rehabilitate existing cultural artifacts,
rather than give in to the temptations of amnesia. The fact that it was a common tool of
fascist propaganda makes it even more powerful (though also more polemical) as a leftist
literary strategy.
For better or for worse, myth was very much a part of the daily lives of many
Europeans (both “primitive” and “enlightened”) prior to the war—hence the effectiveness
30
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of the fascist mobilization of myth. Dismissing myth as escapist or manipulative does not
efface its role in these figures’ lives—individuals who had lost much to the war and who
were therefore understandably hesitant to make a clean break from the myths that had
long structured their communities. Though many intellectuals, faced with the baggage of
myth and history, wanted to simply scrap it all and begin anew, the authors considered
here sought to recover something from contaminated discourses, recognizing that total
rupture would only exacerbate existing feelings of alienation and isolation.

The Lineup
In selecting Pavese, Bataille, Simon, and Morante as case studies of a mythic
mode of cognition, I do not intend to create any false equivalencies among them, or
group them into anything resembling a cohesive “movement.” “Stylistically” (whatever
we might take that word to mean), they are extremely diverse. Pavese is often labeled a
neorealist, while Simon is linked to the nouveau roman. Bataille has been deemed
nihilistic, Morante hopelessly utopian. However, each in her own way offers an
alternative to dominant literary, political, historical, and sociological trends in France and
Italy. For all four authors, myth emerges as a means of negotiating the tension between
individual aesthetic aims and collective political praxis, rehabilitating defunct paradigms
as an alternative to political pessimism.
Chapter One interrogates Cesare Pavese’s late novels, wherein timeless myths and
contemporary tragedies coexist palimpsestically. In direct opposition to the narrative of
World War II as an incommensurable, epoch-making event, Pavese presents the war as
simply the most recent iteration of the tragedy and violence that have defined the rural
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Italian experience since time immemorial. This folding of World War II into a mythical
notion of eternal recurrence has been criticized for belittling the severity and singularity
of contemporary violence, yet I contend that by inscribing the war within a complex and
enduring cultural narrative (rather than dismissing fascism as a mere parenthesis in
history, as Benedetto Croce was quick to do), Pavese posits myth as a means of
productively restructuring chaos in order to overcome its paralyzing illegibility. Though
the cyclical nature of Pavese’s myths would seem to damn characters to an ineluctable
fate, much like in Greek tragedy, I demonstrate that destiny is subverted by Pavese’s
advancement of repetition with a difference. In La luna e i falò, for example, the minor
variations between the narrator’s childhood and that of Cinto, the boy he later encounters,
create a space for political intervention; whereas the narrator lacked political
consciousness in his youth, he is able to imbue Cinto with such knowledge and thereby
offer him a means of resistance both to the aftereffects of fascist rule and to more deeply
ingrained forms of oppression.
In Chapter Two, I challenge the narrative of a radical rupture between Georges
Bataille’s overtly political pre-war thinking and his later writings, associated instead with
mysticism and eroticism. If Bataille seemed to change tack in the late 1930s, locating
political potential not in violence in the streets but rather in “inner experience,” the two
strategies, I argue, lead to the same result: the transfiguration of individual subjectivity
into a state of disindividuation, which in turn facilitates communication with the “other.”
Having recognized the impossibility of revitalizing modern man merely by imitating the
sacrifices and rituals of earlier cultures, Bataille’s pursuit of a modern mythic mentality
turned inward, toward meditation and poetry. That is, he posited internal corollaries to the
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external actions that initially dominated his thinking, ultimately projecting mythic fiction
into the position once occupied by sacrificial violence. I conclude the chapter with a close
reading of Bataille’s 1950 novel L’Abbé C, a complex collision of libertinage and
Resistance activities; the protagonist’s transgressive sexuality and strategically “useless”
betrayals, I argue, are presented as politically efficacious insofar as they serve the same
communicative, community-building function as the myths and rituals of “primitive”
societies.
My third chapter focuses on Claude Simon and the mythic temporalities operative
in his war narratives, including La Route des Flandres, La Bataille de Pharsale, and Les
Géorgiques. I contend that Simon’s seemingly abstract stylistics have much in common
with the primordial, concrete elements of myth and seek to correct for the overly
simplistic ideologies promulgated in many postwar literary circles. Just as Pavese was
able to locate a liberating potential in the otherwise grim repetitions of myth, Simon’s
mapping of archaic imagery onto the modern world does not cynically underscore the
inevitable repetition of tragedy, but rather provides comfort by projecting the individual
out of his isolated condition and into a collective one that transcends temporal and
cultural boundaries. If Simon returns again and again to the same episodes—the failure of
the Spanish Revolution, or the annihilation of the cavalrymen at the Battle of the
Meuse—he nonetheless presents the scenes with slight variations each time, thereby
exchanging traumatic repetition for the Deleuzian notion of “vertical repetition,” which is
dynamic and transgressive rather than fatalistic.
Finally, in Chapter Four I describe how the reception of Elsa Morante’s
bestselling yet highly controversial novel La Storia reflected persistent prejudices against
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both realism, seen as pitifully outdated, and myth, dismissed as dangerously
uncommitted. Her work, which placed highly detailed descriptions of the bombing of
Rome alongside lullabies, nursery rhymes, dragons, gnomes, and magical eggs, was
coded as regressive or reactionary at the time of publication—a moment when mounting
terrorist violence demanded rigorous commitment from writers and intellectuals. Yet I
argue that Morante reinvigorated the realist tradition by imbuing a traditional form with a
mythic, utopian sensibility. Reason alone, she insisted, cannot achieve revolutionary
change; poetry and imagination are equally (if not more) important for stirring men and
women to action. Though her novel is rife with politically charged characters, it is
ultimately the enchanted child Useppe who serves as Morante’s mouthpiece and most
effectively articulates the shortcomings of existing political strategies. I argue that
Useppe’s non-progressive experience of time marks an interruption, however small, in
the relentless, fatalistic march of history; by creatively re-imagining both space—with his
Edenic hideout in the middle of Rome—and language—with his mystical poems—
Useppe demonstrates the constructive endeavors toward which dissatisfaction and
estrangement may be channeled. The novel privileges the affective, mythic experiences
of women, children, the poor, the illiterate, and the elderly over official narratives of the
war, thereby challenging standard historiographic strategies and enacting a sort of
negative utopianism that retains hope for the future while acknowledging the apocalyptic
impulses of the present.
Without romanticizing “primitive” or “innocent” modes of existence à la
Rousseau, I want to take seriously these writers’ claims that notions like sacrality,
utopianism, and, of course, myth had a defensible, and even vital, role to play in postwar
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political life—especially considering the failures of mainstream leftist movements. I do
not attempt any sort of assessment of the “efficacy” of this mythic mode—such an
assessment would be both untenable and unproductive—but by more clearly articulating
what Pavese, Bataille, Simon, and Morante saw as the relationship between myth and
politics, I hope to move beyond the ossified narratives of postwar intellectual life.
As a final note, I should say that this project intervenes in fields with
intimidatingly robust bibliographies. There is a veritable industry of scholarship
surrounding the memory of World War II, intellectuals’ responses to modernization and
decolonization, artists’ political responsibilities, and even myth (though not in the precise
way used here). The novelty of my interrogation, then, lies in the way it weaves together
threads from each of these well-covered terrains, combining them in new ways in order to
reconsider the possibilities for both myth and engagement in the wake of World War II.
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Chapter One
Myth Takes Root: Pavese’s Politics of Place

Mythos e logos: per lunga tradizione sono concepiti come
termini antitetici, che dovrebbero designare realtà che si
escludono. […] Ma lo schema dicotomico del ragionare non
sembra più sufficiente. La coscienza mitica potrebbe anche
essere interpretata come un ampliamento e un arricchimento
della ragione. L’esperienza umana non è tutta compresa
nella dicotomia tra razionale e irrazionale. Fra questi due
campi emerge e si allarga l’ampia regione dell’a-razionale,
le comprensione irriflessa e abitudinaria del pre-compreso.
—Franco Ferrarotti
Il discorso letterario fu per Pavese […] fin da principio un
discorso anche politico.
–Italo Calvino

Pavese critics have long delighted in rooting out his “contradictions,” locating the
driving force of his narratives in the tension between dichotomous terms like
individual/collective, myth/reality, myth/history, symbolism/realism,
rationality/irrationality, and city/country, to name just a few. Italo Calvino, in an essay
composed for the tenth anniversary of Pavese’s death, cites the central theme of both his
fiction and his life as the “contrapposizione del vivere tragico al vivere voluttuoso”
(Pietra sopra 61).31 This framework is not without merit; Pavese admitted to many of
these contradictions in his diary, noting that he lived “in antinomie: voluttuoso-tragico,
vile-eroico, sensuale-ideale” (Mestiere 74). However, none of these pairings accounts for
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“E che cosa è l’essere tragicamente? La definizione di Pavese in quella pagina pare riguardi solo la
freddezza utilitaria del poeta che dà senso allo stato d’animo accettandolo in vista della sua
universalizzazione poetica […] essere tragicamente […] vuol dire trasformare il fuoco d’una tensione
esistenziale in un operare storico, fare della sofferenza o della felicità privata, queste immagini della nostra
morte, […] degli elementi di comunicazione e di metamorfosi, cioè delle forze di vita” (Calvino, Pietra
sopra 61).
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the role of politics within Pavese’s poetics. Though not present in all of his works,
ideological and/or political reflections play a central role in novels like Il compagno, La
casa in collina, and La luna e i falò, not to mention his essays for the Communist
newspaper l’Unità.32 When his political impulses are considered, they are almost
invariably pitted against his more “existential” streak—existential being a thinly veiled
code for solitary, decadent, or antisocial—with the latter painted as the stronger of the
two drives. Politics is likewise posited as incongruous with his engagement with myth: a
given work might be characterized as either political or mythical, but almost never both.
However, to speak of these terms as diametrically opposed would be inaccurate.33 A
more just appraisal might be that Pavese viewed myth as the wellspring for his writing,
though not as its end point. Myth was the germ of his poetry from which he was able to
progress from irrationality to rationality, weaving the two together in symbiotic harmony
in order to confront political challenges. He never intended to dwell indefinitely in the
realm of myth; his goal was to reduce myth to clarity, which also involved transitioning
from a-temporality to temporality, from the eternal to the historically contingent.34 In so
doing, he is able to link myth and politics, framing them as merely two steps in a single
process. Though his actions during World War II, as well as his representation of the
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Antonio Catalfamo views these three novels as Pavese’s “filone resistentiale” (Dialettica 78).
Calvino is one of the few to reject this strict separation, remarking in his introduction to Letteratura
americana e altri saggi, a posthumous collection of Pavese’s essays, that the categories used to organize
the book—“Scoperta dell’America,” “Letteratura e società,” “Il mito”—were more or less arbitrary: “Ma la
nostra è una suddivisione di comodo: si vedrà come questi interessi non siano mai disgiunti; gli stessi
motivi corrono da una parte all’altra del libro, e ne seguiamo la nascita e lo sviluppo attraverso le occasioni
più disparate” (xii).
34
In “Raccontare è monotono,” Pavese writes: “La ragione ultima – e prima – per cui ci s’induce a
comporre una favola, è la smania di ridurre a chiarezza l’indistinto-irrazionale che cova in fondo alla nostra
esperienza” (Letteratura americana 335). Though he uses the word “fable” here, the sentiment is equally
applicable to myth.
33
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resistance after the fact, would not be characterized as “committed” according to more
rigid Marxist definitions, this does not preclude the possibility of his rehabilitation as an
engaged writer. In fact, I will argue that Pavese’s marginal position vis-à-vis more
overtly political writers allowed him to constructively criticize overly-idealistic
depictions of partisan activity, both during and after the war, offering an alternative
means of approaching salient social issues.35
Critical opinion about Pavese is clearly divided. Some claim him as one of Italy’s
greatest modern writers, while others are dismissive of what they perceive to be his
outmoded decadentism, existential angst, and lack of political engagement.36 The
question of Pavese’s relationship to politics has haunted his reception from the start; at a
moment when his friends and colleagues were being jailed for antifascist activities, he
seemed more concerned with women and abstract poetic sentiment.37 His own
incarceration did little to ignite his political fervor; Il carcere, a fictionalized account of
his time in exile, makes almost no mention of politics, focusing instead on the
protagonist’s loneliness and erotic fantasies. He failed to join the partisans after the fall of
Mussolini in 1943, and though he became a card-carrying member of the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) in 1945, his interest in myth, primitivism, and irrationality
35

Of course, this “alternative” approach was not without risk. Luca Doninella writes that, “Pavese è forse
(…) il più fuori moda fra gli scrittori della nostra storia recente; in un certo senso, il meno facilmente
recuperabile, assimilabile: e dunque – diciamola tutta – il più dimenticato” (qtd. in Catalfamo, Dialettica
11).
36
“La critica di sinistra accusò Paese di ‘decadentismo’ e di ‘irrazionalismo,’ quella ‘tradizionalista di
avere distorto i modelli classici in funzione di una analisi speculativa di tipo esistenzialista e psicanalitico”
(Catalfamo, Dialettica 16).
37
In a somewhat ironic turn of events, Pavese’s one brush with the law occurred because of a woman. He
agreed to hold letters for a female acquaintance, hoping to impress her with his obsequiousness, only to be
arrested when the police discovered said letters. Pavese, like many intellectuals of the period, was
sentenced to confino, or internal exile, in Brancaleone Calabro. However, despite his abuse at the hands of
the fascists, this event did not seem to increase his interest in politics.
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continually set him apart from his leftist peers and put him at odds with the party’s
directives. Though many of Pavese’s contemporaries, including Italo Calvino and Elio
Vittorini, defended his political eccentricities, the fact remains that, at a moment when
the notion of littérature engagée was gaining momentum, Pavese was penning imaginary
dialogues between Greek mythological figures.38
Pavese scholarship can therefore be split into two competing camps: one strand
focuses on the poetic and mythic dimensions of his work, while isolating Pavese from the
historical and political events that shaped his generation.39 The second strand remains
invested in Pavese’s biography (with a particular focus on his diary, Il mestiere di vivere
(1952)), but with undue attention devoted to his isolation, existential angst, and suicide.
Any so-called political engagement is dismissed out of hand as performed in bad faith.
The purpose of my intervention is to combine these two critical trends, one
focused on myth, the other on Pavese’s life, in order to demonstrate that Pavese’s study
and deployment of myth was in fact a form of engagement (in the Sartrean sense) with
notable consequences for the representation of World War II, the role of the intellectual,
and the position of the PCI in postwar Italian cultural life. Furthermore, his use of myth
helped to rehabilitate the concept in the wake of its instrumentalization by the fascists.
Much of the Communist resistance to myth stemmed from the fear of its propagandistic
effects on the masses. However, in response to comments from Franco Fortini on the
risks posed by “cose primitive ed arcaiche,” Pavese reassured him that “il pericolo da lui
38

This is the premise of Dialoghi con Leucò (1947), which Pavese considered his magnum opus.
Antonio Catalfamo is unrelenting in his critique of these binary responses to Pavese: “In realtà, la critica
letteraria italiana continua ad essere vittima dei limiti del passato, delle letture puramente simboliche che
furono date dell’opera dantesca e dell’interpretazione crociana, che, chiusa nella sua distinzione e
contrapposizione tra ‘struttura’ e ‘poesia,’ escludeva, per l’appunto, che si potesse fare poesia della storia”
(Mito 279).
39
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prospettato non sussiste perché è chiaro che il folclore e la mentalità mitica interessano il
politico ‘scientifico’ come accadimenti, come fenomeni da ridurre al più presto a chiara
razionalità, a legge storica” (qtd in Lajolo 277). I therefore maintain that he was just as
concerned as his peers with the political responsibilities of the writer, and that his
decision to approach engagement through the lens of myth reflects his dissatisfaction
with existing modes of commitment, rather than evasion. If, as Calvino insists, Pavese is
an exemplary figure for postwar Italian writers, representing a wider intellectual crisis,
then his hesitations and inconsistencies in the political realm are crucial to our
understanding of the postwar climate in Italy, and his decision to superimpose politics
and myth could offer a valuable tool for re-interpreting World War II and its aftermath.40

“Non fate troppi pettegolezzi”
Cesare Pavese was born on September 9, 1908, in Santo Stefano Belbo. Though
raised and educated in Turin, his family returned to Santo Stefano each summer, and the
rural community left an indelible mark on Pavese’s writing; the city/country dichotomy is
a common theme in both his poetry and prose. A great admirer and translator of
American literature, Pavese graduated from the University of Turin in 1930 with a thesis
on Walt Whitman. Much of his early career was dedicated to critical essays on American
writers, ranging from Sinclair Lewis to Herman Melville to William Faulkner (a fact that
some used against him, accusing him of antipatriotic and exoticist tendencies). He also
40

In his introduction to La letteratura americana e altri saggi, Calvino writes: “Il valore di questi scritti,
però, non sta solo nella documentazione di un cammino culturale individuale; l’esperienza di Pavese è stata
esemplare e cruciale di tutta una generazione letteraria, quella cresciuta sotto il fascismo, quella che avvertì
nuovi bisogni e fece una svolta, una sortita (letteraria e morale) nuova, e poi – morto il fascismo – si trovò
di fronte ancora altri problemi, e ancora alterna speranze e inquietudini” (xi-xii).
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translated a number of canonical American novels, including Moby Dick, Of Mice and
Men, and The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas.
Pavese was fourteen when Mussolini seized power, inaugurating a period of
stifled creative and intellectual freedom. Turin, however, was a hotbed of political
dissidence, welcoming such antifascist leaders as Antonio Gramsci and Piero Gobetti.
Though Pavese was certainly not a militant antifascist, his discovery of American
literature had political valences. Many years later, he acknowledged that, “A questo
punto la cultura americana divenne per noi qualcosa di molto serio e prezioso […] Ci si
accorse, durante quegli anni di studio, che l’America non era un altro paese, un nuovo
inizio della storia, ma soltanto il gigantesco teatro dove con maggiore franchezza che
altrove veniva recitato il drama di tutti” (Letteratura americana 194-95). America, in
Pavese’s personal mythology, became a symbol of liberty, creativity, and communicative
potential. He praised American slang for its originality and capacity to more effectively
bridge the gap between words and objects.
At the University of Turin, Pavese fell in with a group of writers, artists, and
intellectuals, including the likes of Leone Ginzburg and Carlo Levi, whose opposition to
Mussolini was more pronounced than his own. Ginzburg and Levi were both leaders in
the antifascist movement Giustizia e Libertà, for which they were arrested in 1935.
Pavese, though not formally a member, was likewise jailed, both for his association with
known resistance leaders, and for carrying politically compromising letters on behalf of a
female acquaintance. Like many dissidents of the period, Pavese was sentenced to
confino, or internal exile; he spent roughly a year in Brancaleone Calabro, at the southern
tip of Italy. Though the experience seems to have affected his personal life more than his
36

political one (the woman with whom he was in love married someone else during his
absence), the displacement was important for at least two reasons: first, it is during this
period that he began his now famous diary (published in 1952 as Il mestiere di vivere),
and second, it put him in contact with the poverty, oppression, and, perhaps most
importantly, mythic mentality of rural southern Italians. These themes became central to
Pavese’s poetics; indeed, the political stakes of the so-called “problem of the South”
weighed on the minds of many exiled intellectuals.41
Prior to his confinement, Pavese had published one collection of verse, Lavorare
stanca, but by 1940 he had made the transition to prose. In 1941, he published two
novels: La Spiaggia and Paesi tuoi, the latter of which treats the violence and fatalism of
Italian peasant life. From 1941 to 1946 there was a gap in his literary output, a reflection
of the difficulties (both artistic and logistical) of publishing in the middle of a world
war.42 In response to the Allied bombing campaign in 1943, Pavese was forced to flee
Turin to the surrounding hills. Many partisans, including a number of Pavese’s friends,
made those hills their base of operations as they sought to eradicate the remaining fascist
forces. Pavese, however, forewent direct participation in the fighting, instead retreating to
his sister’s home in Serralunga di Crea. This period of hiding also corresponds with a
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Vincent Crapanzano describes the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) as: “those impoverished lands that have
for centuries provided the (Northern) Italian geographical, political, and literary imaginary with defining
alterity. Sixteenth-century Jesuits referred to the South as an Italian India. […] The South was – and still is
at varying levels of consciousness – the space of the primitive, of superstition, the irrational, magic,
desiccation, and death. It has also been characterized as the land of violent emotion, explosive passion,
ruthless exploitative, pervasive corruption, and insidious mistrust. It has been a privileged space of
ethnographic and folkloristic investigation which, until scholars like de Martino turned their attention to it,
rarely looked with a critical eye on their own fascination with it and the implications of that fascination for
their understanding of the South and, in consequence, the North” (vii).
42
The offices of the Einaudi publishing house (where Pavese was employed) were temporarily occupied by
fascist forces.
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sudden resurgence of interest in religion. Pavese sought refuge for a period in a
monastery (a fictional account of which occurs in La casa in collina), which only served
to exacerbate his religious fervor. Nonetheless, Catholicism never fully took hold, and
following the war, he returned to a more humanistic approach to religious sentiment.
The postwar period (1945-1950) was Pavese’s most prolific. He published no
fewer than nine works, ranging from the overtly political Il compagno (1947) to the
poetic and mythical Dialoghi con Leucò (1947), and culminating in La luna e i falò
(1950) which, perhaps more than any other novel, effectively blends his political and
mythical impulses. He continued to work as an editor at the Einaudi Publishing House,
having joined the enterprise at Giulio Einaudi’s bidding in 1933.
On August 26, 1950, Pavese rented a hotel room, made a few telephone calls, and
took an overdose of sleeping pills. Most scholars blame his suicide on a failed love affair
with American actress Constance Dowling, though his letters and diary reveal that he had
toyed with the idea from a young age. In true literary fashion, he chose to end his life in
the same manner as one of his characters, mimicking a scene from Tra donne sole. A
copy of Dialoghi con Leucò (which he considered his magnum opus) was discovered on
his bedside table, with the inscription: “Perdono tutti e a tutti chiedo perdono. Va bene?
Non fate troppi pettegolezzi.” He was forty-one years old.

Decadentism, Neorealism, and Other –isms
In order to understand both Pavese’s artistic formation, as well as the reasoning
behind the critical response to his work, it is necessary to situate him within his historical
moment and examine the literary and political trends to which he was responding. His
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early poetry has frequently been compared to the likes of Gabriele D’Annunzio or
Giacomo Leopardi—that is, marked by a decidedly decadent or pessimistic streak.
Though composed during the height of fascist rule, the poems of Lavorare stanca, for
example, do not address contemporary political issues, instead focusing on nature and the
life of the peasant, thus indicating some residue of early twentieth-century (and even late
nineteenth-century) poetic modes.
However, Pavese’s most prolific period (1945-1950) roughly overlaps with the
short-lived yet immensely influential neorealist movement.43 Though often considered
more of a cinematic style than a literary one (a view that Pavese promulgated),
neorealism arose from “the collective experience of the war itself, the civil war, and the
Resistance which trigger[ed] the explosion of a ‘committed’ narrative practice in both
Italian literature and film, as well as an intense debate over the political and ideological
function of art, and a search for a new realism and new modes of expression” (Re 12).44
Neorealism, though stylistically diverse, included the use of such subgenres as memoires,
diaries, sketches, short docufiction, and chronicles in order to narratively reconstruct the
recent past.
The term “neorealist” was used to describe Pavese in a 1941 review of his novel
Paesi tuoi, and despite his stylistic shifts near the end of the decade, he is still often
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The word “movement” may be too strong; in his introduction to the 1964 edition of Il sentiero dei nidi di
ragno, Calvino writes that neorealism was not a school, instead comprising “un insieme di voci, in gran
parte periferiche, una molteplice scoperta delle diverse Italie, anche – o specialmente – delle Italie fino
allora più inedite per la letteratura” (9).
44
Pavese not only noted that “questa parola [neo-realismo] ha soprattutto oggi un senso
cinematografico”— he also bemoaned the fact that the same word was used as a compliment when applied
to film, and an accusation when applied to literature: “Come avviene che la stessa etichetta definisca con
lode una cinematografia e con biasimo una narrativa, che pure sono nate contemporaneamente sullo stesso
terreno?” (Letteratura americana 292).
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linked with the movement.45 It is important to note, however, that neorealism bears little
affinity with either realism (in the nineteenth-century Balzacian sense) or socialist
realism (the genre officially advocated by the Communist party). Indeed, many neorealist
writers engaged with non-realist genres like fables, fairy tales, and myths, convinced that
such “folk” material more effectively captured the experience of working class or rural
Italians. Calvino’s Il sentiero dei nidi di ragno, for example, often considered a
cornerstone of neorealist fiction, in many ways reads like a fairy tale, more redolent of
Treasure Island than For Whom the Bell Tolls.46 Today, the label most commonly
applied to Pavese is “symbolic realist,” referring to his efforts to combine “la ricchezza
d’esperienze del realismo a la profondità di sensi del simbolismo” (Mestiere 166). Thus,
he drew both from the “decadent” symbolism of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century poets and the neorealism of the postwar period, struggling to join them in a
constructive manner without effacing the particularity of either trend.
Though he officially joined the Communist Party in 1945 and frequently wrote for
their newspaper, l’Unità, he soon felt alienated by the party’s increasingly ideological
approach to literature: socialist realism, or Zhdavonism, was the order of the day.47
However, I contend that his comments on the poetic vacuousness of overly ideological
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In fact, in his preface to Il sentiero dei nidi di ragno, Calvino credits Pavese as one of the “founders” of
neorealism: “Ci eravamo fatta una linea, ossia una specie di triangolo: I Malavoglia, Conversazione in
Sicilia, Paesi tuoi, da cui partire” (9).
46
It was Pavese, in fact, who first spoke of the fairy-tale quality in Calvino’s writing (see Calvino’s preface
to Il sentiero dei nidi di ragno, p. 17).
47
Critics have offered several explanations for this sudden entry into politics, including guilt over his
failure to join the partisans and/or a desire to honor his friend Giaime Pintor, who was killed for his part in
the Resistance. Regardless of his reasons, he quickly found the literary directives of the party stifling.
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texts do not reveal, as some claim, a lack of commitment, but rather a profound mistrust
of the particular form of commitment being promulgated in the postwar period.48
Pavese was by no means the only writer to gradually distance himself from the
restrictive dictates of the party. Vittorini, director of the Communist journal Il Politecnico
from 1945-47, got caught up in a very public dispute with Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the
PCI; Calvino similarly framed his own work as a provocative response to the pressure to
politicize literature:
Cominciava appena allora il tentativo d’una “direzione politica” dell’attività
letteraria: si chiedeva allo scrittore di creare “l’eroe positivo”, di dare immagini
normative, pedagogiche di condotta sociale, di milizia rivoluzionaria. […] La mia
reazione d’allora potrebbe essere enunciata così: “Ah, si, volete ‘eroe socialista’?
Volete il ‘romanticismo rivoluzionario’? E io vi scrivo una storia di partigiani in
cui nessuno è eroe, nessuno ha coscienza di classe.” (“Prefazione” 14)
For intellectuals across the nation, the untempered enthusiasm and optimism of the
Liberation quickly ceded to disillusionment and frustration, as the PCI made numerous
concessions in its efforts to form coalitions. These machinations ultimately backfired; the
Christian Democrats, led by Alcide De Gasperi, secured a sweeping victory in the April
1948 elections, effectively shutting the Communists out of government.49 In his
introduction to Pavese’s La Letteratura americana e altri saggi, Calvino notes the mix of
euphoric optimism and sadness that runs through Pavese’s 1946 article “Dialoghi col

48

“La costrizione ideologica esercitata sull’atto della poesia trasforma senz’altro i leopardi e le aquile in
agnelli e tacchini” (Letteratura americana 333).
49
At least some of the credit for De Gasperi’s victory goes to the Americans, who supported him in an
effort to stem the rising tide of Communist influence. The CIA admits to donating upwards of one million
dollars to his campaign, and they have been accused of forging letters to discredit the PCI.
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compagno,” a tone that we might consider emblematic of that fluctuating period in Italian
history.50
We can see, then, that Pavese stood precariously balanced between two poetic
ideals—decadentism and neorealism—each associated with a distinct historical moment.
Despite criticism from his former teacher and mentor Augusto Monti, who urged him to
leave his childish abstractions behind, he remained firmly committed to the goal of
reconciling his passion for myth, primitivism, and irrationality—widely popular in the
early part of the twentieth-century, but viewed with suspicion after World War II—with
the political urgency of the postwar era.
Rather than viewing Pavese’s œuvre as driven by the fundamental tension
between two incompatible strands of thought, I assert that the myths speak directly to
political problems—without falling victim to propaganda (either fascist or Communist),
and without sacrificing complexity in the name of ideological coherence. His oscillation
between private and public, existential and political, myth and logos was a natural
consequence of his search for new modes of “committed” expression that were less
ideologically programmatic. The ways in which Pavese has been read up until this point
are thus more representative of his readers’ dogmatism than of his own principles.
Vincenzo Binetti claims that Pavese was not relegated to the margins of the intellectual
world, but rather intentionally sought this position as a means of fighting mainstream
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“I dialoghi operai del 1946 posson parere dettati da un euforico ottimismo, di giungere a una
comunicazione totale, d’abbattere la barrier, spiegare tutto, capire e far capire tutto: ma c’è dentro una vena
di tristezza che affiora sovente, un presagio di ripiegamento su se stesso” (Letteratura americana xxvxxvi).
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dogma; if we accept this reading, then naturally his style of “commitment” would take a
different form than that of his contemporaries.51
In this chapter, I draw from a wide range of Pavese’s texts in order to tease out his
definitions of terms like myth, symbol, reality, poetry, and impegno. I conclude with a
close reading of his final novel, La luna e i falò (1950), which I view as an ideal synthesis
of his mythical and political thinking. Pavese’s decision to address partisan warfare,
Communist ideology, and the mythic rituals of rural Italy in a single novel reflects his
views of the enduring role of mythology in the everyday lives of Italians and the failure
of the war to stamp out perennial oppression. This convergence of myth and
sociohistorical reality opened up new possibilities for political commitment, ones that
were explored by figures like Calvino in his later, more fantastic works.52 Though the
readers of the late 1940s were not quite ready for Pavese’s brand of commitment (which
they perceived as defeatist), interest in Pavese reached a fever pitch in the 1970s. Antonio
Catalfamo attributes this phenomenon to intellectuals’ growing dissatisfaction with the
inefficacy of leftist politics, a fact that Pavese had already observed some three decades
earlier.

51

Binetti writes that, “La contemporaneità di Pavese risiede dunque nella sua diversità, nel suo porsi ai
margini, opponendo alle coerenze programmatiche di quell momento culturale, una cosciente volontà
disgregante e provocatoria che mettesse in risalto le incrinature ed i limiti di un sistema propenso invece a
stabilire, tra i membri della collettività, accomodanti ed inquietanti certezze” (Vita imperfetta 135).
52
Il barone rampante, for example, published in 1957, is often considered a fabulistic response to
Calvino’s disapproval of Communist policy—most notably, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. He
withdrew from the PCI following the invasion, publishing an explanation of his decision in L’Unità.
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I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means
One of the difficulties of discussing Pavese’s engagement with myth is that he
rarely used the word in the same manner as his contemporaries, and his own definition
emerged only piecemeal (and not without the occasional contradiction). Nonetheless, I
will attempt a preliminary synthesis of his reflections on myth. First and foremost, Pavese
regretted the negative connotations the word had attracted in Italian culture and rejected
any mystical overtones in favor of a more historical definition of the word:
La parola mito è a ragione oggi alquanto screditata. Ma adoperandola per indicare
quell’interiore immagine estatica, embrionale, gravida di sviluppi possibili, che è
all’origine di qualunque creazione poetica, non crediamo di parlare un linguaggio
mistico né estetizzante. Semplicemente, condensiamo in una parola un complesso
discorso storico e una convinta poetica che su di esso si appoggia e si giustifica.
(Letteratura americana 345)
Furthermore, though he takes Greek mythology as his starting point in Dialoghi con
Leucò, his intention is not to reproduce classical myths in a modern context, but rather to
use them as a schema onto which he can map modern social concerns: “Non certo rifare i
miti greci, ma seguire la loro impostazione fantastica (inutile dire che è impossibile, dati i
tempi di ‘lumi’—per questo digrigno i denti e mi magio le unghie)” (qtd. in Lajolo 218).
Thus, Pavese’s conception of myth has little to do with either classical texts or mysticism,
being grounded instead in historical discourse and poetic conviction. And as outlined in
the introduction, Pavesian myth presents itself through a combination of non-linear
temporality, non-rationality, community, fusion, and bricolage.
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Fuori del tempo
Pavese frequently writes about myth as existing outside of time: “qualcosa, per
accadere, ha bisogno d’esser già accaduto, d’essere stato fondato fuori del tempo. Il mito
è ciò che accade-riaccade infinite volte nel mondo sublunare eppure è unico, fuori del
tempo, così come una festa ricorrente si svolge ogni volta come fosse la prima, in un
tempo che è il tempo della festa, del non-temporale, del mito” (Letteratura americana
345-46). Initially, the sort of universality implied by non-temporality might seem
incommensurable with the historically specific political exigencies of postwar Italy.
However, mythic temporality plays two important functions in the context of war
representation: first, it connects singular, unprecedented events—events that resist
representation—to comprehensible times and spaces, thus offering a means of working
through the trauma of the war, and second, it is representative of the temporality
experienced by many peasants in rural communities (especially in the South). Stasis
characterized both their natural surroundings (via seasonal repetition) as well as the
passage from one generation to the next. Furthermore, Pavese never abandoned history in
favor of mythic time, but rather sought to reconcile the a-temporality of poetic
contemplation with the temporal aspects of everyday reality: “Ciò che affascina Pavese è
dunque la possibilità di conciliare le componenti metastoriche del mito e quindi il
momento contemplative dell’ispirazione poetica con la immediatezza del reale: ‘mettere
l’assoluto in un rapporto umano, ecco il desiderio grandioso e pazzo di quest’uomo’”
(Binetti, Vita imperfetta 112). While maintaining a properly Marxist vision of the writer
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as historically and economically determined, he also viewed myth and poetry as a
potential transcendence of those conditions.53
The “eternal” aspect of myth emerges through its repeatability: “A questo temps
retrouvé non manca del mito genuino nemmeno la ripetibilità, la facoltà cioè di
reincarnarsi in ripetizioni, che appaiono e sono creazioni ex novo, così come la festa
ricelebra il mito e insieme lo instaura come se ogni volta fosse la prima” (Letteratura
americana 302). This notion of repetition has both positive and negative connotations for
Pavese. On the positive end of the spectrum, we have the possibility of connecting in a
meaningful way with the past, which Pavese views as a prime source of creativity:
“Ebbero molto più senso del passato i popoli ai primordi della storia che non i successivi.
Quando un popolo non ha più un senso vitale del suo passato si spegne. La vitalità
creatrice è fatta di una riserva di passato. Si diventa creatori – anche noi – quando si ha
un passato. La giovinezza dei popoli è una ricca vecchiaia (genius is wisdom and youth)”
(Mestiere 155). However, this insistence on the perpetuation of older stories and practices
does not preclude the possibility of innovation or modernization; for Pavese, the eternal is
merely a starting point from which one then enters history: “Se tutto si ripete, non si
ripete mai allo stesso modo, e in questa diversità s’inserisce la dimensione storica,
l’intervento dell’uomo buono” (Catalfamo, Dialettica 261). Myth metamorphoses into
other forms, thus linking the a-temporal to the temporal in productive ways: “Veduto
dall’interno, un mito evidentemente è una rivelazione, un assoluto, un attimo

53

“Che ciascuno di noi – anche lo scrittore – sia radicato in una data situazione, in una classe, in uno
storico conflitto inevitabile, è vero. Ma è vero, altrettanto che, quando si prende in mano la penna per
narrare sul serio, tutto è già accaduto, si chiudono gli occhi e si ascolta una voce che è fuori dal tempo”
(Letteratura americana 280).
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intemporale, ma per la sua stessa natura tende a farsi storia, ad accadere tra gli uomini, a
diventare cioè poesia o teoria, con ciò negandosi come mito, come fuori-del-tempo, a
sottoponendosi all’indagine genetico-causale degli storici” (Letteratura americana 349).
Pavese argues that myth is never myth the first time it appears; it becomes myth in
subsequent iterations. Thus, the repetitions that occur across an individual’s lifetime are
not experienced as identical repetitions. In “Del mito, del simbolo e d’altro,” Pavese
insists that as a child, we fail to appreciate the mythic power of that which we behold; it
is only when we experience it a second time that its true value emerges: “Poiché,
rigorosamente, non esiste un ‘veder le cose la prima volta’: quella che conta è sempre una
seconda” (Letteratura americana 302). Myth, then, is the combinatory effect of a firsttime (a childhood experience) and a second-time (the return of said experience as an
adult)—a repetition that imparts meaning to the quotidian.
On the negative side of the spectrum, repetition possesses the ability to trap men
in an irrefutable destiny. Destiny, too, is defined by its temporality; it is that which is
fixed in time: “Una vita appare destino quando inaspettatamente si rivela esemplare e
fissata da sempre. Dal groviglio del banale-imprevisto esce una figura essenzialerisaputa” (Letteratura americana 342). Pavese goes on to discuss destiny’s rhythm—a
rhythm of perpetual returns: “Un destino non è altro che un ritmo, una cadenza di ritorni
previsti nel gioco di una libertà tutta tesa” (Letteratura americana 343). Repetition with a
difference is thus essential to interrupting mythic recurrences before they doom
characters to an ineluctable fate. Though Pavese often adopts a wistful, reverent tone
when writing about nature or childhood, he does not advocate an indefinite perpetuation
of those “ideal” states through eternal repetition, instead facilitating incremental change
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through minor differences. Thus, when Anguilla, the protagonist of La Luna e i falò,
encounters Cinto, a boy whose experiences and social status seem to mark him as
Anguilla’s duplicate, Anguilla strives to impart some political consciousness to the boy—
consciousness that he himself did not acquire till much later in life—in order to open up a
different path for him. Though it is unclear whether the advice takes—his friend, Nuto,
despite being a devoted Communist, is skeptical of the possibility of change—the seed of
revolution has nonetheless been planted.

Il selvaggio
Pavese frequently maps the tension between rational and irrational worldviews
onto the city/country dichotomy. The majority of his novels are set in rural locations (or
feature city-dwellers pining for their rustic origins). However, despite some romantic
residues in his thinking, Pavese’s appreciation for nature is not merely a holdover from
romanticism, wherein nature serves as the embodiment of innocence and purity. On the
contrary, Pavese often portrays nature as hostile and potentially deadly. Though he draws
a clear contrast between city and country, the moral attributes that he applies to each
locale are malleable. In early works like Paesi tuoi, it is the city, not nature, which
assumes a positive valence within Pavese’s schema. The country is a place of violence—
primordial, irrational violence stemming from centuries of poverty and oppression. The
city, as the symbol of class ascension, offers the only means of escape. In later works, the
terms are inverted and the city is viewed as a corruptive influence. In Il diavolo sulle
colline, for example, it is Poli, the friend who visits from the city and who has
successfully transitioned from a mere country boy to a member of Turin high society,
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who is prey to self-destructive impulses and threatens to infect his boyhood friends. In
the end, neither city nor country retains its redemptive potential. In La luna e i falò,
Anguilla criticizes residents of both locales: the peasants for their downtrodden
acceptance of abuse at the hands of the landlords and their decision to direct that
frustration toward their own families; and the city folk for their superficiality,
exploitation, and greed. Brian Moloney identifies war as the great leveler that leads
Pavese to view both city and country as equally likely to house “il selvaggio.”54
What is most germane to this discussion, however, is the fact that the
“irrationality” associated with rural locales, though coded as violent, is not presented as a
strictly negative phenomenon. On the contrary, in Pavese’s later novels “irrationality”
emerges as a powerful, untapped force, and thus a catalyst for political progress. The city
may be linked to order, reason, and social mobility, but it is also cut off from myth and
tradition and thus cannot provide the social change Pavese yearns for. In La luna e i falò,
Anguilla feels compelled to return to the “barbaric” countryside of his childhood, despite
his financial successes in America. While he mocks his friend Nuto for spouting
“ignorant” superstitions, it’s not long before he, too, adopts a quasi-mythical position
towards nature, lovingly anthropomorphizing the grapevines: “rimuginavo che non c’è
niente di più bello di una vigna ben zappata, ben legata, con le foglie giuste e quell’odore
della terra cotta dal sole d’agosto. Una vigna ben lavorata è come un fisico sano, un corpo
che vive, che ha il suo respiro e il suo sudore” (40).
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“War, however, reveals that the ‘selvaggio’ is an omnipresent threat, both in the city (as with the rat in
the ruins of the bombed house in La casa in collina) and in the country (as we see with the bodies of the
‘repubblichini’ in La luna e i falò)” (Moloney 119).
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Even when striving for rational conclusions, Pavese acknowledged the limitations
of reason:
Possiamo, dunque, individuare una prima dimensione del mito pavesiano, quella
che definiamo ‘razionale.’ È necessaria, però, una precisazione. Questa
definizione si riferisce al fatto che Pavese analizza il mito attraverso la ragione,
per ‘ridurlo a chiarezza.’ Ma egli è, nel contempo, consapevole dei limiti della
ragione, che, ciononostante, è l’unico strumento che l’uomo ha a disposizione per
comprendere il mondo. Nel suo processo di ‘regressione’ verso l’inconscio e il
passato, fino ai primordi, lo scrittore incontra anche elementi ‘irrazionali’ e ‘arazionali.’ Quel che importa qui rilevare è che Pavese ha superato, grecamente, la
contrapposizione tra ‘mito’ e ‘logos,’ che, purtroppo, caratterizza ancora tanta
parte della cultura moderna.” (Catalfamo, Mito 251-52)
Working in opposition to both Crocean and Marxist visions of rationality, which
frequently displayed an ethnocentric snobbism towards the superstitions and rituals of the
South, Pavese argued that such rituals should in fact lead “enlightened” individuals to
scrutinize their own conception of reality, especially given rationalism’s failure to
address modern alienation. In this, he builds off of Ernst Cassirer’s theorization of myth,
wherein man is not a rational animal, but a symbolic one.55 For Cassirer, to treat myth as
a false representation of the world, one waiting to be “corrected” by a properly rational
representation, is to ignore the wider range of human intellectual power. Pavese sought to
recuperate this wider range of experiences, arguing that myth was valuable not in spite of
its irrationality, but precisely because of it.

Pavese e il popolo
Many of Pavese’s protagonists suffer from a crippling sense of isolation (which
scholars have frequently read as autobiographical); the collection Prima che il gallo
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See Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 2. As I discuss later in the chapter, Pavese also
associated symbolism with myth.
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canti, for example, which comprises the novels Il carcere and La casa in collina,
thematizes the painful inability to relinquish isolation and self-interest in the face of the
struggles of others, and the lonely remorse of the uncommitted. Yet these characters also
express a strong desire to join a community or cause, whether political, religious, or
merely fraternal. In many cases, the community they seek is linked to a homeland;
Anguilla, for example, though a bastard with no familial ties to his village, feels
compelled to return there as an adult. Having experienced the hyper-individualism of
America, he longs for the community in which he was born, to the point of rejecting the
people, the stars, and the wine anywhere else.56 As Paolo Milano explains, “Pavese is
haunted by the feeling that modern life has no roots. Our life is either mechanical or
utopian, practical or fanatical. Amid the poverty-stricken people of backward countries,
sap is still flowing, but it may very well dry up soon” (xiii). Thus, Pavese’s turn to myth
is motivated by a desire to keep the sap flowing, as it were. The theme of man’s
fundamental isolation is ubiquitous in modern Italian poetry; what sets Pavese apart is
that he tries to solve this problem by revitalizing a mythic mentality, which might in turn
revitalize marginalized communities.
Pavese’s non-fiction also reveals a sustained concern with writers’ relationships to
the masses.57 Though the literary profession has often suffered from accusations of ivory
tower escapism, for Pavese writing was one of the few occupations that allowed a
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Staring at the sky one evening in California, for example, he reflects, “Capii nel buio, in quell’odore di
giardino e di pini, che quelle stelle non erano le mie, che come Nora e gli avventori mi facevano paura. Le
uova al lardo, le buone paghe, le arance grosse come angurie, non erano niente […] Valeva la pena esser
venuto?” (17).
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See, for example, “Il comunismo e gli intellettuali” and “Dialoghi col compango” in Letteratura americana
e altri saggi.
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convergence of “io” and “noi,” of solitude and communion: “È bello scrivere perché
riunisce le due gioie: parlare da solo e parlare a una folla” (Mestiere 273). Pavese writes
of the movement from individual to collective as one of maturation, whereby the force of
the individual artist is transferred to collective symbols:
I simboli, creati da una cultura con sforzi individuali, diventano operanti e fanno
maturità quando assurgano a simboli collettivi – il passaggio di una cultura a
un’altra più complessa è come il passaggio dalla mitologia di un creatore singolo
a una mitologia collettiva. Se lo sforzo benemerito di un singolo uomo o di una
singola città non deve servire a tutti i volenterosi, non si capisce a chi deva
servire. (Letteratura americana 363)
Pavese insists that reality becomes more comprehensible when viewed through the lens
of the collective (that is, when all the resources of a group are available and one is no
longer limited by individual interpretation):
La nostra definizione di mito avverte che di questo si può parlare soltanto quando
incarni una realtà inafferrabile. Ma ne esiste tutta una classe dove la realtà è
afferrabilissima quando si tenga presente ch’essa supera la sfera individuale e
richiama un’esperienza collettiva, vale a dire afferrabile da chi raccolga la
cangiante materia dei successivi sedimenti accumulati da un intero gruppo umano
(Letteratura americana 335).
If reality seems to be inscrutable, it is perhaps because the individual has yet to finish
probing it to the point that his interests coincide with those of the group.
To return once more to the lingering influence of romanticism on Pavese’s poetics,
a comment from his diary succinctly expresses his interest in the convergence of
individuality and cosmic totality for romantic poets:
È curioso come il Romanticismo, che passa per la scoperta e la protesta
dell’individuo, dell’originalità, del genio, sia tutto pervaso di una ansia d’unità, di
totalità cosmica; e abbia inventato i miti della caduta dalla primitiva Unità e
ricercato i mezzi (poesia, amore, progresso storico, contemplazione della natura,
magia, ecc.) per ricomporla. Prova di questa tendenza è la creazione di tanti
concetti collettivi (la nazione, il popolo, il cristianesimo, il germanesimo, il
gotico, la latinità, ecc.) (Mestiere 225)
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Thus, even if we accept the accusations of isolationism and overly existential
contemplation that were leveled against Pavese, the fact remains that “individual” and
“collective” are not mutually exclusive terms. Though the community Pavese imagined
was not entirely in line with mainstream Marxist conceptions of the term, he nonetheless
sought to mobilize existing myths and rituals in order to revive declining communal
structures.

In Search of Lost Unity
Pavese’s fiction reveals a definite preoccupation with childhood; child characters,
as well as adult protagonists reminiscing about their childhoods, populate his novels. This
is due in part to the fact that childhood is the age at which one’s relationship to myth is
most salient. It is the stage during which we are in closest contact with the world, when
the barrier between word and world (between signifier and signified) is malleable, when
we are immersed in myth without being aware of it: “Nessun bambino ha coscienza di
vivere in un mondo mitico. […] La ragione è che negli anni mitici il bambino ha assai di
meglio da fare che dare un nome al suo stato” (Letteratura americana 302). In such a
state, poetry emerges spontaneously as an unfettered reflection of nature.
Pavese made no secret of his appreciation for Giambattista Vico, the eighteenthcentury philosopher and historian whose most famous work, La scienza nuova (1725),
presents a cyclical model of history.58 The first stage in the cycle, the age of gods, is often
referred to as the “childhood” of man; however, contrary to historical models that view
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In a 1950 article written for Cultura a realtà, he set down his interpretation of Vico, insisting on his
continued relevance.
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primitive man as less sophisticated and with less linguistic prowess than his more
enlightened counterpart, Vico aligned the age of gods with poetic language.59 Pavese
drew a direct connection between children, primitive men, and poets in his analysis of
Vico: “Quelli che il Vico chiama universali fantastici sono – è noto – i miti, e in essi i
fanciulli, i primitivi, i poeti […] risolvono la realtà, sia teoretica che pratica” (Letteratura
americana 346). To be a poet, then, one must adopt the position of the child (or primitive
man), which in turn means dismantling the barriers between self and world such that
unity is once more possible.
In La casa in collina, the protagonist’s desire to recreate the instinctive world of
childhood is expressed as a desire to physically unite with nature. In the midst of war and
alienation, nature provides a much-needed sense of continuity and reliability. Pavese
reiterates the centrality of this human-animal bond in his journal:
Il tuo motivo del caprone era il mot. del nesso tra l’uomo e il naturale-ferino. Di
qua il tuo gusto della preistoria: il tempo in cui s’intravede una promiscuità
dell’uomo con la natura-belva. Di qui la tua ricerca dell’origine dell’immagine in
quei tempi: la promiscuità di un primo termine (solitam. umano) con un secondo
(solitam. naturale) che sarebbe qualcosa di più di un semplice fantastico: una
testimonianza di un nesso vivo. (Mestiere 165)
Man’s connection with the land is also a central preoccupation for Pavese. In La luna e i
falò, Anguilla describes the land as something carried in one’s bones:
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“Essential to Pavese’s subsequent treatment of myth is the Vichian notion of a parallel between each
individual’s experience of childhood and the psychology of the earliest epoch of humanity. Like Vico,
Pavese envisaged childhood as a reflection of the primitive world, in which contact with immediate reality
was direct and instinctive, and the perception of the savage and the sacred forces in nature was marked with
spontaneous emotion. This perception, largely lost to the modern era and forgotten by the child who has
grown to be an adult, survives, however, in poetry and in mythology, and can be recaptured by the adult in
rare instances of sharp recall. From this concept Pavese developed his notion of the ‘ecstatic moment’—
illustrated in many of the stories of Feria d’agosto—which is not without a convergent influence from the
late-romantic sensibility” (O’Healy 86).
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Che cos’è questa valle per una famiglia che venga dal mare, che non sappia niente
della luna e dei falò? Bisogna averci fatto le ossa, averla nelle ossa come il vino e
la polenta, allora la conosci senza bisogno di parlarne, e tutto quello che per tanti
anni ti sei portato dentro senza saperlo si sveglia adesso al tintinnio di una
martinicca, al colpo di coda di un bue, al gusto di una minestra, a una voce che
senti sulla piazza di notte. (41)
He goes even further, claiming that when men breathe in the scent of the land, they are
themselves contained in that scent via some sort of fluid exchange: “È un caldo che mi
piace, sa un odore: ci sono dentro anch’io a quest’odore, ci sono dentro tante vendemmie
e fienagioni e sfogliature, tanti sapori e tante voglie che non sapevo più d’avere addosso”
(22). In these rural communities, the land is therefore not simply a place, but something
physically integrated into the body.
Pavese’s narrative descriptions of peasant life create the impression that the land
has not only invaded the blood of its inhabitants, and also frequently “reabsorbs” them in
a dramatic fashion. In La luna e i falò, the peasant Valino finally succumbs to misery,
murdering his family and setting fire to his house before committing suicide. Santa, a
double agent, is discovered by the partisans and killed; her body is burnt on the hillside,
mimicking the bonfires lit to ensure the fertility of the fields.60 The fact that Valino and
Santa are welcomed back into the earth, their deaths inscribed within existing ritual
structures, grants meaning to their demise. As Anguilla says when justifying his decision
to return, “Ho girato abbastanza il mondo da sapere che tutte le carni sono buone e si
equivalgono, ma è per questo che uno si stanca e cerca di mettere radici, di farsi terra e
paese, perché la sua carne valga e duri qualcosa di più che un comune giro di stagione”
(7). Mythical integration with the land thus offers a sense of continuity that wouldn’t
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Anguilla explains to Cinto that the older peasants believe that ritualistic bonfires will bring much needed
rain.
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otherwise be possible. “Un paese vuol dire non essere soli, sapere che nella gente, nelle
piante, nella terra c’è qualcosa di tuo, che anche quando non ci sei resta ad aspettarti” (9).
Indeed, in his 1945 essay “Del mito, del simbolo e d’altro,” Pavese zeroes in on
place as the key to understanding myth. Mythic place involves the convergence of the
universal and the particular:
Ora, carattere, non dico della poesia, ma della fiaba mitica è la consacrazione dei
luoghi unici, legati a un fatto a una gesta a un evento. A un luogo, tra tutti, si dà
un significato assoluto, isolandolo nel mondo. Così sono nati i santuari. Così a
ciascuno i luoghi dell'infanzia ritornano alla memoria; in essi accaddero cose che
li han fatti unici e li trascelgono sul resto del mondo con questo suggello mitico.
Ma il parallelo dell'infanzia chiarisce subito come il luogo mitico non sia tanto
singolo, il santuario, quanto quello di nome comune, universale, il prato, la selva,
la grotta, la spiaggia, la casa, che nella sua indeterminatezza evoca tutti i prati, le
selve ecc., e tutti li anima del suo brivido simbolico. Neanche nella memoria
dell'infanzia il prato, la selva, la spiaggia sono oggetti reali fra i tanti, ma bensì il
prato, la spiaggia come ci si rivelarono in assoluto e diedero forma alla nostra
immaginazione. (Letteratura americana 299)
Thus, myth translates the individual experience of place from our childhood into
universal mythic locales, uniting the real and the imaginary. Pavese’s approach to nature
always contains a quasi-fantastic dimension. It is not nature in and of itself that matters,
but nature as an expression of eternal myths: “Pensavo che descrivere storie di contadini
(sia pure psicanalizzati e trasfigurati) non basta ancora. Descrivere poi paesaggi è cretino.
Bisogna che i paesaggi – meglio i luoghi, cioè l’albero, la casa, la vite, il sentiero, il
burrone, ecc. – vivano come persone, come contadini, e cioè siano mitici” (qtd. in Lajolo
217-18). This anthropomorphized view of nature often results in a slippage between man
and nature, such that the two begin to merge into one another in a literal, visceral way.
The transition from the individual to the universal is thus presented as the individual’s
absorption by the universal.
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Picking Up the Pieces
The difficulties critics’ experienced in categorizing Pavese’s writing—difficulties
that necessitated the creation of new generic terminology, like “symbolic realism”—serve
as evidence of Pavese’s bricolage. Equally inspired by the likes of D’Annunzio,
Leopardi, neorealism, Greek mythology, folklore, French existentialism, and the
anthropological writings of Lévy-Bruhl, James Frazer, and Karl Kerényi (to name just a
few), Pavese’s hodgepodge approach to representing World War II and postwar social
concerns was undeniably perplexing to his contemporaries. At a moment when clear lines
were being drawn between committed and uncommitted literature, Pavese’s position
proved difficult to map. Nonetheless, I argue that his efforts to weave together the eternal
and the historical, timeless ritual and contemporary politics, allowed him to subvert both
anti-historical and overly-historical trends in postwar Italian literature. Already in the late
1940s, many Italian writers had decided that existing literary models were insufficient to
deal with the particularity of postwar political and aesthetic concerns, and thus sought to
invent new forms. Though Pavese expressed his own misgivings about the insularity of
hermetic poetry, or the propagandistic potential of socialist realism, he was also
determined, in proper bricoleur fashion, to use whatever materials were at hand in order
to deal with both political and existential crises. In La Luna e i falò, Anguilla critiques the
transient, disposal nature of American culture: “In America si faceva così – quando eri
stufo di una cosa, di un lavoro, di un posto, cambiavi. Laggiù perfino dei paesi intieri con
l’osteria, il municipio e i negozi adesso sono vuoti, come un camposanto” (103). Painful
as the past may be, Pavese could not abide the thought of simply erasing it. By
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simultaneously reconnecting with and transforming the past, rather than dismissing it as a
lost cause, he believed writers could more effectively overcome dangerous social divides.

Symbolic Realism
The generic confusion of Pavese’s work led early critics to read his prose as either
realist or symbolist, but rarely both, whereas more recent analysis has ceded that the term
“symbolic realism” is the more appropriate moniker for his style.61 Pavese himself coined
a version of the term in his diary: “Ci vuole la ricchezza d’esperienze del realismo a la
profondità di sensi del simbolismo. Tutta l’arte è un problema di equilibrio fra due
opposti” (Mestiere 166). However, the question remains: what is the position of myth visà-vis these two modes, symbolism and realism?
Pavese frequently expressed a preference for symbol over allegory; he viewed
allegory as univocal and therefore limited, whereas symbols offered a multiplicity of
meaning. And myth was firmly situated in the realm of the symbol: “Un mito è sempre
simbolico; per questo non ha mai un significato univoco, allegorico, ma vive di una vita
incapsulata che, a seconda del terreno e dell’umore che l’avvolge, può esplodere nelle più
diverse e molteplici fioriture” (Letteratura americana 301). In an essay on Walt
Whitman, he associates symbolism with transcendence, praising the symbolism of the
American poets over and above the allegory of a Dante:
Indirection è quel modo per cui lo scrittore non sarà né descrittivo né epico, bensì
trascendente. Con altre parole, simbolico. Giacché il nuovo simbolismo di
Whitman e della sua generazione consisté proprio in questo: non le ambiziose
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“…il metodo tanto caro a Pavese, consistente nel ‘realismo simbolico,’ cioè nel filtrare la realtà
attraverso la propria coscienza, per trarre da questo processo di razionalizzazione e di ‘riduzione a
chiarezza’ conclusioni esistenziali di carattere generale” (Catalfamo, Mito 59).
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strutture allegoriche d’intreccio e d’impostazione—quelle di un Bunyan o di un
Dante, —ma una diversa realtà verbale, una sorta di doppia vista per cui dal
singolo oggetto dei sensi avidamente assorbito e posseduto irradia come un alone
d’inattesa spiritualità.” (Letteratura americana 184-85)
Most importantly, symbols—because they stem from myth—are more natural than
allegories.62 They do not arise from academic study, but rather from the encounter with
the simplest modes of human expression—the fable, the argument, and the prayer:
Ciò è tanto vero che di qualunque individuo, anche il più colto e creatore, si può
sostenere che i simboli non si radicano tanto nei suoi incontri libreschi o
accademici, quanto nelle mitiche e quasi elementari scoperte d’infanzia, nei
contatti umilissimi e inconsapevoli con le realtà quotidiane e domestiche che
l’hanno accolto al principio: non l’alta poesia ma la fiaba, il litigio, la preghiera,
non la grande pittura ma l’almanacco e la stampa, non la scienza ma la
superstizione (Letteratura americana 311).
Though he wrote only two collections of actual poetry—Lavorare stanca (his first
book, published in 1936) and Verrà la morte e avrà i tuoi occhi (published posthumously
in 1951)—Pavese frequently elided the distinction between poetry and prose, and thus his
theoretical reflections on poetry are just as applicable to his novels. His vision of poetry
is indelibly linked to myth: “Far poesia significa portare a evidenza e compiutezza
fantastica un germe mitico […] senza mito – l’abbiamo già ripetuto – non si dà poesia:
mancherebbe l’immersione nel gorgo dell’indistinto, che della poesia ispirata è
condizione indispensabile” (Letteratura americana 350, 338). However, he is careful not
to lose sight of his commitment to reduce myth to clarity, to take irrationality as merely a
starting point on the path to rational thought: “Ma significa anche, dando una corposa
figura a questo germe, ridurlo a materia contemplativa, staccarlo dalla materna penombra
della memoria, e in definitiva abituarsi a non crederci più, come a un mistero che non è
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“Dobbiamo accettare i simboli – il mistero di ognuno – con la pacata convinzione con cui si accettano le
cose naturali. La città ci dà simboli come la campagna ci dà frutti” (Letteratura americana 323).
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più tale” (Letteratura americana 350-51). Poetry, then, is the clarified, rationalized
version of myth; it is the distilled and stylized product of a mythic germ.
In his reflections on Vico, Pavese’s vision of the relationship between myth and
poetry is further developed. Though poetry is often considered more sophisticated than its
mythic counterpart, Pavese, as a devotee of Vico, believed that “primitive” man was
highly poetic, that myth and metaphor are in fact the fundamental modes of expression
corresponding to the earliest stage of man. Furthermore, Pavese saw no contradiction
between the almost childlike simplicity of myth and so-called high arts (i.e. the
classics).63 In fact, in his diary, he conflates his classicist and primitivist tendencies: “Il
tuo è un classicismo rustico che facilmente diventa etnografia preistorica” (255).
Similarly, he rejected the binary opposition of myth and logos so common to
anthropological studies of myth: “mito e logos non sono necessariamente termini
susseguenti di una sequenza evolutiva, ma piuttosto coesistono dialetticamente in uno
stato di continua tensione” (Musumeci 82). This joining of seemingly opposed terms is a
recurring theme in Pavese’s work and will be central to my efforts to connect his mythic
and political impulses.
If, for Pavese, myth is linked to symbolism, and symbolism is linked to realism,
then it follows that myth and realism are not diametrically opposed. On the contrary,
myth is the means by which reality is most effectively accessed: “Il mito gli apparve con
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In an essay on Herman Melville, for example, Pavese discusses the superimposition of barbary and
academicism in Moby Dick: “Un greco veramente è Melville. Voi leggete le evasioni europee dalla
letteratura e vi sentite più letterato che mai, vi sentite piccino, cerebrale, effeminato. Leggete Melville, che
non si vergogna di cominciare Moby Dick, il poema della vita barbara, con otto pagine di citazioni, e di
andare innanzi discutendo, citando ancora…” (Letteratura americana xvii)
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chiarezza come lo strumento privilegiato per cercare di comprendere la realtà” (Esposito
2). Rather than treating myth as unreal, he viewed it as a richer form of reality:
È evidente che tensione mitica significa la gioiosa certezza di una più ricca realtà
sotto la realtà oggettiva – l’indistinta presenza del nuotatore nell’acqua – e questa
presenza si esprime in vortici, schiume, affioramenti. Possibile che si dia simbolo,
cioè la presenza mitica, anche nell’ormai secolare arte veristica, che sembrerebbe
votata alla più piatta univocità? Senza dubbio, e anzitutto perché l’ispirazione
veristica è la celebrazione di un grandioso mito collettivo. (Letteratura americana
337)
By defining “realism” as little more than the expression of collective myths, Pavese
destabilizes the boundary between concrete reality and abstract symbolism. In his 1949
article “Raccontare è monotono,” he claims that the most symbolic (and therefore the
most mythic) works are composed of solid reality: “Perciò i racconti più simbolici, più
intrisi di mito – come di salsedine chi nuota – sono quelli che apparentemente non hanno
un secondo senso che qua e là affiora, ma sono piuttosto un solido blocco di realtà,
sufficiente in se stesso, aperto, se mai, a innumerevoli sensi che tutto lo intridono e
interessano” (Letteratura americana 336).
In short, rather than abandoning history and reality in the name of myth and
symbolism (or vice versa), Pavese sought to reconcile the two realms. He consistently
spoke of writers as historically situated, and insisted that only those works of art that have
some practical or historical relevance are of any interest, yet he also qualified these
comments by alluding to the writer’s ability to escape his historical moment and speak
“outside of time”: “Che ciascuno di noi – anche lo scrittore – sia radicato in una data
situazione, in una classe, in uno storico conflitto inevitabile, è vero. Ma è vero, altrettanto
che, quando si prende in mano la penna per narrare sul serio, tutto è già accaduto, si
chiudono gli occhi e si ascolta una voce che è fuori dal tempo” (Letteratura americana
61

280). Despite his desire to remain rooted in reality, he worried about the creative
limitations posed by neorealism; as Binetti explains, “il neorealismo rappresenta allo
stesso tempo per Pavese, proprio perché movimento artistico inglobante poetiche e
tendenze di pensiero di per sé diverse, un limite alle potenzialità creative ed alla varietà di
impostazioni della sua poetica” (Vita imperfetta 98). Nonetheless, he did admire the
simple objectivity of neorealism, and in his introduction to a new translation of Homer’s
Iliad, he compared neorealism to Homer’s poetics, thus once again uniting realism and
myth.
By insisting on the intellectual operations that undergird fantasy, he suggested
that fantasy (here used as a synonym for myth or symbol) has the potential to impose
order onto the chaos of everyday reality, thus rendering it a potent political tool:
La fantasia non è l’opposto dell’intelligenza. La fantasia è l’intelligenza applicata
a stabilire rapporti di analogia, di implicanza significativa, di simbolismo. Dicevo
che essa sola costruisce, perché essa sola sfugge alla tirannia del reale tranche de
vie, dell’evento naturalistico, e sostituisce alla legge del reale (che è assenza di
costruzione, tanto à vero che esso non ha fine né principio) la favola, il racconto,
il misto, costruzione dell’intelligenza. (Mestiere 241)
Fantasy offers a reprieve from the “tyranny” of reality, but not, I argue, in an escapist
manner. Rather, Pavese sought to use myth as a vehicle to intervene in reality and thereby
transform it: “libero è solamente chi s’inserisce nella realtà e la trasforma, non chi
procede tra le nuvole. Del resto, nemmeno i rondoni ce la fanno a volare nel vuoto
assoluto” (Letteratura americana 238). Fantasy is posited as an alternative to submitting
to an oppressive fate.
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Pavese’s Impegno
By now it should be clear that Pavese exhibited a strong commitment to myth as
both a literary framework and a political tool, and that his particular definition of the term
strayed from that of many other intellectuals of the period in its clever constellation of
reality and symbol, history and eternity, man and nature. Nonetheless, it remains to be
seen how his use of myth might be characterized as “committed” according to the
standards operative in postwar Italy. The evidence of Pavese’s lack of political
commitment is substantial: he showed little interest in politics during his formative years,
despite the fact that most of his peers were avid antifascists and were jailed for their
activities; his own experience in exile did little to increase his political fervor, as
evidenced by his diary entries during the period and Il carcere, the novel based on his
experiences in Brancaleone Calabro; many of his novels show a “regressive” interest in
bourgeois life, rather than political dissidence;64 he failed to join the partisans in their
fight against the remaining fascist forces during the second half of the war; his inscription
in the Communist Party came at a moment when the danger of political opposition had
largely passed and the PCI’s popularity was at its peak;65 many of his political articles for
l’Unità read at best as naïve, and at worst as heavy-handed propaganda dictated by party
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Works like Tra donne sole have been criticized as little more than drawing room dramas.
Recent work suggests that Pavese’s Communist leanings may have emerged earlier than previously
thought: “Sinora si era ritenuto che l’accostamento di Pavese all’idea comunista fosse avvenuto nei giorni
immediatamente successivi alla Liberazione. Ma recentemente Mariarosa Masoero ha documentato che lo
scrittore era comunista già nella tanto contestata fase della sua vita trascorsa a Casale Monferrato”
(Catalfamo, Dialettica 83) Even if this is true, it is difficult to argue with the claim that he was less
“committed” to the revolutionary cause than his peers.
65
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officials;66 and the works he deemed his best were the least obviously political (e.g.
Dialoghi con Leucò).
Faced with this laundry list of sins, it would be easy to accept the image of Pavese
as a lovesick misanthrope, more invested in his own existential crises than any sort of
political or social cause. His diary does little to dissuade readers of this portrait; despite
the fact that it covers the period from 1935-1950, he makes almost no mention of fascism
or the war. Nonetheless, I maintain that Pavese’s status as an “engaged” writer has
frequently been overlooked due to his particular mode of engagement: namely,
mythology. In the following pages, I will demonstrate not only that Pavese’s work on
myth was inextricably linked to political and social issues related to World War II and its
aftermath, but also that his methods may have been more effective than the heavy-handed
propaganda of other Communist writers of the period. Indeed, Pavese’s decision to
focalize his social commentary through the lens of myth is in many ways the result of his
dissatisfaction with existing methods of engagement.
Pavese recognized that he was somewhat out of sync with his moment. Defining
history as an alternation between progressive and regressive tendencies—and more
recently between hermeticism and neorealism—he demonstrated an attentiveness to the
political forces working against him and the reasons why myth had been dismissed out of
hand in the wake of World War II:
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Catalfamo defends Pavese against the usual critiques of ideological slavery, insisting that Pavese, in
“Dialoghi col compagno,” takes an important stance against the pedagogism of much popular literature:
“Queste pagine [“Dialoghi col compagno”] sono state frettolosamente archiviate come esempi di
‘vassallaggio ideologico’ dello scrittore nei confronti del partito, ma, in realtà, contengono chiare prese di
posizione contro il finto pedagogismo di tanta letteratura populista” (Dialettica 88). Unfortunately, this is
the minority opinion.
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Tutta la storia culturale degli ultimi secoli è in continuo altalenare, sotto etichette
svariate, tra queste due poetiche […] Si tratta del riflesso drammatico di una lotta
politica, dell’oscillazione tra i momenti involutivi, d’arresto (=angelismo) e quelli
progressivi, slanciati (=realismo). E anche l’affrontarsi di queste due posizioni
negli anni intorno alla recente guerra mondiale – l’inaridirsi (non nella sola Italia)
dell’angelismo ermetico, e l’imporsi e diffondersi soprattutto in Italia del
cosiddetto neo-realismo, sono a modo loro un riflesso delle lotte e delle
trasformazioni politiche in corso (Letteratura americana 357).
Nonetheless, in a 1950 radio interview, Pavese once again justified his decision to
combine symbolism and realism, or distance and immediacy, citing myth as a means of
communicating with the masses in a “current” way without sacrificing more universal
themes:
Della civiltà umanistica quest’opera vuole (sia detto con tutta umiltà) conservare
il distacco contemplative e formale, il gusto delle strutture intellettualistiche, la
lezione dantesca e baudelairiana di un mondo stilisticamente chiuso e in definitiva
simbolico. Della realtà contemporanea rendere il ritmo, la passione, il sapore, con
la stessa casuale immediatezza di un Cellini, di un Defoe, di un chiacchierone
incontrato al caffè. (Letteratura americana 293-94)
The convergence of symbolic formalism and café gossip is what makes Pavese’s
language so unique—and, I argue, so effective. His mythic worldview resonated with the
nonsynchronous experiences of rural Italians.
If we look to Pavese’s critical essays (most notably his early work on American
authors), we find evidence of what he valued in others’ writing. Although it does not
automatically follow that he took his own advice, we can use his criticism to form a
clearer picture of his sense of the ethical obligations of writers. In a 1931 essay on
Sherwood Anderson, for example, Pavese negates the validity of art for art’s sake,
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affirming that literature must satisfy human needs.67 In his 1946 essay “Il Comunismo e
gli intellettuali,” written in response to a survey issued by the PCI asking why writers had
decided to join the party, he insists that:
Per uno scrittore, per un “operaio della fantasia,” che dieci volte in un giorno
corre il rischio di credere che tutta la vita sia quella dei libri, dei suoi libri, è
necessaria una cura continua di scossoni, di prossimo, di concreta realtà. Noi
rispettiamo troppo il nostro mestiere, per illuderci che l’ingegno, l’invenzione, ci
bastino. Nulla che valga può uscirci dalla penna e dalle mani se non per attrito,
per urto con le cose a con gli uomini. Libero è solamente che s’inserisce nella
realtà e la trasforma, non chi procede tra le nuvole. (Letteratura americana 238)
Thus, his pessimistic and abstract impulses were invariably tempered by his belief in the
curative properties of concrete reality.
This “collision with things and men” translates to solidarity with the people (as
opposed to those intellectuals who, well-intentioned though they may have been, were
ultimately condescending in their efforts to “educate” the masses). Pavese worried that
the impulse to speak to the masses without truly communing with them would lead us
back to fascism:
Ora, in questo atteggiamento è latente un pericolo: quello di ‘andare verso il
popolo.’ Specialmente in Italia. Verso il popolo ci vanno i fascisti. O i signori. E
‘andarci’ vuol dire travestirlo, farne un oggetto dei nostri gusti e delle nostre
degnazioni. Libertà non è questo. Non si va ‘verso il popolo.’ Si è popolo. Anche
l’intellettuale, anche il ‘signore’, che soffrono e vivono l’elementare travaglio del
trapasso da una civiltà d’impedimento e di spreco a quella organizzata nella
libertà della tecnica, sono popolo e preparano un governo di popolo. Che è ciò che
vuole il comunismo. Democrazia significa questo governo. (Letteratura
americana 237-38)
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“L’opera d’arte ci commuove e ci si lascia comprendere soltanto finché conserva per noi un interesse
storico, finché risponde a un qualche nostro problema, risolve insomma un nostro bisogno di vita pratica.
Non esiste arte per l’arte” (Letteratura americana 33).
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Merely going towards the people, rather than being with them, is not only
disingenuous—it is also a dangerous path to despotism. And being with the masses
requires the writer to embrace their worldviews—their traditions, superstitions, and
myths.
Yet Pavese also explicitly connected his mythic literary aspirations with more
properly Marxist definitions of labor. Art, he writes, is not a realm set apart from
everyday reality, but rather emerges directly from other (more concrete) forms of labor.
In a 1946 essay “Maturità americana,” he expressed admiration for F.O. Matthiessen’s
proposal of an organic union between labor and culture and posited that the way to
achieve this union was by deploying a language that breaks down the barrier between
things and words, between ordinary life and mythic reality: “quello che implicitamente
importa: esigenza di un nuovo linguaggio che, distruggendo le barriere fra cose e parole,
investa di luce spirituale i più ordinari aspetti della vita quotidiana e ne riveli la profonda
natura simbolica. […] Arrivare a un linguaggio che tanto s’identificasse alle cose da
abbattere ogni barriera fra il comune lettore e la realtà simbolica e mitica più vertiginosa”
(Letteratura americana 179-80). He saw myth as indelibly linked to the techne of the
common worker, and he felt duty-bound to communicate to these workers their role
within a symbolic-mythic reality. In nearly all of his discussions of myth, the term is tied
to historically grounded subjects and to a more “common” language, thus allowing him to
steer clear of decadentism and align himself with the masses.
As a means of achieving his desired communion with the people, Pavese agreed
to write for the Communist newspaper L’Unità, yet refused to collaborate with Vittorini
on his Communist journal Il Politecnico, a fact that has struck many scholars as strangely
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contradictory. However, the decision is logical when one takes into account the intended
readership of each project: Vittorini, though more overtly political than Pavese, preferred
to write in terms of abstractions, for an elite, “intellectual” reader, whereas l’Unità was
written for the masses. Thus, Pavese’s commitment to reaching as broad an audience as
possible led him to choose the latter. Even if we admit to certain contradictions within his
publishing decisions, I disagree with the reading of Pavese as uncommited simply due to
the occasional ideological inconsistency. As Binetti claims, Pavese’s willingness to
verbalize doubts and inconsistencies ultimately presented a more honest portrait of the
postwar political landscape than the consistent (but borderline propagandistic)
compositions of those who upheld the myth of the Resistance in an effort to buttress the
PCI’s position in the new government.68
In terms of the “contradictions” by which critics define Pavese’s output, one of
the most notable is that between existential crisis (associated with solitude, an inability to
“commit” to one’s fellow man, a privileging of individual concerns over collective ones)
and sociopolitical engagement. And yet, Sartrean engagement is a logical extension of
existentialism, thus invalidating this dichotomy. In his 1960 essay “Pavese: essere e
fare,” Calvino insists that Pavese, by choosing to live tragically (rather than
voluptuously), wanted to transform “il fuoco d’una tensione esistenziale in un operare
storico” (61). Thus, once again irrationality, destiny, and isolated existential crisis
comprise merely one step in a larger dialectical process. In fact, Pavese’s attraction to
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“Questa dialettica testimonia invece la volontà sincera di un intellettuale impegnato che preferiva
comunicare al suo lettore anche le incertezze e le conflittualità intrinseche nel dibattito politico-culturale di
quel tempo, anziché travestirle discorsi tautologici falsamente coerenti e celebrativi” (Binetti, Vita
imperfetta 86).
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myth and destiny was in part motivated by his dissatisfaction with the limitations of
political dogma and his desire to protect individual liberty from programmatic ideology.69
Reflecting on the vitriolic rhetoric of revolution, Pavese writes:
A sentire, non esistono ora che gli impulsi alle rivoluzioni violente. Ma tutto nella
storia è rivoluzione; anche un rinnovamento, una scoperta impercettibili e pacifici.
Via quindi anche il preconcetto oratorio del rinnovamento morale che ha bisogno
(magari da parte di altri, gli attivi) dell’azione violenta. Via questo bisogno
infantile di compagnia e di fracasso. Io devo contentarmi della minima scoperta
contenuta in ogni singola poesia, e mostrare il mio rinnovam. morale nell’umiltà
con cui mi sottopongo a questo destino, che è la mia natura. Che è molto
ragionevole. Se non è però pigrizia o vigliaccheria. (Mestiere 13)
The final phrase demonstrates Pavese’s awareness of the accusations that would be
leveled against him for failing to embody the revolutionary fervor of his peers and
indicates some doubt about the authenticity of his own sentiments. Nonetheless, his
insistence that moral rejuvenation can be located in a poem or myth, rather than solely in
triumphant rhetoric, reveals a new possibility for literary commitment.
For Pavese, writing about history and politics did not mean drawing grandiose
teleological conclusions. In his review of a book by Pino Levi Cavalgione, he bemoans
the quality of most of the literature of the Resistance—with the exception of
Cavaglione’s book, which he praises for its ability to avoid historical lessons: “Con la
stessa sicurezza egli ha escluso dal racconto ogni sforzo di giustificazione storica, ogni
enfasi costruttiva e simbolica, ogni sondaggio in profondo, che mirasse a far del libro un
piccolo Guerra e pace. […] Non predica, non fa la lezione di storia o di eroismo, né a sé
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For example, Pavese frowned upon the naïve optimism of those who hailed industrialization as the
solution to all social woes: “Non si riconosce, invece, nell’ottimismo sfrenato del socialismo riformista, di
stampo positivista, che punta tutto sull’industrializzazione, sul rapporto privilegiato tra industriali e classe
operaia, che tagli fuori non solo il Sud, ma anche tutto il mondo contadino del Nord” (Catalfamo,
Dialettica 263).
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né agli altri” (Letteratura americana 268). Avoiding melodramatic images of partisan
heroism, Pavese chose instead to represent reality as he saw it: an often bleak (but never
fatalistic) convergence of mythical and political forces.
The pessimistic elements of Pavese’s prose are undeniable and are one of the
main reasons critics have been so quick to compare him to Leopardi.70 Catalfamo,
however, rehabilitates this pessimism by dubbing it an active pessimism: “Pavese è un
‘pessimista,’ ma il suo è un ‘pessimismo attivo,’ leopardiano, nel senso ch’egli ritiene
che, nonostante il destino, l’uomo deve prendere posizione, deve agire per il bene di tutti,
in particolare dei più deboli” (Dialettica 262). While acknowledging his fatalistic streak,
most evident in his discussion of destiny in peasant life, Catalfamo underscores Pavese’s
refusal to give in to nihilism: “Ma, accanto al ‘destino,’ c’è la ‘speranza.’ È vero: per
Pavese nelle vicende umane si ripropongono paradigmi di una catastrofe inevitabile.
Ciononostante, non viene meno l’obbligo di assumere una posizione etica, non viene
annullata la responsabilità personale” (Dialettica 261). For Pavese, rebelling against
destiny is an ethical act, an expression of personal responsibility, and thus a form of
engagement.

The Ethnographic Connection
If “committed” writers like Sartre, Vittorini, and Calvino were critical touchstones
for Pavese, his relationship with ethnographer Ernesto de Martino was no less so. As coeditors of the “collana viola,” a series of ethnographic publications for Einaudi, Pavese
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For more on the parallels between Pavese and Leopardi, see Arnaldo Colombo’s Santo Stefano Belbo e
Recanati Leopardi e Cesare Pavese (2000) and Michela Rusi’s Le malvage analisi: sulla memoria
leopardiana di Cesare Pavese (1988).
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and de Martino were able to combine their respective research on the political and
economic utility of myth.71 I argue that Pavese’s novels are in many ways a fictional
application of de Martino’s theories, a means of exploring communal solutions to
individual, existential afflictions.
Sometimes referred to as the Italian equivalent of Marcel Mauss or Bronislaw
Malinowski, De Martino studied classics and comparative religion at the University of
Naples. Initially a devotee of Croce, he soon turned away from Croce’s idealism in favor
of an eclectic theoretical-philosophical orientation inflected by Gramsci, existentialism,
and psychoanalysis. At the end of the 1940s, he began active fieldwork in Southern Italy,
investigating social environments where belief in magic, myth, and ritual continued to
thrive. De Martino is an intriguing figure not only because of his continued interest in
myth after the war, but also because he consciously sought to integrate anthropology and
Marxism, two fields largely considered incompatible. According to Croce, modern men
take an active stance toward their world and their history, whereas primitive men remain
passive and accepting of their circumstances. Consequently, they are without history,
without the spontaneity of spirit (consciousness) that is mediated by the flow of historical
action and thought. De Martino, however, was critical of this ethnocentric position.
Though he suffered some abuse from hardline Marxists due to his supposed “irrational”
streak, his on-the-ground investigations in Southern Italy superimposed analyses of myth,
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La Collezione di studi religiosi, etnologici e psicologici, nicknaked the "collana viola" due to the color of
the volumes’ covers, was edited by Einaudi froom 1948 to 1956. Through this series, Pavese and de
Martino oversaw Italian translations of works by the likes of Jung, Lévy-Bruhl, Malinowski, Frazer, Eliade,
and Durkheim, among others. I should note that several of de Martino’s most famous works, including Sud
e magia and La terra del rimorso, were published after Pavese died, and thus obviously could not have
influenced his fiction. Nonetheless, Il mondo magico, published in 1948, already laid the groundwork for
many of de Martino’s later theories.
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religion, and superstition onto a vested interest in improving the social and economic
plight of the peasants.
In a 1950 article in Cultura a realtà, Pavese defended de Martino against
criticisms from writer Franco Fortini and reiterated the connection between ethnology
and socialism:
Dice Ernesto de Martino, autore illustre del Mondo magico, che ormai tutto è
chiaro: il folclore, l’etnologia, che studiano quanto è primitivo, arcaico, nella
psiche e nel costume dei popoli, possono soltanto fiorire genuini in una società
che dei popoli ‘subalterni’ faccia il soggetto della sua politica, una società che
socialisticamente organizzi questi popoli diseredati e ne rivendichi l’arcaica
originalità d’istituzioni e di valori. (Letteratura americana 353)
Though the two writers did not always see eye-to-eye as spearheads of their editorial
project—de Martino had doubts about Pavese’s fascination with irrationality, despite
enduring similar criticisms—they shared a commitment to the thorough, “scientific”
study of subjects like myth, ritual, and the unconscious.72
Much of de Martino’s research centers on what he called the “crisis of
presence”—a sense of not being there (Dasein). It is a feeling of death, but also of lost
subjectivity, vulnerability, alienation, dissociation, being out of control, being
overwhelmed to the point of extinction, and, most importantly, being outside of history.
The circumstances of primitive and subaltern peoples, he argues, render them more
vulnerable to these crises of presence; “primitive” rituals, such as curing rites and
mourning ceremonies, are a means of restoring to the afflicted a sense of presence, of
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There was some question as to how “scientific” the volumes in the series truly were, though these doubts
may have been politically motivated: many of the authors they published had, at one point or another, been
labeled as fascist, racist, and/or counter-revolutionary. It’s true that Eliade, for example, had ties to the
Fascist Party, but even with less obvious targets like Frazer and Durkheim, there was hostility toward the
notion of myth and religion as anything other than a socioeconomic by-product. Pavese defended his choice
of authors by insisting that a writer’s personal beliefs did not invalidate his scientific contributions.
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being there, vitally, in the world. In short, de Martino sees mythic practices as a means of
resolving (or at the very least alleviating) otherwise insurmountable psychic conflicts.
Through mythical-ritual practices, personal conflicts are rearticulated in a shared,
depersonalized discourse.73 And whereas the repetitions of myth and ritual are often seen
as antithetical to historical temporality, de Martino argues that, “ripetizione ritmica,
sicura e prevedibile al pari dell’orbita di un pianeta” provides “un ridischiudersi alla
esistenza storica” (Terra 135). Myth involves a momentary escape from history, but only
as a means of reconnecting with one’s cultural heritage in order to locate existing
solutions to seemingly insurmountable, historically contingent problems. As Fabrizio
Ferrari explains, “The ritual performer engages with ritual because he/she seeks a
solution to aspects of life perceived as uneven. Such a solution, however, does not exist
in reality. It must be found in an alternative dimension, a reality that has already
happened: myth” (79). This retreat into mythic a-historicism paradoxically restores
historical equilibrium.74
Though classical Marxist theory views ritual as exploitative and/or externally
imposed (and thus as an impediment to equality), de Martino argues that myth and ritual
“make it possible for the performers, who become protagonists of their own history, to
leave the condition of subalternity” (Ferrari 83). In fact, for the most disenfranchised,
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La terra del rimorso, for example, is a sustained study of the rituals associated with tarantism. De
Martino argues that tarantism “costituiva un dispositivo simbolico mediante il quale un contenuto psichico
conflittuale che non aveva trovato soluzione sul piano della coscienza, e che operava null’oscurità
dell’inconscio […] veniva evocato e configurato sul piano mitico-rituale” (76).
74
This is yet another version of Caillois’ claim that the festival returns us to a mythic temporality as a
means of rejuvenating the present world. In both cases we see a-temporality deployed to overcome the
death and decay characteristic of temporality. It is worth noting that Caillois published a revised version of
his essay “Festival” in 1950; in his new ending, he insisted that war was the twentieth-century’s response to
the festival.
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myth and ritual are the only political tools at their disposal. Furthermore, though he often
focused on individual existential crises—the death of a loved one, marital woes, etc.—he
also suggested that a nation is equally susceptible to crises of presence (Ferrari 78). It is
this aspect of de Martino’s thought that Pavese latched onto—the ways in which myth
and ritual might address the trauma of fascism and its aftermath. In La luna e i falò, we
encounter characters still grappling with the consequences of the war, buckling beneath
the weight of crises of presence, yet Pavese offers them a means of escape—and thus a
means of re-entering history—via a mythic connection with the land.

From Burning Fields to Burning Bodies
La luna e i falò, Pavese’s final novel, is also frequently cited as his most fully
developed, and as the work that most effectively integrates his two competing impulses:
myth and engagement.75 While numerous critics have noted the presence of both of these
strands in the novel, they are typically analyzed in isolation from one another.76 By
contrast, I am not merely arguing that both myth and politics appear in the novel; I
maintain that myth is political, that myth is the vehicle through which he addresses social
issues. Pavese positioned the novel as the final installment of a historical tetralogy: “il
ciclo storico: Carcere (antifascismo confinario), Compagno (antifascismo clandestino),
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“La luna e i falò è l’opera della piena maturità letteraria di Cesare Pavese, licenziata poco prima della
tragica fine, e rappresenta il punto di sbocco di tutta la produzione precedente, ch’essa comprende e supera,
concludendo l’itinerario artistico ed ‘ideologico’ dello scrittore langarolo” (Catalfamo, Dialettica 247).
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To cite only one example, Biasin acknowledges that the characters in La luna e i falò “are the
mouthpiece of [Pavese’s] own irresolute but spontaneous political engagement,” but he immediately
qualifies his own remarks, concluding that “he dealt with the asocial side of man, the crisis of the
individual torn from society and contemporary reality: solitude, the inability to communicate which is
suffered and yet at the same time self-determined, the contemplativity of the writer isolated in his ivory
tower yet tormented by awareness and remorse that this tower of his (as Virginia Woolf wrote) would
henceforth overlook burning fields on all sides” (“Myth and Death” 206).
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Casa in collina (resistenza), Luna e i falò (post-resistenza)” (Mestiere 375). His decision
to focus on the postwar climate, rather than the resistance itself, is part of what makes La
luna e i falò so striking: he rejects the myth of the resistance still being promulgated in
1950, instead revealing the shortcomings of the resistance efforts—evident in the
perpetuation of violence and misery even after the war—and the naiveté of revolutionary
sentiment, especially in rural communities where the war was merely the latest iteration
in a long history of violence and oppression. If La casa in collina depicts the optimism
that briefly galvanized partisans in 1943, La luna e i falò tackles the disappointing
aftermath and a return to the realities of peasant life following the unreality of war.
The novel is focalized through the character of Anguilla, a bastard who grew up in
the Langhe hills. He departs for America (we later learn it is because his antifascist
activities have been discovered) and returns to Italy after the Liberation. The novel can be
divided into roughly three sections: his boyhood, first at Gaminella, the family farm, then
as a worker at the larger farm of La Mora; his time in America during the war; and his
return to Italy and rediscovery of his home. His childhood friend, Nuto, (loosely based on
Pavese’s real-life friend Pinolo Scaglione) informs him of the fates of the various
residents of the area and the effects (or lack thereof) of the war. Interlacing Communist
ideology and rural superstitions, this novel, more than any other, brings together each of
the components of Pavese’s definition of myth into one unified vision.
As previously discussed, Pavese’s approach to myth was rooted in the natural
world; nature both engenders myth and preserves it against modernity’s contamination. In
La luna e i falò, it is nature (rather than Communism) that appears as the great equalizer:
“Cosa credi? la luna c’è per tutti, così le piogge, così le malattie. Hanno un bel vivere in
75

un buco o in un palazzo, il sangue è rosso dappertutto” (72). When formal politics fails,
the land retains its potential for signification and liberation. Anguilla begins his tale with
a reflection on the necessity of roots: “Ho girato abbastanza il mondo da sapere che tutte
le carni sono buone e si equivalgono, ma è per questo che uno si stanca e cerca di mettere
radici, di farsi terra e paese, perché la sua carne valga e duri qualcosa di più che un
comune giro di stagione” (7). However, the autochthonous vision of man that Pavese
provides is hardly a romantic one. As a farmhand, Anguilla learns early on that his
livelihood depends on the fertility of the land. The crops prove to be dangerously
unreliable, thus pointing to the potential hostility of nature, though it is ultimately man
who poses the largest threat: Valino, who now inhabits Gaminella, is forced to turn over
the vast majority of his already meager harvest to the landowner, thus leaving him and his
family in a state of borderline starvation. In a desperate effort to subsist from year to year,
the farmers succumb to what Anguilla dubs “superstition” by lighting bonfires in the
fields as a means of ritualistically ensuring fertility for the coming year. Anguilla is
skeptical of this practice (having worked as a fertilizer salesman): “Era inutile che [Nuto]
trovasse tanto da dire sul governo e sui discorsi dei preti se poi credeva a queste
superstizioni come i vecchi di sua nonna” (39). Nuto, however, defends their beliefs,
identifying the reasoning behind the ritual, rather than the ritual itself, as the central
concern: “superstizione è soltanto quella che fa del male, e se uno adoperasse la luna e i
falò per derubare i contadini e tenerli all’oscuro, allora sarebbe lui l’ignorante e
bisognerebbe fucilarlo in piazza” (40). If the moon and bonfires are used for noble
purposes, they no longer qualify as ignorant. Indeed, Nuto is a believer in the practical
power of these rituals: “non sapeva cos’era, se il calore o la vampa o che gli umori si
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svegliassero, fatto sta che tutti i coltivi dove sull’orlo si accendeva il falò davano un
raccolto più succoso, più vivace” (39). Yet in the end, the ritual does not really exist to
improve the quality of the harvest, but rather to provide powerless individuals with a
sense of control and an image or practice around which their community can cohere. This
is ritual as theorized by de Martino, whose function is to help the subaltern overcome
crises of presence.
Thankfully, nature is not a purely destructive force; it also offers positive
experiences. As a boy, Anguilla delights in the simple pleasures available around the
farm: exploring the hills, catching frogs, picking apples. Even after his return, his primary
activity is wandering the land, commenting on the similarities from his childhood (the
shape of the hills, the smell of the earth), as well as the differences (the hazel trees have
been cut down). He continues to feel connected to his native soil, a bond he was unable to
form in America. There, he shied away from the vast expanses of land—“Molti paesi
vuol dire nessuno” (45)—and was frightened of the stars, different than those back home.
After breaking down in the desert one night, the threat of a relentlessly indifferent nature,
so unlike the one that birthed him, strikes fear into his heart: “Più avanti nella notte una
grossa cagnara mi svegliò di soprassalto. Sembrava che tutta la pianura fosse un campo di
battaglia, o un cortile. C’era una luce rossastra, scesi fuori intirizzito e scassato; tra le
nuvole basse era spuntata una fetta di luna che pareva una ferita di coltello e
insanguinava la pianura. Rimasi a guardarla un pezzo. Mi fece davvero spavento” (48).
While working at a restaurant, he meets a follow Piedmont native, and their conversation
opens with a nostalgic desire for the region’s wine (and thus for the particularity of the
Piedmontese earth). His village holds a quasi-mythic sway over him—but not in the form
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of an inescapable destiny. Instead, he feels a political devotion to his people and returns
to them in part to improve their economic plight—though without trampling on their
traditions.
Childhood occupies the bulk of the novel, either in the form of Anguilla’s
memories or in his interactions with Cinto, the crippled boy who now lives in his former
farmhouse. Cinto represents a sort of repetition with a difference; upon meeting him for
the first time, Anguilla reflects, “vederlo su quell’aia era come vedere me stesso” (24).
But Nuto points out that Cinto is even worse off than Anguilla had been, both due to his
physical infirmity (he has difficulty walking due to rickets) and the increased demands of
the landlord. Anguilla reflects that even though he did not always have enough to eat as a
child, they rarely went without some sort of supper, a boast that Cinto is unable to make.
Anguilla therefore decides to take Cinto under his wing, determined to help him
escape the poverty and oppression into which he had been born, just as Anguilla did. He
buys him a pocketknife in order to win the boy’s trust; the knife plays a key role at the
novel’s conclusion, when Cinto menaces Valino with it in order to escape his murderous
rampage. Anguilla likewise tries to impart some sense of social awareness to him by
describing the larger world and thereby piquing his interest in a different lifestyle (though
it is unclear to what extent the boy is moved by these conversations). When Cinto is left
an orphan following Valino’s murder-suicide, Anguilla convinces Nuto to take him on as
an apprentice carpenter, hoping that the acquisition of a trade will ease his transition out
of the desperate agrarian life. Throughout these interactions, Anguilla never denigrates
the peasants’ devotion to a hostile land (despite their desperate situation), instead striving
to integrate tradition and innovation.
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If we keep in mind Pavese’s emphasis on the recurrence of experiences (rather
than their first iteration), we can see why Cinto’s boyhood is of even greater importance
to Anguilla than his own. Seeing Gaminella and the surrounding area as a well-traveled
adult, the experiences of his youth acquire a mythic significance that he failed to observe
the first time. However, this mythic glow goes hand-in-hand with a finely tuned political
conscience that Anguilla lacked in his early years. Even while reflecting on the timeless,
ritualistic nature of his home, he recognizes (with Nuto’s help) the economic disparity
created by the exploitation of farmers.77
This specific social issue was not selected at random. Agricultural inequality was a
major concern in Italy, both before and after the war. In Southern Italy in particular, the
unreliability of the land, combined with widespread corruption, made eking out a living
nigh impossible. In the mid-to-late 1940s, extensive peasant agitations and land
occupations in the South led to promises of agrarian reform, but there were few long-term
results; by 1950, the peasant cooperatives had been disbanded, protestors were being
shot, and wealthy landowners had swayed legislation in their favor.78 Both Nuto and
Anguilla reveal a certain pessimism in their political reflections, echoing many
intellectuals’ growing disillusionment with the failure of the government to follow
through on promised changes. In Catalfamo’s reading:
[Nuto] è proiezione narrativa di quella parte fortemente ideologizzata della sinistra
che giudica la Resistenza un fallimento, perché non ha cambiato i rapporti sociali,
cosicché, dopo la cacciata dei nazi-fascisti, tutto è tornato come prima, o quasi.
Esprime la delusione subita da una parte della base della sinistra dopo la rottura dei
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“Adesso il casotto l’ha comprato la madama della Villa e viene a spartire i raccolti con la bilancia… Una
che ha già due cascine e il negozio. Poi dicono i villani ci rubano, i villani sono gente perverse…” (23).
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Paul Ginsborg offers an extensive analysis of postwar agrarian reform in Chapter 4 of A History of
Contemporary Italy (1990).
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governi di unità nazionale e la sconfitta nelle elezioni del 18 aprile 1948, che danno
alla DC di De Gasperi la maggioranza assoluta. (Dialettica 262)
Biasin instead identifies Valino as the locus of this postwar disillusionment:
In Valino is concentrated, physically first and them emblematically, the failure of
the Resistance to shatter the mezzadria, a typical Italian agricultural and bourgeois
institution, which has only recently been modified by the impetus of
industrialization, and yet, even after the Second World War, it was often
synonymous with exploitation and misery, especially in the not very fertile regions
of the Langhe hills, and presented a continual source of stifled bitterness among the
social classes. (“Myth and Death” 189)
In short, for many Italians, especially the poorest, life was not dramatically different after
the fall of fascism. Nuto states that there was a brief moment during the war when “s’era
fatto qualcosa,” when the peasants were waking up to their exploitation, but almost
immediately following the Liberation, things went downhill; now the townspeople
declare that, “tutti i partigiani erano degli assassini” (54, 49). Thus, we might read
Pavese’s decision to draw on myth, with its fixed and timeless qualities, not as a rejection
of contemporary social issues, but rather a critique of the inefficacy of PCI policy. Myth,
with its sense of an immutable fate unaffected by historical events, effectively captured
the reality of the postwar Italian peasant experience. And though myth may not be able to
force fallow lands to bear fruit, at the very least it can provide a sense of belonging.
The mythic temporality of the novel reveals itself not only through generational
repetition, represented by Cinto, and agricultural repetition, represented by seasonal and
agricultural fixity, but also through the framing of World War II as simply one piece of a
larger cycle of oppression and violence. When reflecting on the war, the peasants seem
unsurprised by the horrific events that occurred, and in fact construct narratives
connecting those events to older, even more severe forms of violence:
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E una volta, dicevano i vecchi, era stato ancora peggio – una volta si
ammazzavano, si davano coltellate –, sulla strada di Camo c’era ancora la croce a
uno strapiombo dove avevano fatto ribaltare un biroccino con due dentro. Ma
adesso ci aveva pensato il governo con la politica a metterli tutti d’accordo: c’era
stata l’epoca dei fascisti che picchiavano chi volevano, d’accordo coi carabinieri,
e più nessuno si muoveva. I vecchi dicevano che adesso era meglio. (75)
When Anguilla brings the war up with Valino, he merely shrugs and responds: “Non
hanno fruttato da vivi. Non fruttano da morti” (30). Even Nuto links the everyday
violence of peasant children to the emergence of political violence. After taking a lizard
away from two boys who are tormenting it, he comments: “E poi, si comincia così, si
finisce con scannarsi e bruciare i paesi” (21). The daily beatings endured by the likes of
Cinto and his female relatives, as well as the abuse suffered by Irene, one of the sisters
from La Mora, nearly eclipse the violence of the war period. Thus, the perpetuation of
violence even after the war lends it a sense of timelessness and naturalness that calls into
question the singularity of World War II.79
An implacable sense of destiny pervades the landscape of La luna e i falò. The
only changes wrought by the war are that the priest now has a new platform upon which
to consolidate his power; when murdered fascists are discovered in the hills, he uses the
opportunity to stir up anti-Communist sentiment, offering to perform funerals for the
fascists, but refusing the same right to murdered partisans. Indeed, the economic
inequality of the community seems built into the very land and the blood of its residents.
Nonetheless, there are important moments of rebellion within the novel. Valino’s
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Pavese makes an overt connection between the war and nature when he describes Valino’s attitude
toward the war: “Non mise disgusto nella voce, né pieta. Sembrava parlasse di andare a funghi, o a fascine”
(30). The war had been integrated into his daily routine as seamlessly as the other chores on the farm.
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decision to burn down his home and murder his family, for example, can be viewed
through a political lens, wherein his violence assumes the form of social protest:
Il Valino […] dà fuoco alla Gaminella non per rivoltarsi agli dei, ma per protestare
contro l’ingiustizia economico-sociale voluta dagli uomini. Ne La luna e i falò, il
pessimismo ‘metastorico’ conosce una compensazione, seppur precaria e relativa:
se il destino è ineluttabile, vale, comunque, la pena di opporsi ad esso per ragioni
etiche, di lottare contro l’ingiustizia. (Catalfamo, Dialettica 262)80
Likewise, the fact that Cinto manages to escape from the tragedy that claims his family
(in part by threatening his father with the knife Anguilla purchased for him) suggests that
destiny can be combatted. Catalfamo goes so far as to read Cinto’s story as one of
liberation:
Quella di Cinto è, infatti, una storia esemplare di liberazione da un triplice giogo:
la sofferenza fisica, in quanto zoppo, la miseria economica, l’oppressione
familiare. Il coltello che Cinto brandisce contro il Valino, quando questi vuole
ucciderlo, è una sorta di simbolo di ribellione al destino, all’autorità atavica dei
padri, che hanno diritto di vita e di morte sui figli. In conclusione, tra la
soggezione alle leggi inesorabili della natura e l’onnipotenza dell’io, su cui si
fonda certa propaganda politico-ideologica, Pavese trova una ‘terza via,’ quella
che valorizza la responsabilità individuale, l’eticità della persona, che, comunque,
deve distinguere il bene dal male, deve praticare il primo ed aborrire il secondo,
forzando la mano al destino. (Dialettica 266-67)
Biasin even argues (though less convincingly) that Santa’s dual role as both fascist and
partisan spy assumes the form of rebellion: “By making a mistake, [Santa] finally
transformed her destiny into freedom: she betrayed both fascists and partisans, but only in
an effort to understand, to be herself, disregarding and transcending historical
contingency” (“Myth and Death” 201). Thus, despite Pavese’s pessimism in his portrayal
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In Pavese’s own description of Valino, he is careful to note that it is impotent rage, not wine, that leads
him to beat his family: “Nuto mi disse che dalla piano del Belbo si sentivano le donne urlare quando il
Valino si toglieva la cinghia e le frustava come bestie, e frustava anche Cinto – non era il vino, non ne
avevano tanto, era la miseria, la rabbia di quella vita senza sfogo” (42).
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of destiny, he never cedes to resignation. On the contrary, Nuto advocates active rebellion
against even the most seemingly intractable situations—even to the point of selfdestruction. In fact, he mentions active resistance and destiny in the same breath: “Ma
anche a lui che non si è mosso è toccato qualcosa, un destino – quella sua idea che le cose
bisogna capirle, aggiustarle, che il mondo è mal fatto e che a tutti interessa cambiarlo”
(33). Destiny, then, becomes the impetus for action rather than an impediment to it.81 And
though myth and destiny are closely linked, myth as a narrative structure assumes a
strange equalizing power that allows some level of transcendence of destined social
inequality. When discussing the novels he borrowed from the girls at La Mora, Anguilla
is shocked to discover that the stories are the same as those he was told as a child: “A me
questi romanzi piacevano, me possibile che piacessero anche a Irene, a Silvia, a loro
ch’erano signore e non avevano mai conosciuta la Virgilia né pulito la stalla? Capii che
Nuto aveva davvero ragione quando diceva che vivere in un buco o in un palazzo è lo
stesso, che il sangue è rosso dappertutto, e tutti vogliono esser ricchi, innamorati, far
fortuna” (116). For farmhands and ladies alike, fantasy offers a chance at liberation.
Though initial readings of the novel were primarily in the realist vein (and thus
highly critical of Pavese’s portrayal of political impotence), symbolic analyses are now
more common. Biasin offers a thorough summary of the wide range of symbolic readings
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Biasin notes that Anguilla and Nuto are in many ways foils to one another, with Anguilla embodying
passive characteristics and Nuto active ones. Nuto criticizes Anguilla’s acceptance of (and even delight in)
the repetition that defines peasant life: “Per me, delle stagioni eran passate, non degli anni. Più le cose e i
discorsi che me toccavano eran gli stessi di una volta […] più me facevano piacere. […] Qui Nuto diceva
che avevo torto, che dovevo ribellarmi che su quelle colline si facesse ancora una vita bestiale, inumana,
che la guerra non fosse servita a niente, che tutto fosse come prima, salvo i morti” (42).
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contained merely in the two elements of the novel’s title.82 Rather than repeating his
interpretive work, I will turn my attention instead to the text’s final bonfire, which I read
as an image operating both inside and outside of history.
Anguilla devotes a considerable amount of time to describing his childhood
experiences with the three girls who live at La Mora. The novel culminates with Nuto’s
revelation of the fate of the youngest sister, Santa: she is identified as a double agent,
executed by the partisans, and burned on a pyre in the hills, thus superimposing a
mythical practice onto a historically precise moment. The novel concludes with Nuto’s
observation that, “L’altr’anno c’era ancora il segno, come il letto di un falò” (132). The
fact that Santa, who loses her life due to contemporary political intrigue, is ultimately
destroyed through an ancient, mythic practice sums up in one potent symbol the
interpenetration of politics and myth in Pavese’s imagination. Brian Moloney aptly points
out that bonfires serve a dual purpose: they may be either destructive or restorative (120).
Thus, the destruction wrought by both the fire at Gaminella and the one on the hill
contains within it the possibility of rejuvenation.83
By adopting a mythic framework, Pavese is able to see beyond immediate political
concerns in order to insert his historical moment into a larger human narrative and
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“The Moon and the Bonfires, in fact, contains, even in the title, various symbolic references embedded in
the two image which compose it: the moon as cycle of nature and the seasons, the bonfires as moments of
human time, as an echo of escapism, joy and festivals (already mythical) for the young narrator, and as a
sacred part of human activity and work (in that they serve to awaken the earth, they are also the ancient
propitiatory rites); the moon as an impassive force of destiny, the bonfires as man’s acts—of destructive
violence (Valino burns his own house in rebellion against an unfair destiny), and of compassionate love
(Baracca and Nuto burn Santa consecrating individuality in the face of destiny); the moon as immanence,
the bonfires as transcendence” (“Myth and Death” 202-03).
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There are numerous examples of anthropological theories in which destruction and excess are
characterized as restorative behaviors. Roger Caillois’ work on festivals is perhaps the most useful here
insofar as Pavese frequently featured festivals in his writings; La luna e i falò both begins and ends with a
fair, odd bookends to an otherwise violent narrative. Caillois maintains that the festival returns us to a
mythic temporality as a means of rejuvenating the present world.
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imagine an alternative future—one in which destruction cedes to rejuvenation. Myth thus
becomes a source of liberty, a means of transcending the divide between the individual
and the social, the particular and the universal. Enzo Noé Girardi views this effort at
transcendence as the key difference between Pavese and Leopardi (despite the numerous
parallels drawn between the two poets); for Leopardi, binary terms are always mutually
exclusive, whereas Pavese seeks to reconcile opposites. As Catalfamo explains,
“Senonchè – qui sta la differenza – mentre in Leopardi i due termini si contrappongono e
si escludono […] Pavese mira invece con ogni sforzo alla conciliazione degli opposti,
cioè al superamento del mito in chiarezza, del bestiale nell’umano; e all’incontro del
naturale a dell’umano con il divino; e questo sia in se stesso, come persona, sia nel
pensiero e nella poetica” (Dialettica 5). We can, of course, debate whether Pavese ever
achieved the desired transcendence, but it was undeniably his aim.
La luna e i falò is dense with tragedy: both the everyday tragedy of poverty and
exploitation and the historical tragedy of the war. However, at his most optimistic, Pavese
envisioned myth as a vehicle through which tragic fate might be transformed into
liberty.84 Myth represents the core of the poet, the single theme or image to which he
cannot help but return: “Di ogni scrittore si può dir mitica quell’immagine centrale,
formalmente inconfondibile, cui la sua fantasia tende sempre a tornare a che più lo
scalda” (Mestiere 257-58). It is the specter that haunts all poetic creation. And as that
which symbolizes all of a person’s experiences, it necessarily contains historical and
political valences, in addition to purely aesthetic or existential ones. If Nuto can be
guided by both Communism and the mythic powers of the moon, then perhaps the two
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“Noi siamo nel mondo per trasformare il destino in libertà (e la natura in causalità)” (Mestiere 388).
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threads—one historically contingent, the other eternal; one political, the other poetic—
can be reconciled. Davide Lajolo concludes his biography of Pavese with the following
claim:
Quello che mi pare d’aver documentato con evidenza è che la sua dimensione
mitica non hanno mai voluto né potuto essere un aristocratico distacco, ma la
fiducia, che un colloquio con le masse, era possibile anche nel campo del mito e
del simbolo. La sua strada tendeva al superamento del tradizionalismo
classicheggiante e della ribellione romantica, dell’accademismo e del futurismo,
in uno sforzo costante, anche se vano per lui, di riconciliazione tra gli slanci verso
il mondo e il ripiegamento su se stesso. (382)
I would echo his sentiments, with the amendment that dialogue is not possible even in the
realm of myths and symbols, but rather especially in that realm.
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Chapter Two
Headless, Not Heartless: Bataillean Politics After Acéphale
« Je ne pense pas qu’un mythe puisse appauvrir
l’existence. Je pense au contraire qu’une existence
sans mythe est d’une pauvreté insoutenable. »
—Georges Bataille, Choix de Lettres
« C’est ainsi que la mythologie s’introduit, dès
l’abord, dans notre compréhension, comme la clé de
voûte d’une science de la société peut-être avant
même d’être un jeu d’images ensorcelantes donné
en nourriture à notre inquiétude. »
—Georges Bataille, “Ce que nous avons
entrepris…”
There is a certain irony in selecting Georges Bataille, author of a text entitled
“L’Absence de mythe,” as an exemplar of mythic sensibilities. Written for the occasion
of the 1947 Surrealist exhibition (another irony, given Bataille’s longtime antipathy
towards Surrealist leader André Breton), this brief text—less than a page long—
underscores the dearth of myths in contemporary Western society. And yet, Bataille goes
on to claim that we have made a myth of the absence of myth; that is, the notion of a
liberal humanist subject, free from mythic, irrational prejudices and ruled by reason and
productivity alone, is itself a myth. For even in 1947, Bataille remained invested in an
idea he had first posited during the interwar period, namely that modern man is just as
much in need of myth as his “primitive” ancestors, and that if the old myths have died
out, it is our responsibility to create new ones. The question, then, is: what form should
these new myths assume? If during the interwar period, Bataille proposed rather dramatic
and visceral solutions to the problem—he sought, for example, to reinstate human
sacrifice through his secret society, Acéphale—by the time Europe had plunged into a
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second world war, he realized the impossibility of revitalizing modern man merely by
imitating the sacrifices and rituals of earlier, or non-Western, cultures.85 Consequently,
his pursuit of a modern mythic mentality turned inward, toward meditation and poetry,
rather than explosive violence in the streets. This is not to say that World War II
inaugurated a radical rupture in Bataille’s thinking; on the contrary, I argue (like Susan
Rubin Suleiman and Alexander Irwin, among others) that despite the superficial
contradictions separating his pre- and post-war writings, Bataille displays remarkable
continuity of thought on the subject of myth. If the forms assumed by myth (as well as its
necessary correlatives: sacrifice, the sacred, and transgression) varied over time, myth’s
fundamental tenets remained consistent through historical upheavals.
Of course, those commentators who locate a radical turning point in Bataille’s
work are rarely interested in his supposed equivocation on the subject of myth, instead
highlighting the changes in his political attitude. He was involved with numerous radical
political groups in the 1930s, including Boris Souvarine’s Cercle communiste
démocratique and Contre-Attaque, a political group of intellectuals under whose auspices
Bataille and the Surrealists enjoyed a brief truce. One of Bataille’s primary critiques of
Surrealism was that Breton had failed to translate aesthetic subversion into concrete
political action, and as such Contre-Attaque emphasized force, agitation, and violence.
Drawing on the work of Georges Sorel, Émile Durkheim, and (most troublingly for his
contemporaries) fascist leaders, Bataille sought to use Contre-Attaque to inspire
communal effervescence (and political efficacy) through explosive violence. If Breton
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The human sacrifice plan suffered from a number of logistical problems: most notably, none of the
members of Acéphale wanted to play executioner (though several, including Bataille, volunteered to be the
victim).
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described the simplest Surrealist act as descending to the street and firing at random into
a crowd, it was Bataille who took the sentiment to heart, frequently expressing frustration
at the failure of the Communist party and other leftist groups to incite the same kind of
ecstasy as the fascists—an ecstasy he would later link to sacrality.86
With the outbreak of World War II, however, when many of his contemporaries
were joining the Resistance and finally translating their philosophical commitments into
concrete political ones, Bataille began penning L’Expérience intérieure, the first volume
of his Summa atheologica; from strikes, protests, and human sacrifice, he had progressed
(or regressed, according to some critics) to mysticism, meditation, and solitude, all of
which smacked of political indifference, especially given the magnitude of the violence
wrought by the war.87 The first few sentences of Le Coupable, the second volume of the
Summa atheologica, acknowledges the war, only to dismiss it out of hand: « La date à
laquelle je commence d’écrire (5 septembre 1939) n’est pas une coïncidence. Je
commence en raison des événements, mais ce n’est pas pour en parler. […] Je ne parlerai
pas de guerre, mais d’expérience mystique » (OC V: 245). And this mystical experience
involved, among other things, contemplating photographs of torture victims in order to
attain the anguished ecstasy he deemed a precondition for communication. During the
course of the war, Bataille split his time between Paris and the suburbs, leading a quiet
(and at times tubercular) life; and while accusations of fascist collaboration are
86

In the “Second manifeste du surréalisme” (1930), André Breton writes: “L’acte surréaliste le plus simple
consiste, revolvers aux poings, à descendre dans la rue et à tirer au hasard, tant qu’on peut, dans la foule.
Qui n’a pas eu, au moins une fois, envie d’en finir de la sorte avec le petit système d’avilissement et de
crétinisation en vigueur a sa place toute marquée dans cette foule, ventre à hauteur de canon.”
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Among Bataille’s colleagues in the College of Sociology, some served as soldiers (Michel Leiris, Patrick
Waldberg); some were forced into exile (Roger Caillois, Georges Duthuit); some were arrested (Jean
Paulhan, Jean Wahl); and some were shot for their Resistance activities (Lewitsky). Bataille is decidedly
the odd man out.
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unjustified, it is fair to say that his political activities were decidedly subdued in
comparison both to his pre-war commitments and the commitments of many of his
contemporaries (including Jean-Paul Sartre, with whom Bataille had a long-standing
rivalry).
My goal, then, is twofold: first, to demonstrate that Bataille remained invested in
the possibility of a contemporary mythology in the postwar era, and second (and more
importantly) to show that this mythology had undeniable political consequences. In short,
I maintain that Bataille’s devotion to myth, mysticism, and sacrality at a moment when
such terms seemed at best tangential to prevailing political problems, and at worst a form
of active collaboration with fascism, was in fact a clearly outlined political program, one
in which subversive eroticism and useless sovereignty went hand-in-hand with
revolutionary politics.
I will begin by outlining Bataille’s vision of myth, both before and after 1939, as
well as myth’s interpenetration with concepts like sacrifice, the sacred, and community. I
will then discuss Bataille’s political investments, distinguishing them from more popular
commitments like Sartrean existentialism and Communism. Finally, through close
readings of both his “philosophical” texts and his fiction, in particular his 1950 novel
L’Abbé C, I will demonstrate that Bataille’s mythic thinking and activities were pregnant
with political potential. Indeed, literature will ultimately play a key role in Bataille’s
efforts to envisage a modern mythology, with fiction and poetry assuming the position
once occupied by physical sacrifice.
It is difficult to parse Bataille’s feelings toward myth, given that he deployed the
term to describe different phenomena (ethnographic inquiries, fascist propaganda, poetic
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expression) and often used “myth” interchangeably with other words (ritual, poetry,
sacrifice). Bataille has, at various moments, described myth as collective representation,
provocation, fantasy, ritual, intimacy, immediacy, irrationality, taboo, transgression, and
the overcoming of fear and disgust. While I will attempt to deconstruct these various
features of myth, for the sake of clarity I will begin by establishing Bataille’s mythic
sensibilities according to the definition of myth set forth in the introduction to this
dissertation. What is most important to note is that Bataille did not advocate a myth (that
is, a given narrative), but rather a mythic mentality, or mythic mode of existence. For
Bataille, myth was not a discursive phenomenon, but rather a way of being.

Ecstatic, Catastrophic, and Explosive Time
Temporality is a central feature of such Bataillean concepts as inner experience,
sovereignty, and unemployed negativity. What unites these terms (and what likewise
links them to ethnographic notions of the sacred) is a concern for the present at the
expense of the future. For Bataille, the problem with so-called rational man (and his
counterpart, the capitalist) is that he subordinates present desires to future projects.
Sovereign expenditure, a concept Bataille began to outline in his 1933 essay “La notion
de dépense” and further developed in La Part maudite (1949), must, by definition, exist
only for its own sake. It cannot be enacted in the name of exchange or some sort of gain,
for:
to exist in the service of some interest, to subordinate present life to an end or
future goal, to judge actions according to their usefulness, consider the greater
good or even think of consequences beyond the present moment…in short, to
work or employ one’s negativity in any way is a betrayal of the humanity within
us, is a ‘fragmentation’ of existence and the time of existence. Consequently, if
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Bataille privileges chance occurrences such as laughter, eroticism, or tears, it is
because they are confined to the ‘present moment.’ They are not involved in the
calculations of productive activity. (Gemerchak 66)
The rejection of project is therefore motivated by temporal considerations, the desire to
immerse oneself in a sort of eternal present. To achieve the ecstasy that Bataille believes
fundamental to communication and community, we must enter a mythic, non-linear
time—“time unhinged” [“le temps ‘sorti des gonds’”] (OC V: 89).
Nonetheless, it is important to note that entering “mythic time” is not equivalent
to returning to some primordial past. Bataille knew as well as anyone that the practices
and beliefs of the past were inaccessible to modern man. In fact, he showed little interest
in the past, in history, believing us to be living after the end of history.88 His investment
in the present is more akin to an experience outside of time; when we lose ourselves in
immanence, he claims, we encounter the divine. Bataille tells us that, « l’expérience
intérieure est le contraire de l’action. Rien de plus » (OC V: 59). In place of the profane
time of work and history, Bataille offers a sacred temporality, which is in fact a nontemporality.
Of course, such presentness is not sustainable, a fact that Sartre was quick to point
out:
« Car enfin M. Bataille écrit, il occupe un poste à la Bibliothèque nationale, il lit, il fait
l’amour, il mange » (202). Nevertheless, immanence not only informs his definition of
key notions such as sovereignty and the sacred; it also dictates the form of his fiction.
Stuart Kendall has noted the “hallucinatory sense of time” that pervades Blue of Noon:
“Churning in rumination, Blue of Noon plays with time, which is to say with history and
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See Bataille’s correspondence with Alexandre Kojève in Choix de Lettres.
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with genealogy as well, this last in both the direct sense of parent-child relations and in
the larger Nietzschean sense of the genealogy of values.” (Georges Bataille 121) In the
journal Acéphale, Bataille refers to time alternately as “object of ecstasy,” “catastrophe,”
and “time-explosion.”89 Denis Hollier, in his introduction to the writings of the Collège
de Sociologie, discusses the experiments with time that were so central to all of the
College’s participants, experiments he loosely links to Walter Benjamin’s messianism
(Benjamin being a sometimes visitor to the College). In one of the College’s lectures,
Anatole Lewitzsky defined shamanism (one of the many mystical fields the College
investigated) as a rebellion of man subjected to the force of time. Bataille’s goal, then,
was to resist servility to linear time in whatever way possible.
Abandoning the Light
« Tout le réel est sans valeur, toute valeur
irréelle. »
—Bataille, OC III: 222
« La vie humaine est excédée de servir de
tête et de raison à l’univers. Dans la mesure
où elle devient cette tête et cette raison, dans
la mesure où elle devient nécessaire à
l’univers, elle accepte un servage. »
—Bataille, OC I: 445
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« Surhomme et acéphale sont liés avec un éclat égal à la position du temps comme objet impératif et
liberté explosive de la vie. Dans l’un et dans l’autre cas, le temps devient objet d’extase et il importe en
second lieu qu’il apparaisse comme « retour éternel » dans la vision de Surlej ou comme « catastrophe »
(Sacrifices) ou encore comme « temps-explosion » : il est alors aussi différent du temps des philosophes
(ou même du temps heideggérien) que le christ des saintes érotiques l’est du Dieu des philosophes grecs.
Le mouvement dirigé vers le temps entre d’un coup dans l’existence concrète alors que le mouvement vers
Dieu s’en détournait pendant la première période. » (Acéphale 20)
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Bataille’s objection to future-oriented projects likewise led him to reject
rationality—rational humanism being inordinately concerned with future productivity.
This did not, however, involve a full-scale embrace of irrationality. Despite his flirtation
with Surrealism, for example, (and a more sustained defense of it in the postwar era), he
demonstrated little interest in the unconscious. Though he was undeniably attracted to the
violent effervescence of the crowd, such effervescence cannot be equated with
irrationality. Instead, the key term which Bataille holds in opposition to reason is affect.90
Bataille’s position is closer to that of Lefebvre who, in Critique de la vie quotidienne,
advocates moving outside of Western reason not to assert an opposite to reason, as in the
writing of romantic philosophy and literature, but instead to define everyday lived
experience by something other than that which is dictated by the strictures of reason.
Kendall likewise underscores the fact that Bataille’s “mythological anthropology”
embraced both rational and irrational forces (Georges 53). Bataille’s favored object of
criticism throughout his career was not so much rationality as utilitarian thinking, or
utilitarian reductionism. “Inner experience,” Kendall tells us, “is the opposite of
(Hegelian) useful activity” (Georges 163). Faced with Hegel’s negativity—a useful
negativity—Bataille proposes an unemployed negativity whose goal is expenditure
without external justification.91 Ffrench frames this thinking as supra-rational, rather than
irrational:
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According to Amy Hollywood, Bataille’s language “operates through emotion—rather than through (or
perhaps better, in addition to) reason” (31-32).
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Opposition to Hegel is a consistent theme throughout Bataille’s career. Rodolphe Gasché, for example,
describes Bataille’s mythological anthropology as a systemtic takedown of Hegel’s phenomenology. See
Georges Bataille: Phenomenology and Phantasmatology (2012).

94

Bataille does not, as might be supposed, propose an irrationalism. His theory of
the sacred is a science of the heterogeneous, a supra-rational critique of
rationality. Bataille’s account of affectivity attempts a form of supplementation of
materialist Marxism with the sociological account of collective exaltation and
social ‘effervescence’ (a word favoured by Durkheim and which as we will see
has a particular currency in Bataille’s writing of this period) engendered by the
sacred. (After 29)
A devoted reader of Dostoevsky, “Bataille assimilated the wisdom of the underground
man who realized the inhumanity of subjecting oneself to reason and mathematics,
calculations and prosperity, and who asserted the positive value of letting pure caprice
and whimsical desire command one’s actions, even if—no, precisely because—it goes
against reason and common sense” (Gemerchak 64). For Bataille, humanist ideology and
representational thinking (both linked to reason) are distorting and alienating. His
decision to foreground non-rational forces is justified insofar as they represent an
undeniable component of human experience. Whereas reason seeks to either assimilate or
reject that which is heterogeneous, or radically other, Bataille’s vision of sovereignty
necessitates the acceptance of all facets of human identity, even (and especially) those
elements that are most grotesque or terrifying—that is, those that are irrational. In the
end, it is the refusal of reason that brings us closest to the divine: « Dionysos est un dieu
ivre, c’est le dieu dont l’essence divine est la folie. Mais, pour commencer, la folie ellemême est d’essence divine. Divine, c’est-à-dire, ici, refusant la règle de la raison » (OC
X: 610, italics mine). Bataille (like Nietzsche before him, with whom Bataille closely
identified) wrote in the shadow of this mad god, Dionysus, seeking a means to effectively
communicate, and even provoke, this experience of divine madness.92
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Bataille devoted an entire issue of Acéphale to Dionysus.
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The Evil Individual
« Il ne peut y avoir de connaissance sans une
communauté de chercheurs, ni d’expérience
intérieure sans communauté de ceux qui la
vivent. » —Bataille, OC V: 37
« Le mal serait l’existence des êtres – en tant
qu’elle implique leur séparation. »
—Bataille, OC VI: 41

Bataille showed little patience for the hyper-individualism that has characterized
Western philosophy and politics since the Enlightenment. His ethnographic interest in
“primitive” cultures and his keen study of Durkheim and Mauss stemmed not from a
naïve nostalgia for seemingly simpler (and thus superior) societies, but rather a
recognition of both the necessity for cohesive communities and the waning efficacy of
such communities in the modern era; the Collège de Sociologie blamed the development
of bourgeois individualism for the devirilization of man. The centrality of community in
Bataille’s thought cannot be overstated; Jean-Luc Nancy and Maurice Blanchot have
each devoted a book to the topic—La Communauté désoeuvrée
and La Communauté inavouable, respectively—and numerous other monographs and
articles have sought to parse Bataille’s writings on the creation and function of
community.93
According to Bataille, the foundation of community is concomitant with the
sacrifice of the self; through self-loss, self-forgetting, or self-sacrifice, whether in sex or
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See, for example: Sweedler, Dismembered Community: Bataille, Blanchot, Leiris, and the Remains of
Laure; Mitchell and Winfree, eds., The Obsessions of Georges Bataille: Community and Communication;
ffrench, After Bataille: Sacrifice, Exposure, Community.
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other social forms of unproductive expenditure, we achieve unity with others. This selfloss is paradoxically the path to understanding one’s identity. For self-loss, Bataille
claims, is a wound whereby we achieve communication; communication binds the
wounds of discontinuous beings, thereby creating continuity.94 « Un individu », he writes,
« n’est entier que cessant de se distinguer des autres, ses semblables » (OC XI : 63).
It is necessary to note the methods of community building endorsed by Bataille.
Contrary to common sociological understandings of community, whereby the community
coheres around shared goals (e.g. work), Bataille’s community arises from unemployed
negativity. It is a social bond not subject to recuperation, accumulation, or production—
the “inoperative community” addressed by Nancy.95 Bataille’s efforts to revitalize the
notion of community took several different forms: the explicit call for community in such
groups as Acéphale and the Collège de Sociologie, groups that desired “contestatory
creativity in the face of political disaster”; communities of excess motivated by
transgression and expenditure (best exemplified by “primitive” cultures); and
communities bound by eroticism and/or inner experience (Mitchell 2). This third stage in
his thinking of community may initially appear contradictory: how can inner experience,
which would seem to imply solitude, engender community? Yet we must not forget that
the communication of inner experience is just as important as inner experience tout court.
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“Community for Bataille is born of a crisis in communication, a rupture in communicability in which
understanding can nevertheless be shared. Identity is discovered only in self-loss. In communication, as
Bataille said, ‘beings are lost in a convulsion that binds them together. But they communicate only by
losing a portion of themselves. Communication binds them only through wounds where their unity, their
integrity disperses in fever’” (Kendall, Georges 150).
95
As Michèle Richman explains, “In his important study, Jean-Luc Nancy underscores how the Bataillian
premise that all community is rendered possible by an expenditure or dépense, traditionally in the form of a
sacrifice, breaks with the usual telos of community united through a work or collective goals. Whence
Nancy’s title ‘La communauté désoeuvrée’” (“Sacred Group” 76).
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It is by sharing anguished ecstasy that we achieve connectedness. Indeed, the moniker
“inner experience” is misleading for:
inner experience is not what it seems to be: internal (inner, interior) to an
experiential subject. Rather, it serves to undermines the classic opposition
between inside and outside, subject and object, as there is no interior place into
which the subject can retreat: ‘inner’ experience is ex-centric experience. Indeed,
the only sense in which it can be referred to as ‘inner’ comes from the fact that it
escapes assimilation by any external authority (language or knowledge) and does
not refer to any goal or reality transcending the experience itself (God, state,
salvation, or profit in any form). (Gemerchak 67)
In short, inner experience—the notion that is often cited as the turning point in Bataille’s
thought—is not incompatible with the more explicitly communal nature of his prewar
writings. If Bataille seems to change tack in the late 1930s and early 1940s, replacing the
collective effervescence of the crowd with inner experience, the two experiences lead to
the same result: “the transfiguration of individual subjectivity into a state of
disindividuation,” and thus into a community (Allison 94). Both the delirium of the
crowd and inner experience are motivated by an intense encounter with the sacred that
generates connectedness. However, it is not merely in eroticism or torture that one can
locate sacrality and community; myth also emerges as one of the most effective ways of
creating community. For Bataille, myth is not intellectual or abstract, but rather becomes
real “insofar as it produces effects, or affects, in those who believe in it, in their
subjective attitudes” (ffrench, After 21). His search for modern myths was a search to
revitalize elective communities through non-utilitarian means in an age of extreme
individualism. And, as I will later explore in more detail, community (and therefore
myth) are central to Bataille’s political project, the means by which hegemony is
disrupted through radical heterogeneity.
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Like Waves in the Sea
In his pursuit of communication, Bataille goes beyond merely privileging the
collective over the individual; he ultimately advocates transgression of the boundaries
separating self and other, outside and inside. Transgression, he argues, is the founding
principle of existence, such that the borders between man and nature, subject and object,
sacred and profane, are disrupted. In short, he aspires to totality through mythic fusion.
However, it is important not to mistake Bataille’s totalizing impulses for the
totality of totalitarian ideology or other master narratives.96 Totality of the latter sort,
when encountering a radically heterogeneous element, seeks to either appropriate or
expel said element. Its movement is always in the direction of homogenization. Bataille,
on the other hand, embraced the heterogeneous, so much so that he developed a “science”
of heterology.97 Mythic fusion, therefore, is the antithesis of homogenization, for “fusion
requires heterogeneity. Bataille’s conception of ‘fusion,’ then, is not the result of either
an appropriation of the other or an expropriation of oneself into identity with the world
but the introduction of something other at the core of the self” (Mitchell 11). Indeed,
Bataille rejected the Aufhebung of Hegelian dialectics, instead fighting to maintain things
in contradiction. In his discussion of the potentialities of the human spirit, for example,
which range from the ascetic to the voluptuous, he states: « Je ne tente pas de les réduire
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“Assimilation to sameness should not be mistaken for the sovereign moment of fusion so attractive to
Bataille” (Mitchell 11).
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“[W]hat he sometimes would call Heterology, sometimes scatology or even base materialism [was] a
materialism based more on the abject than on the object. Matter there was defined less by its internal
properties than by an absolute impropriety, its resistance to any appropriation or assimilation—even
intellectual. The residue of discharges, matter is first of all an object of disgust. […] Heterology would be
the theory of that which theory expels. In its battle with the angel of repugnance, in the depths of darkness,
thought persistently faces the things that repel it. What unites men? The things that repel them. Society
stands upon the things it cannot stand” (Hollier xix).
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les unes aux autres, mais je m’efforce de saisir, au-delà de chaque possibilité négatrice de
l’autre, une ultime possibilité de convergence » (OC X: 11). Myth, then, represents the
totality that arises in communication—the totality that resists utility: “he is at pains to
distinguish separation, utility and servitude from totality and from myth [and] moves
towards the reactivation of myth as the image which will call the totality of existence into
play” (ffrench, After 21).
The image that most effectively summarizes Bataille’s conception of fusion is that
of water (also a favorite metaphor for Nietzsche): « car les rieurs deviennent ensemble
comme les vagues de la mer, il n’existe plus entre eux de cloison tant que dure le rire, ils
ne sont pas plus séparés que deux vagues » (OC V: 113). In order to achieve this fusion,
this radical self-loss, Bataille initially prescribes visceral experiences: laughter, tears, sex,
death, torture. Yet during World War II, he began to explore the possibility of
engendering fusion through dramatization: that is, through poetry, tragedy, and myth.

Creation, Destruction
“Guilty begins with a poem, reads like a
diary, and contains passages of dense
intellectual reflection as well as
commentary. […] Simply put, this book is
all but hopelessly unpublishable. It may be
unreadable.”
—Stuart Kendall, Introduction to Guilty
Bataille’s texts are notoriously difficult to categorize generically, a fact he
unabashedly acknowledged; in his preface to Haine de la poésie, he states: « Sur la
publication, en un même livre, de poésies et d’une contestation de poésie, du journal d’un
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mort et des notes d’un prélat de mes amis, j’aurais peine à m’expliquer » (OC III: 508).
He culled from numerous genres, including fiction, poetry, autobiography, philosophical
essay, and ethnographic treatise, among others, in his efforts to capture something of
“total man.”98 He is likewise quite overt about his influences, drawing on (and
contesting) everyone from Nietzsche to Hegel, Sade to Camus. However, he rarely offers
critical analysis of the sort we might expect from a philosopher commenting on a fellow
traveler. Sur Nietzsche, for example, despite its title, could only be dubbed an “analysis”
of Nietzsche in the broadest sense of the world; instead, Bataille seeks to become
Nietzsche, transforming Nietzsche’s ideas into something new and uniquely Bataillean.
As he explains in the introduction:
En ce livre écrit dans la bousculade je n’ai pas développé ce point de vue
théoriquement. Je crois même qu’un effort de ce genre serait entaché de lourdeur.
Nietzsche écrivit « avec son sang » : qui le critique ou mieux l’éprouve ne le peut
que saignant à son tour. […] Qu’on n’en toute plus un instant : on n’a pas entendu
un mot de l’œuvre de Nietzsche avant d’avoir vécu cette dissolution éclatante
dans la totalité. (OC VI: 15, 22)
Kendall explains that, “Like the Greek tragedians, who rewrote myths familiar to their
viewers, Bataille rewrites ideas in order to provoke an experience. He relies on and
repeats the language of ‘authorities’ whose work he writes through, challenges and
carries into unexpected territories, to unexpected uses and conclusions” (Georges 39). In
his quest for communication (which, in Bataillean terminology, is closer to something
like experience or affect than pure discourse), Bataille took as his inspiration a collection
of authors that can only be described as heterogeneous—Christian mystics, sociologists,
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« Au fond, l’homme entier n’est qu’un être où la transcendance s’abolit, de qui rien n’est plus séparé : un
peu guignol, un peu Dieu, un peu fous… c’est la transparence » (OC VI: 20).
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Surrealists, economists. His corpus is at once “utterly obsessively coherent and utterly
incoherent and disrupted” (Kendall, Georges 95).99
His fiction is just as difficult to categorize; “Blue of Noon is in fact a collage of
fragments assembled for rumination” (Kendall, Georges 121). And in order to acquire
these fragments for reassembly, one must first break apart existing texts and thought. If
we define bricolage as the fragmentation of existing entities in order to reassemble them
in new (and unexpected) ways, then it is clear that this is the organizing principle for
Bataille’s thought. When, in a text like L’Expérience intérieure, he prescribes selflaceration, it is not in order to destroy the subject tout court. His aim is rather to break the
both the subject and object apart in order to form a new being that fails to recognize clear
subject-object distinctions, instead advocating continuity: “The workings of death in the
text of Haine de la poésie designate the place where the subject of the speech-act comes
to die, to dissolve and be born again, or, more precisely, to lose himself in order to
recompose himself differently, since loss is the enabling condition of symbolic
enactment” (Lala 108). Writing for Bataille thus becomes a means of self-destruction
whereby reader and writer are brought into closer proximity.

Sacrifice, Sacrality, and Communication
One of the reasons critics claim that Bataille lost interest in the myth-politics
connection after 1939 is that, whereas he uses the word myth frequently and explicitly in
his pre-war writings, the term mostly drops out in his later work. However, Bataille is
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For a more complete sense of Bataille’s intellectual trajectory, see Volume XII of his Complete Works,
which includes a list of every book he checked out of the Bibliothèque nationale from 1922-1950.
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notorious for terminological inconsistency, and though the word may be absent, the core
tenets that undergird his understanding and appreciation of myth persist in his discussions
of sacrifice, the sacred, and communication. As a result, Bataille’s reflections on the
latter three can reveal much about his thinking on the former.
Sacrifice could be deemed the most consistently vital term in Bataille’s thinking.
Though it is most famously associated with Acéphale, the secret society that
contemplated enacting a human sacrifice, it assumes an array of forms, both physical and
metaphysical.100 For Bataille, sacrifice is the basis of the social bond, a unifying act that
creates or revitalizes communities through a shared identification with both victim and
executioner. In “primitive” societies, social revitalization was facilitated by proximity to
the sacred; as Kendall makes clear, “Sacrifice, as a religious practice, establishes a
connection between two separate spheres of experience, the homogeneous profane sphere
of everyday life and the heterogeneous sacred sphere of timeless and infinite value, the
realm of the gods” (Georges 99). Sacrifice is therefore a means of accessing the sacred
realm, of overcoming the limits of profane existence. Sacrifice opens the subject and
exposes him to loss, and this loss is the wound whereby communication between
discontinuous beings becomes possible. If we return to our initial definition of myth, it
becomes clear that sacrifice and myth are united through the shared goals of community
and communication.
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“For Bataille, sacrifice describes a wide set of practices—from eroticism to festivals to writing—that
challenge the modern modalities of being. As a political practice, sacrifice is a mediated form of selfdemolition, which allows its practitioners to unravel violently the tapestry of the modern servile self”
(Goldhammer 23).
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In direct contradiction to other forms of sacrifice (e.g., Hegelian), Bataillean
sacrifice is not for anything; it is not subordinated to a project, or enacted as an exchange.
It is a sacrifice for nothing—a loss without gain. And yet, despite Bataille’s strict
opposition to utility, sacrifice does possess “useful” political potential; as Goldhammer
argues, “In order to overcome the modern institutions and ideas that reduce human beings
to servile things, Bataille argued for the adoption of sacrificial practices whose invocation
of the sacred would shatter the reifying fictions of modern life” (16). In its modern
iteration, then, sacrifice is that which opposes totalization (whether fascistic or
capitalistic) by operating beyond the twin realms of utility and servility.
It is important to note that sacrificial violence is by no means equivalent to the
violence of war, and more specifically to fascist violence. It is not the destruction of the
thing (be it man, animal, or object) that matters, but rather the destruction of the thingness
of the thing (in properly Heideggerian terms); the point is to remove the sacrificial victim
from the realm of everyday, profane reality—from the realm of work and utility—and
thereby restore him to the world of unintelligible caprice. This does not necessarily
require a literal death, as evidenced by the fact that Bataille eventually turned away from
blood sacrifice and toward the dramatization of sacrifice. If the sacrificial victim could be
symbolically stripped of his ties of subordination, the effect would be as powerful as that
of a physical sacrifice. As Bataille explains:
La puissance qu’a la mort en général éclaire le sens du sacrifice, qui opère comme
la mort, en ce qu’il restitue une valeur perdue par le moyen d’un abandon de cette
valeur. Mais la mort ne lui est pas nécessairement liée et le sacrifice le plus
solennel peut n’être pas sanglant. Sacrifier n’est pas tuer, mais abandonner et
donner. La mise à mort n’est qu’une exposition d’un sens profond. Ce qui importe
est de passer d’un ordre durable, où toute consumation des ressources est
subordonnée à la nécessité de durer, à la violence d’une consumation
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inconditionnelle ; ce qui importe est de sortir d’un monde de choses réelles, dont
la réalité découle d’une opération à longue échéance et jamais dans l’instant –
d’un monde qui crée et conserve (qui crée au profit d’une réalité durable). Le
sacrifice est l’antithèse de la production, faite en vue de l’avenir, c’est la
consumation qui n’a d’intérêt que pour l’instant même. (OC VII : 311)
In short, sacrifice means leaving the world of duration in favor of immanence—which is
precisely what myth aims to do. Thus, though Bataille’s attachment to blood sacrifices
waned after 1939, his belief in the general vitality of sacrifice as a path to communication
and community did not. He merely retooled his views on form, shifting his attentions to
symbolic or dramatic enactments of sacrifice. This is where myth acquires renewed
importance, for myth emerges as the symbolic approximation of a literal sacrifice, just as
closely tied to blood as the sacrifices of old: « Les mythes sont même plus que les foyers
de cohésion des existences individuelles: ils sont ce pourquoi un homme peut donner ce
qu’il a de plus précieux, son sang » (L’Apprenti sorcier 374). In its opposition to linear
temporality, rationality, individuality, and discontinuity, a mythic way of being could,
Bataille argued, prove as positively disruptive and rejuvenative as more ancient rituals.
The sacred, in both its Christian and ethnographic incarnations, is likewise a
central tenet of Bataille’s thought. The College of Sociology was founded on the
principle of sacred sociology: that is, not a sociology of the sacred, but a sociology
“where the group itself embodied the sacred character it would also study” (ffrench, After
15). Unfortunately, defining the sacred is a tricky task; Bataille himself admits: « De ce
mot, nous ne pouvons donner une définition justifiable » (OC X: 626). Perhaps its most
central feature is its opposition to the profane; Denis Hollier refers to the sacred-profane
distinction as “the basis for all aspects of the thinking of Bataille” (qtd. Guerlac 22). In
Théorie de la religion, Bataille associates the sacred with continuity—that is, a lack of
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distinction between subject and object—and the profane with discontinuity. In a similar
vein, he foregrounds the communal aspect of sacrality: the sacred is supra-individual; it
ruptures isolation; it is a convulsive form of communication comparable to love.101 It is
this feature of the sacred that brings it in closest proximity to sacrifice, for it is the
sacrality of sacrifice that unites communities in a mutual wounding and shared
identification with the victim: « Le sacré est justement la continuité de l’être révélé à
ceux qui fixent leur attention, dans un rite solennel, sur la mort d’un être discontinu »
(OC X: 27).
If the profane realm is one of work and utility, then the sacred is by definition
useless. The sacred is the realm of loss, beyond meaning and instrumentality. It is the
persistence of the natural order—the natural order being that which preceded work.102
The sacred is almost always described in terms of affect and immanence (as opposed to
reason and futurity). It engenders an immediate, affective violence that Bataille
associated with crowd psychology and mass violence (at least in the prewar period): « Le
sacré est ce bouillonnement prodigue de la vie que, pour durer, l’ordre des choses
enchaîne et que l’enchaînement change en déchaînement, en d’autres termes en
violence » (OC VII: 312).103
What, then, is the relationship between the sacred and myth? Though Bataille
favors the “immediate affectivity” of the sacred, it nonetheless “may be engaged or
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According to Kendall, “Bataille described the sacred as nothing but ‘a privileged moment of communal
unity, a moment of convulsive communication of what is ordinarily stifled.’ In the margin of his draft,
beside that line, he wrote ‘identical to love’” (Georges 145).
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« Le monde sacré n’est, en un sens, que le monde naturel subsistant dans la mesure où il n’est pas
entièrement réductible à l’ordre instauré par le travail, c’est-à-dire à l’ordre profane » (OC X: 115).
103
“Crowd psychology is thus an incidence of the sacred, and the violent mass appears as the contemporary
equivalent of the archaic tribe in a state of collective exaltation” (ffrench, After 31).
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conjured by means of a mythic representation” (ffrench, After 50). The sacred by nature
defies representation, order, and discourse, yet myth emerges, if not as the sacred in
discursive form, then as a sort of totem that possesses the power to provoke sacred
experiences. Myths, then, are not merely stories but rather the symbolic repository for
collective (and sacred) effervescence. Myth symbolically enacts sacrifice, eliciting
communal, affective responses, which in turn allow us to access sacrality.
Bataille was famously resistant to discourse: it is not language, he claims, but
affect that lies at the heart of communication. Suzanne Guerlac reminds us that “Bataille
initially rejected language altogether for silence, the silence of a non-savoir (nonknowledge) which was not at all a philosophical concept nor primarily a poetic mood or
language effect. It was an experience of emotional intensity” (17). His privileging of
sacrifice over linguistic expression was due to the fact that “Sacrifice, performed within
the context of sacred ritual, could bind the members of a community together more
forcefully, Bataille believed, and more enduringly, than anything words could do because
of its overwhelming affective shock” (Guerlac 17). Yet despite Bataille’s opposition to
discourse, he maintained that communication held the key to community, and indeed to
existence itself: « la communication est un fait qui ne se surajoute nullement à la réalitéhumaine, mais la constitue » (OC V: 37). He defines communication broadly as the
experience of being outside oneself and thereby connected with another.104 In the Summa
atheologica, he likens communication to a kind of mutual laceration, a wounding
whereby we are able to form attachments to others:
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“Communication in Bataille’s sense of the word is rather the volatile experience of being ‘outside’
oneself, ‘beyond’ oneself in relation to another human being” (Gemerchak 68).
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Dans la mesure où les êtres semblent parfaits, ils demeurent isolés, refermés sur
eux-mêmes. Mais la blessure de l’inachèvement les ouvre. Par ce qu’on peut
nommer inachèvement, animale nudité, blessure, les divers êtres séparés
communiquent, prennent vie en se perdant dans la communication de l’un à
l’autre. […] La communication demande un défaut, une « faille » ; elle entre,
comme la mort, par un défaut de la cuirasse. Elle demande une coïncidence de
deux déchirures, en moi-même, en autrui. (OC V: 263, 266)
Furthermore, any “philosophical revelation” remains meaningless unless communicated.
In fact, his commitment to the principle of communication was such that he came out
strongly against Jean Genet, an author with whom he shared countless aesthetic affinities,
because of Genet’s alleged refusal to communicate: « L’œuvre de Genet, quoi qu’on
puisse en dire qui en montre le sens n’est immédiatement ni sacrale ni poétique parce que
l’auteur la refuse à la communication » (OC IX: 302). When Bataille spoke out against
language and in favor of silence, discourse was frequently his true target—that is,
language defined as utilitarian, rational, slavish. « On ne peut, discursivement, exprimer
l’intimité » (OC VII : 311). His aim in L’Expérience intérieure was to explore
alternatives to the conventions of written discourse. Though he desired communication,
the words of the text are not in and of themselves that communication. Instead, he
described meditative practices that, if properly enacted by the reader, would ideally lead
to his laceration, a wounding through which he might communicate not with words, but
with affect.105 Amy Hollywood explains that, “Bataille, following the tradition of Pascal,
Nietzsche, and the Surrealists, offers an alternative, a language that operates through
emotion—rather than through (or perhaps in addition to) reason” (31-32). Even if Bataille
had wanted to disseminate a message, the nature of the experiences he sought to describe
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See in particular his description of the photograph of a Chinese torture victim in L’Expérience
intérieure. Meditative contemplation of the photograph provoked ecstasy in Bataille, an ecstasy he believed
could approximate the state of mind of the victim.
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defied such efforts. As Alexander Irwin reminds us, “A mystical method ‘cannot be
communicated in writing’. But it can be embodied in and as the anguished substance of a
human life: a life that produces itself (and enacts – repeatedly – its own violent end) as
writing” (146).
What Bataille sought to communicate was an experience, affect beyond discourse,
what Irwin dubs “literary sainthood”: “sacred figures transmit, not philosophical or
political theses, but an attitude, a style of existence, an orientation that perhaps cannot be
precisely verbalized, but whose emotional atmosphere the ‘addressee’ absorbs” (217).
How, then, does this notion of communication relate to the aforementioned themes of
sacrifice, the sacred, and most importantly myth? Though certain terminological
convergences must be inferred, others are explicitly stated in Bataille’s texts, as when he
equates sacrifice and communication in L’Expérience intérieure (though he specifies that
sacrifice is communication through the heart, rather than the mind—“mouvement du
cœur”) (OC V: 65). This view of communication is what led him to initially embrace
those experiences and rituals (like human sacrifice and torture) most likely to elicit strong
affective responses. However, as previously discussed, in the postwar period he began to
consider a more capacious definition of communication that might include more
“traditional” engagements with language. In the Summa atheologica and later works,
inner experience and writing become the new means of symbolically approximating the
sovereign experience generated by blood sacrifices of the past. And the particular form of
writing to which Bataille was most drawn was poetry, which he defines as the modernday equivalent of myth: « Mais la poésie n’est plus, de nos jours, une expression de
mythes donnés avant elle, elle-même est le mythe […] qui nous rend au mouvement
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éperdu et si volontiers déchaîné, que nous sommes » (OC XI: 274). By linking myth to
poetry, he both resurrects the potential for a modern mythology, and rescues literature
from wholesale dismissal as servile. For not all forms of poetry assume the status of
myth—only those that enact a sovereign form of writing capable of lacerating readers to
the point of tears or laughter.

From Silence to Sovereignty: Poetry’s Transgression of Poetry
“Il s’agit de faire entendre cette chanson de
la sirène qu’est pour Bataille la littérature,
chanson dans laquelle se composent la
séduction et la terreur.”
—Ernst and Louette, Georges Bataille,
cinquante ans après
“Mythic invention […] is not so different
from artistic creation.”
—ffrench, After Bataille
The discrepancy between Bataille’s pre- and postwar thought, then, does not
involve, as most critics have claimed, a loss of political fervor, but rather a shift in
attitude regarding the political potential of literature. The College of Sociology, one of
the principle vehicles for Bataille’s thought in the late 1930s, was fervently opposed to
art and literature. In fact, Bataille’s criticisms of Surrealism and other so-called
revolutionary groups centered on their over-investment in the creation of “works”; as
Denis Hollier explains in his introduction to the writings of the College, “by exhibiting
and publishing, the [Surrealist] movement renounced its revolutionary inspiration. They
talked about changing existence but ended up signing paintings, books, and checks like
ordinary artists” (ix). If for Hegel, the sacred emerges as art’s fourth dimension, the
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College assumed the opposite position: “Restoration of the sacred begins by breaking
with the world of art. The College is a negative cathedral” (Hollier xi). Roger Caillois,
who, along with Bataille and Michel Leiris, helped to found the College, was particularly
virulent in his critiques of the novel. In Puissances du roman, he describes the novel as
an attack against society itself, a drain on the sacred that works against unity. For
Caillois, resistance to fascism began with resistance to the novel. Literature was servile,
the College claimed, and consequently any “revolutionary” movement that remained
invested in literature was doomed to failure. Furthermore, since reading a novel is a
solitary pleasure, it robs men of their collective potential. Bataille expanded on the
connection between (failed) artistic movements and political ones, stating that democracy
and the novel are linked through their devirilizing impulses: “The crimes of democracy
therefore are no different from the crimes of the novel. Like the novel, democracy makes
men lose their virile unity: democracy, by desocializing, ‘devirilizes’ them,
(‘emasculates’ them, Bataille said). It spreads them apart, disseminates them, and dooms
them to emptiness, interstices, and solitude” (Hollier xvi). Hollier has even suggested that
Bataille’s decision to delay publication of his own novel, Le Bleu du ciel, for over twenty
years is linked to his literary antipathy during the 1930s. Yet beginning with
L’Expérience intérieure and continuing through the postwar writings, Bataille revealed a
profound investment in poetry, treating sacrifice and poetry as equivalent terms insofar as
both are safety valves for the release of excess energies.106 In fact, as early as “La notion
de dépense” (1933), Bataille had suggested that, “Le terme de poésie […] peut être
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Excess energy being the central conceit of his “economic masterpiece,” La Part maudite. For more on
this, see ffrench, After Bataille, p. 85.
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considéré comme synonyme de dépense: il signifie, en effet, de la façon la plus précise,
création au moyen de la perte. Son sens est donc voisin de celui de sacrifice” (OC I:
307).107
As previously discussed, Bataille’s penchant for working in multiple genres, and
for tearing apart and reassembling these genres in novel ways, makes it difficult to trace a
clear trajectory of his feelings toward literary form. Nonetheless, given his tendency to
describe poetry and myth as comparable genres, and given poetry and myth’s parallel
imbrication with sacrifice, further exploration into his attitude toward poetry will help
elucidate his investment in myth.108 Mythology and poetry may not be identical, but both
are forms of the sacred and sacrifice; both seek to avoid servitude; both operate against
discourse in the spirit of contestation. Though he recognizes the limitations of the
analogy, he nonetheless locates in modern poetry the potential for inciting the same
affective responses previously restricted to myth. If, with the outbreak of World War II,
Bataille seemed to abandon those rituals and concepts most closely connected to myth
(e.g. human sacrifice), these same rituals later reappear in forms more appropriate to the
social and historical context in which Bataille was operating. Indeed, this transition from
mythic ritual to poetry is clearly outlined in L’Érotisme, wherein Bataille describes
literature as religion’s heir: « Le sacrifice est un roman, c’est un conte, illustré de manière
sanglante » (OC X: 89).
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In Michael Richardson’s introduction to The Absence of Myth, he explains: “Above all, Bataille
considered poetry to be the only real residue of the communal sense of the sacred that had survived into the
present-day society; thus it is that he makes the equation between it and sacrifice” (22).
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« En particulier, les mythes, à certain égards analogues aux rêves, ne diffèrent pas entièrement des
trouvailles poétiques récentes. Il est vrai qu’un poème moderne n’a nullement le sens d’un mythe, mais un
mythe a parfois le même attrait qu’un poème moderne » (OC XI : 57). See also: Bataille, “Ce que nous
avons entrepris…” in L’Apprenti sorcier, pp. 367-78.
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Though the abruptness of Bataille’s transition from the pre- to postwar eras has
perhaps been overstated, it is true that he recognized the inefficacy of his early efforts to
recreate ancient forms of myth and sacrifice and sought alternative outlets for expenditure
more appropriate to the modern world. And though he virulently rejected literature
pressed into political service, he did not dismiss the possibility of poetry having social
consequences; in the postwar years “the writing on poetry mediates the political concerns
of the pre-war period” (ffrench, After 88). But how does Bataille envisage postwar
French politics playing out in poetry and myth? How can artistic creations preserve the
effervescence of myth without bowing to prescribed political aims?

Contemplation as Action
During the 1930s, Bataille wrote explicitly about the political consequences of
myth. The Collège de Sociologie (1937-39) and, to a lesser extent, Acéphale (1936-39),
were created with the express purpose of exploring the interpenetration of myth and
politics. In a letter to Pierre Kaan, he insisted on the need to fight fire with fire—the need
to employ fascist (i.e. mythological) techniques to combat fascism: « Je n’ai pas de doute
quant au plan sur lequel nous devrions nous placer – cela ne peut être que celui du
fascisme lui-même, c’est-à-dire le plan mythologique » (L’Apprenti sorcier 112). The
key difference, of course, was that “Bataille’s project would put myth in the service of
the community of individuals rather than in the service of their oppressive leaders,
political, religious, economic or otherwise” (Kendall, Georges 107). The problem with
formal political parties, and even with some “radical” groups, was that “the forum of the
political party does not permit the expression of revolutionary effervescence and
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necessarily leads to compromise at the level of ‘reality’. The political space of the party is
in effect exceeded by the affective force of the street, in other words by heterogeneous
affectivity or effervescence” (ffrench, After 48).
Disillusioned with the inefficacy of traditional political methods and seeking
alternative expressions of the subversive force of the sacred, Bataille began work on the
Summa atheologica in 1939.109 This is the moment often described by critics (taking their
cue from Sartre) as Bataille’s mystical turn.110 The term is not entirely inaccurate;
Bataille himself welcomed the moniker, freely admitting to the influence of such
Christian mystics as Angela of Foligno, Theresa of Avila, and St. John of the Cross on
his own work. He was careful, however, to distinguish between his meaning of mysticism
and the meaning typically attributed to it: « J’entend par expérience intérieure ce que
d’habitude on nomme expérience mystique : les états d’extase, de ravissement, au moins
d’émotion méditée. Mais je songe moins à l’expérience confessionnelle, à laquelle on a
dû se tenir jusqu’ici, qu’à une expérience nue, libre d’attaches, même d’origine, à
quelque confession que ce soit. C’est pourquoi je n’aime pas le mot mystique » (OC V:
15). What attracted Bataille to mysticism was the notion of contemplation as action, of
inner ecstasy as a precondition of external political change.111 Whereas Sartre (along with
Caillois and others) saw politics and mysticism as fundamentally antithetical, Bataille
placed them in dialogue, such that communication engendered by the shared wounds of
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To cite merely one example of his political frustrations, in April 1935 Bataille, Pierre Kaan, and Jean
Dautry sent a card to various friends and comrades which asked simply: “Que faire? Devant le fascisme,
étant donné l’insuffisance du communisme."
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See Sartre, “Un nouveau mystique,” in Situations I (1947).
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“For Bataille, as for a central strand of the medieval Christian mystical tradition, contemplation is itself
a form of action, one that generates a community brought together through their shared contemplation of
the real (what Bataille in Guilty refers to as the catastrophe, which can be linked to contemporary
discussions of trauma)” (Hollywood 66).

114

meditation proved more politically potent than more conventional activism. As
Hollywood explains, “Bataille understands mysticism not as a flight from history but as
the apprehension of the other in his or her bodily specificity and particularity—a form of
communication necessary before more goal-directed political projects can be usefully or
meaningfully undertaken” (15). Irwin, emphasizing both the continuity between
Bataille’s pre- and postwar thinking and the political potency of mysticism, writes:
“Viewed through the lens of Bataille’s shifting interpretations of sacrifice, mystical
writing reveals itself not as a break with politics, but as a gesture that carries forward a
certain form of political contestation entwined with the subversive force of the sacred”
(30).112 The mysticism to which Bataille was attracted was radically heterogeneous, and
as such was capable of subverting totalizing systems; it represented a non-political
solution to a political problem.
However, the primary point of contention regarding Bataille’s politics is not
simply that he seemed to abandon his former radicalism, but that he did so on the eve of
World War II, at the very moment that concrete action mattered most. It is undeniable
that Bataille rarely wrote about the war. Yet, as is the case with all Bataillean
terminology, he created associative chains, such that his discussion of something like
religion often contains insights into his ideas on politics and war. Quoting Kierkegaard in
“La Conjugation sacrée,” Bataille insists: « Ce qui avait visage de politique et s’imaginait
être politique, se démasquera un jour comma mouvement religieux » (OC I : 442).
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Irwin continues: “Bataille was convinced that the meditational method and more broadly the mystical
style of existence he made available through his writings opened the route to a concrete experience of the
heterogeneity and sovereignty of the self and thus laid the groundwork for genuine freedom. The inner
experience of freedom remains the precondition of any meaningful deployment of freedom in the public,
political world” (163).
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Indeed, Bataille (like Caillois) saw war as a sort of natural heir to primitive religion:
“War and religion are historically among the most potent channels of expenditure,
catalyzing violent ecstasies whose essence is a ‘loss of substance’” (Irwin 129). However,
if war and religious sacrifice begin as comparable forms of expenditure, modern warfare
diverges from its religious antecedent by submitting to principles of calculation and
utility:
L’esprit méthodique de conquête est contraire à celui du sacrifice et dès l’abord
les rois militaires se refusent au sacrifice. Le principe de l’ordre militaire est le
détournement méthodique de la violence vers le dehors. Si la violence sévit à
l’intérieur, il s’y oppose dans la mesure où il le peut. Et, la détournant vers le
dehors, il la subordonne à une fin réelle. Il la subordonne ainsi généralement.
Ainsi l’ordre militaire est-il contraire aux formes de combat spectaculaires, qui
répondent davantage à une explosion effrénée de fureur qu’au calcul raisonné de
l’efficacité. Il ne vise plus, comme le faisait dans la guerre et dans la fête un
système social archaïque, à la plus grande dépense de forces. La dépense des
forces subsiste, mais soumise au maximum à un principe de rendement : si les
forces sont dépensées, c’est en vue de l’acquisition de forces plus grandes. […] Il
fait de la conquête une opération méthodique, en vue de l’agrandissement d’un
empire. (OC VIII : 321-22)
Bataille concludes that the principal philosophical aim of the postwar era is the search for
a form of expenditure other than war, an adequate means of channeling our collective
energy that does not lead to utter annihilation: « il s’agit d’épuiser sans guerre cette
accumulation sans précédent, qui a changé le monde entier en un colossal tonneau de
poudre » (OC VIII: 454).
Of course, in the context of World War II, Bataille’s particular brand of politics
would have been viewed with suspicion, if not downright hostility. In response to Francis
Marmande’s efforts to rehabilitate Bataille as a political figure by claiming that “the
resistance of Bataille's writing, his focus on the use of words rather than simply their
meaning, is itself a form of antiauthoritarian and contestatory political engagement,”
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Hollywood is justified in suggesting that Sartre and others would have viewed this as “an
attenuated understanding of politics” (63). Sartre’s opinion, not only of Bataille but also
of politics writ large, and of the relationship between literature and politics, dominated
the postwar intellectual landscape. It was therefore difficult for Bataille’s contemporaries
to take him seriously as a “political writer” given the tenuous connections between his
meditative methods and concrete responses to the war. Yet the generation that came after,
in particular the writers associated with Tel Quel (Foucault, Barthes, Sollers, and
Kristeva, among others) made immense strides toward locating the political potential in
Bataille’s work, ultimately using him as the fulcrum by which to finally surmount the
obstacle of Sartrean hegemony.113
In place of littérature engagée, which Bataille believed made literature a slave to
political goals, Bataille proposes an excessive and violent form of art that could have
political consequences, but only insofar as the excess is enacted for its own sake. For
examples of such an art, he points to painters like André Masson and Picasso; in a 1945
essay written for a collection on “L’Espagne libre,” Bataille develops the argument that
Picasso is not an inherently political painter, but that “the bombing of Guernica provides
him with an event that allows him to give a ‘precise political sense’ to the violence and
excess which his painting already expresses” (ffrench, “Donner” 127-28). Likewise, in a
1946 essay on André Masson, Bataille seeks to redefine engagement: « Mais si l’on parle
d’engagement, nous pouvons l’entendre en deux sens. Être engagé peut vouloir dire :
servir une activité définie, une révolution, une guerre, une réforme politique, un effort de
production agricole ou industrielle. Mais ce qui m’engage aussi bien, peut être une
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For more on the post-structuralist appropriation of Bataille, see Suzanne Guerlac’s Literary Polemics.

117

totalité. […] Chaque œuvre d’André Masson est une totalité » (OC XI: 36). The
Bataillean totality, as previously mentioned, is not totalizing or totalitarian, but rather
seeks to acknowledge (without appropriating or expelling) the radical heterogeneity of
existence, maintaining a space for the most anguished and grotesque aspects of human
life. If myth is a totality, as is engagement, then it stands to reason that the two realms
intersect.

Diverting the Powder Keg
Bataille may not have met Sartre’s standards for engagement, but it is impossible
to deny the political resonances of his postwar writings—most notably La Part maudite.
As Shannon Winnubst remarks:
Written across that intense period of European history that witnessed the close of
the Second World War and the emergence of the Cold War, these three volumes
attempt to think against the trend of historical thought that would render
capitalism or communism the only two alternatives to fascism. Michael Surya
describes this as a period of intense production and seriousness for Bataille, a
period in which politics in its broadest sense took hold of his writing, leaving the
Dada and surrealist scandals from the 1930s ‘a distant and disparate echo.’ (3)
Bataille himself explains that one intent of La Part maudite was to “trancher les
problèmes politiques” (OC VII: 23). It is in this text that we are treated to the clearest
articulation of the intersection of mysticism with Bataille’s vision of economics and
politics. The three volumes of La Part maudite roughly address economics, eroticism,
and sovereignty, respectively, thus demonstrating the inherent affinity of these three
seemingly disparate domains. What unites them is transgression—by violating the
precepts of economic (i.e. capitalist) utility, reproductive sexuality, and Hegelian
mastery, we encounter a revitalized sacrality largely lost to modern man. This sacrality
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has distinctly political resonances: “The theory of the sacred develops as a theory of
political violence; it also informs a pragmatics of political intervention” (ffrench, After
24). And as we shall see, the characteristics of transgression intersect at numerous points
with those of myth.
I will not attempt a detailed summary of the economic “theory” promulgated in
La Part maudite. Suffice it to say that its basis is excess; taking as his starting point the
fact that all living things produce more energy than they require for mere survival, and
that they must therefore decide how to channel the remainder, Bataille advocates
“wasteful” spending in the form of festivals or conspicuous consumption, rather than
reinvesting the excess in order to accumulate more profit (as in the capitalist model). In
fact, both capitalism and communism are on the receiving end of Bataille’s critiques:
“Bataille ultimately sees little difference between capitalism and communism. Both
systems subordinate the lives of workers to the need for production, and both subordinate
production not to the senseless expenditure that characterized the aristocratic sovereigns
of the past but to the ‘responsible’ accumulation of wealth” (Kendall, “Horror” 54). By
transgressing the “sacred” law of profits, Bataille believes we can rediscover
communication, community, and true sacrality.
Thus emerges the main issue to which Bataille continuously returns: the
reinterpretation of the instant of dépense as the basis for an alternative ethic.
Whether it surfaces in discussions of artistic activity or is perceived in the
political flirtation with nuclear disaster that marks politics in the atomic age, the
characterization of unlimited expenditure remains constant. (Richman, “Bataille
Moralist” 146)
It is by uniting wildly disparate fields through the shared motor of dépense that Bataille is
able to imbue seemingly apolitical acts (eroticism, poetry, myth) with potent political
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potential. To this end, he followed the economic lessons of La Part maudite with a fulllength study of eroticism—including its political potential.

The Community of Lovers
Eroticism is one of the most pervasive themes in Bataille’s oeuvre; his earliest
published works were pornographic tales (Histoire de l’oeil, L’Anus solaire); in addition
to L’Histoire de l’érotisme, the second volume of La Part maudite, he penned L’Érotisme
(1957) and Les Larmes d’Éros (1961) as a continuation of his theorization of the
community of lovers. Eroticism is one of several experiences (others include laughter,
tears, and anguish) that bring us into proximity with death; in short, eroticism is assenting
to life to the point of death. It is a wound by which we communicate with the other, an
experience of mutual anguish that allows us to peer into the void that is death without
expiring ourselves. It brings us from discontinuity into continuity: « Ce qui est en jeu
dans l’érotisme est toujours une dissolution des formes constituées. Je le répète : de ces
formes de vie sociale, régulière, qui fondent l’ordre discontinu des individualités définies
que nous sommes » (OC X: 24). And, crucial to this discussion, the “breaking down of
established patterns” has far-reaching political consequences. Indeed, Bataille insists that,
“Le monde des amants n’est pas moins vrai que celui de la politique. Il absorbe même la
totalité de l’existence, ce que la politique ne peut pas faire” (OC I: 532). The marriage of
eroticism and politics is perhaps most apparent in his 1935 novel Le Bleu du ciel;114 as I
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For an extended analysis of the relationship between eroticism and politics in Le Bleu du ciel, see Irwin,
Saints of the Impossible and Suleiman, “Bataille in the street: The search for virility in the 1930s” in
Bataille: Writing the Sacred.
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will argue later in this chapter, the interpenetration of these two seemingly incompatible
domains reappears in the 1950 novel L’Abbé C., wherein Bataille expands upon the
consequences of excessive eroticism by pairing it with strategically useless betrayal.
When La Part maudite was published in 1949, the cover announced the title of
the forthcoming second volume as De l’angoisse sexuelle au malheur d’Hiroshima.
Though the title eventually granted to the work was merely L’Histoire de l’érotisme,
Hiroshima’s position in the title indicates the explosive convergence of eroticism and
politics, and more specifically the politics of the recent war, in Bataille’s thought. As
Kendall explains:
Thus while the History of Eroticism had long been among Bataille’s concerns, it
was also very much a product of its era, of the Second World War, Hiroshima,
Auschwitz and the atomic politics of the Cold War. In extension of this thought,
Bataille reviewed John Hershey’s accounts of Hiroshima and its aftermath, as
well as a number of books on the Nazi concentration and death camps, racism, the
excesses of Stalinism and war in general. Bataille, in short, praised eroticism as
acceding to life even to the point of death against the horizon of man-made mass
death and the potential extinction of the human race in nuclear holocaust.
Eroticism, for him, offered a form of consumption that was opposed to the
bourgeois accumulation of wealth and to the wars that have historically proven
the only outlet for that wealth. (Georges 191)
If large-scale social unity could no longer be attained through shared myths and rituals,
then eroticism could at least create a community of two that would produce the same
useless yet effervescent effects on a smaller scale. Like myth, eroticism rejects rationality
(associated instead with reproductive sexuality) and favors the community (however
small) over the individual. Like myth, it leads to fusion, creating wounds that facilitate
communication. Excessive eroticism is precisely the sort of behavior that Bataille’s
mystical, sovereign writing is meant to provoke and that his later writings would seek to
symbolically enact through language.
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Sovereignty
The third installment in La Part maudite trilogy remained unfinished during
Bataille’s life, and was posthumously published in a fragmentary form. It is here that
Bataille engages in his most sustained discussion of communism, the Cold War, and the
possibility (or lack thereof) for revolution in postwar Europe. As previously mentioned,
Bataille believed communism to be just as complicit as capitalism in the enslavement of
man to future-oriented projects. During the 1930s, he had sought an effective means of
combating the contagious effervescence of fascism. Two decades later, he at last arrived
at that means (opposed now not only to fascism but to all major political orientations):
sovereignty became the talisman of renewed sacrality, a form of power rooted in
powerlessness. As Irwin explains, “The basis of effective resistance to political tyranny
was not a theory or a political doctrine, but an experience of radical sovereignty, an
experience of the self as sacred” (161). Bataille defines sovereignty as an experience of
the miraculous—the miraculous being that which is impossible, yet there all the same. It
is freedom from anticipation—being fully present in the moment rather than sacrificing
present desires to future concerns (which, of course, is what myth also strives to do). It is
delivery from servitude. The sovereign « échappe en un sens à la mort, en ceci qu’il vit
dans l’instant. […] Le souverain est celui qui est, comme si la mort n’était pas » (OC
VIII : 267, 270). Bataille provides an extensive, though not exhaustive, list of sovereign
“effusions” (that is, expressions of sovereignty, or experiences that allow us to channel
sovereignty); the list includes all the heavy hitters from Bataille’s arsenal, including
laughter, tears, eroticism, ecstasy, the sacred, and sacrifice. To these he adds tragedy,
comedy, play, anger, dance, music, combat, funereal horror, the magic of childhood, the
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divine, the diabolical, beauty (and its opposite), crime, cruelty, fear, and disgust. If these
terms appear frustratingly vague, this is due in part to the general nature of Bataille’s
investigation (for which he apologizes on multiple occasions), and in part to the difficulty
of speaking the sovereign (sovereignty being by definition that which exceeds language
and knowledge). Sovereignty, Bataille tells us repeatedly, is nothing. It can only be
experienced, not subjugated to discourse, though art and the imagination may allow us
some insight: « Je désigne à présent l’ouverture de l’art, qui ment toujours mais sans
tromper ceux qu’il séduit. […] Dans le monde de la souveraineté déchue, l’imagination
est seule à disposer de moments souverains » (OC VIII: 300). It is perhaps this realization
that sovereignty could no longer be accessed directly, as in ancient times, but only
approached through the imagination that led him to reconsider the potential of mythic, or
sovereign, writing.
Following a general methodological introduction, parts II and III of Sovereignty
are devoted to an in-depth investigation of the relationship between sovereignty and
communism. For Bataille, sovereignty is rarely connected to the notion of sovereign
states or contemporary political leaders (which explains his lack of interest in politics as
conventionally understood). Rather, he defines sovereignty as man’s primordial
condition, a condition that, though in decline, continues to be available to those willing to
throw off the shackles of utilitarianism. And myth, as a sort of dramatization of sacrifice
and sacrality, facilitates this unshackling by reigniting the ecstasies once characteristic of
religion and war—though in a less destructive form.
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Transgression
Transgression, as the common element uniting the three volumes, plays two
conflicting yet essential roles: it “not only disrupts the social order but also serves to
sustain and strengthen it” (Mitchell 4). And in fact, the latter feature is more central to
Bataille’s thinking: “transgression serves to constitute society as such” (Allison 92).
Given the importance of community to Bataille’s thinking, transgression’s social value
cannot be ignored. Bataille claimed that « le monde sacré s’ouvre à des transgressions
limitées. C’est le monde de la fête, des souvenirs et des dieux » (OC X: 70). Thus,
returning sacrality to the modern context would require transgression.
Bataille argues that the violation of rules and interdictions heightens the
awareness of their necessity. Such collective ritualization of experience beyond
the boundaries of the quotidian, including festivals of destruction whose modern
avatar is warfare, provide access to the heterogeneous domain of the sacred
Bataille subsumed under the experience of sovereign expenditure. Never is the
cycle rejected for inducing a mechanistic repetition. Rather, it offers possibilities
that would otherwise remain closed to private experience or states of
consciousness. (Richman, “Bataille Moralist” 160)
By extension, then, myth, which is built on the principle of contestation and
transgression, offers possibilities that would otherwise remain closed to private
experience. Or rather, myth is one form assumed by such possibilities.
If transgression occupied a central position in Bataille’s thinking throughout his
career, the forms that transgression adopted were subject to change. What mattered was a
representation’s ability to provoke emotion, to “be” sovereignly, something to which
myths—or certain kinds of myths, myths of immediacy—were particularly well-suited. In
fact, he insists that, without myth, existence is unbearably empty—“une blessure ouverte”
(Choix de lettres 132). The value of myth for Bataille is thus incontrovertible. What
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remains is to demonstrate the precise political repercussions of an existence founded on
the useless imminence and sovereignty of myth.
Just as myth rejects future-oriented projects in favor of pure immanence—
uselessness—so too does Bataille insist that transgression can never be committed for
something. It is always for its own sake. It is an act outside of project and utility. If the
Surrealists favored transgression for its ability to provoke scandal, Bataille showed little
patience for “those rituals of cultural aggression that were intended to test the limits of
avant-garde tolerance” (Hollier xix). Uselessness, then, becomes (paradoxically) the
linchpin of Bataille’s political “action,” insofar as “Powerlessness, or rather a certain
performative renunciation of power, possesses paradoxical political efficacy” (Irwin 28).
Inutility remains a consistent theme across La Part maudite: useless economic
expenditure; useless (i.e. non-reproductive) erotic adventures; and useless living (i.e.
indifference to survival and attraction to death).115 And it is this uselessness, as enacted
by transgression, that leads to sovereignty: « Jamais rien de souverain ne devait s’asservir
à l’utile » (OC VIII: 273). Thus, having hit upon the “non-political” solutions to political
problems that still evaded him in the 1930s, Bataille could now return to the question of
literature—not littérature engagée, which was irrevocably tainted by servility, but a
sovereign literature capable of occupying the position once held by myth and ritual.
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« La souveraineté est le pouvoir de s’élever, dans l’indifférence à la mort, au-dessus des lois qui assurent
le maintien de la vie. […] Le principe de la morale classique se lie à la durée de l’être. Celui de la
souveraineté (ou de la sainteté) à l’être dont la beauté est faite d’indifférence à la durée, même d’attrait
pour la mort » (OC IX: 296).
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The Priest, the Libertine, and the Resistant
“And the pen is my terror, the pencil my
shame…”
—William Blake
In the wake of his “economic masterpiece,” Bataille, defying all expectations,
returned to fiction, publishing his novel L’Abbé C in 1950.116 The text follows twin
brothers Charles, a self-professed libertine, and Robert, a parish priest, as Charles
attempts to draw Robert into a life of erotic excess, only to discover that Robert has been
masking a corrupt nature all along. At first glance, the novel features many of the same
themes as Bataille’s earlier writings, both fictional and non-fictional: sadistic eroticism;
condemnation of utilitarian action; mockery of devotion to external causes like the
Church or politics. Yet, for a writer who rarely spoke explicitly about World War II, the
novel is unique in that he includes a brief yet vital discussion of the Resistance. L’Abbé
C’s narrative is primarily focalized through the lenses of eroticism and religion—those
twin obsessions that followed Bataille throughout his career—yet a residual investment in
politics rears its head in the form of Robert’s Resistance activities and eventual death at
the hands of Nazi torturers. References to his political activities are few and far between,
and Bataille does not seem to accord them any particular importance. The word
“Résistance” first appears about thirty pages in, when Charles is describing Robert’s
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Though I don’t engage in a sustained analysis of the title here, Jean-Louis Cornille describes it as “un
peu ridicule sous sa forme potachique de calembour facile.” Nevertheless, he ultimately insists on the title’s
importance, writing, “Un ABC, c’est non seulement l’alphabet ou l’abécédaire de nos débuts scolaires ;
c’est aussi un petit livre dans lequel sont énoncés fondements et principes. Denis Hollier insistait déjà sur
l’importance de l’alphabet, de l’abc chez Bataille : en particulier de la lettre A – qui, dit-il, s’entend deux
fois dans le nom de Bataille” (35). From 1929-1930, Bataille, along with Michel Leiris, Robert Desnos, and
other contributors to the journal Documents, penned entries for a Dictionnaire critique, a sort of mock
dictionary that resembled an alphabet book (A is for Abattoir, O is for Œil, etc.).
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“transformation” following his encounter with Eponine, the prostitute who desperately
desires Robert, in a church tower. Most of the passage refers to his depression in the
wake of Eponine’s debauchery and excessive flirtation, with some of his parishioners
believing him to be going mad. Suddenly, the narrator adds: “A cela s’ajoutait l’appui de
la Résistance, dont il acceptait sans mot dire, et peut-être, en un sens, indifférent, les
missions les plus imprudentes” (OC III: 265). The modifier “indifférent” is key in this
passage; Robert does not help the Resistance out of some sense of loyalty or patriotism or
religious righteousness. It is merely one form of expenditure among many, as becomes
clear at the end of the novel, when we finally learn details of Robert’s actions following
his capture and torture.
Save for this passing allusion to the war, there is almost no discussion of anything
that could pass as “political” until Robert’s arrest, and even then, it is the erotic actions
immediately preceding his arrest that dominate the narrative.117 The questions of erotic
excess, hypocrisy, and betrayal take precedence over any political investments. Yet to
write a novel so soon after the war in which the principal character expires at the hands of
fascist interrogators is an undeniably provocative act—so provocative, in fact, that
Bataille was accused of slander by a former résistant who believed the character of
Robert to be based on a real-life personage. Robert is obviously far from the
quintessential Resistance hero; his motives for joining are never explicitly addressed, and
though he does not give up the names of the other members of his cell, this is not due to
feelings of loyalty or political fervor. He withholds the names of the true Resistance
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Shortly before his arrest, Robert runs away with two prostitutes and spends several weeks drinking and
making love to them in a hotel
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members, but he does give up his twin brother, Charles, and Eponine, Robert’s would-be
lover, though neither has any connection to the Resistance. One of Robert’s cellmates
visits Charles near the end of the novel to relate Robert’s bizarre final words, wherein he
justifies surrendering the names of Charles and Eponine as a purer form of betrayal than
simply giving in to torture.
This final confession is essential to understanding Robert’s actions throughout the
novel—his counterfeit life as a priest, his behavior toward Eponine, his complex
relationship with Charles—and is therefore worth quoting at length:
Robert lui dit agressivement : « Je n’ai pas voulu résister, je ne l’ai pas voulu et ne
croyez pas que j’ai résisté, la preuve en est : j’ai donné mon frère et ma
maîtresse ! » Mon visiteur, si gêné qu’il fût, voulut savoir s’il aimait ou s’il
haïssait ceux qu’il venait de donner ainsi. Charles eut à ce moment quelque peine
à reprendre : Robert répondit qu’il avait donné justement les êtres qu’il aimait le
plus. Son interlocuteur imagina que la torture venait de le rendre fou, mais Robert
n’était pas fou : il avait même alors la plus grande lucidité. Et comme il portait les
marques d’un long supplice, mon visiteur lui demanda : « En ce cas, pourquoi
vous ont-ils torturé ? » Tout d’abord, ses bourreaux n’avaient pas voulu le croire,
ils avaient demandé d’autres noms. Il est certain que finalement, il se laissa
torturer et ne parla plus : il ne donna pas les noms de ceux dont il avait réellement
partagé l’activité clandestine. De guerre lasse, les policiers se contentèrent des
premières dénonciations, auxquelles la longue torture qu’il subit ensuite sans
parler donnait un caractère de véracité… (OC III : 363)
One page later, he reiterates the connection between betrayal and love: « Finalement, si
j’ai refusé de donner les noms des résistants, c’est que je ne les aimais pas, ou les aimais
loyalement, comme il faut aimer ses camarades. […] il m’était facile d’endurer s’il
s’agissait d’hommes auxquels je suis étranger ! Tandis que j’ai joué de trahir ceux que
j’aime » (OC III : 365).
How are we to understand this claim? Is Robert merely being provocative, or is there a
more coherent political or philosophical program undergirding his actions? As a first step
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toward answering this question, we can characterize Robert’s betrayal as a sort of wound:
he wounds his brother and Eponine by falsely (and dangerously) accusing them of
Resistance activities, and he wounds himself in the process by betraying those he loves
most. And of course, Bataille had long maintained that shared wounds are the means by
which communication and communities emerge. Secondly, the fact that his betrayal is
useless means that it operates outside of the logic of dominant social and political
systems; the irrationality of the betrayal therefore subverts hegemonic power. The
function of myth and ritual in primitive societies was to interrupt the profane realm of
work and utility, paradoxically revitalizing the community through its privileging of
present desires at the expense of future concerns. If it is true that “transgression serves to
constitute society as such,” then Robert’s transgression could serve a rejuvenative
purpose (Allison 92). Mythic interruption is what allows the community to renew its
contact with the sacred—which is Robert’s goal all along. Sacrality in the novel is
located not in the Church or the Resistance; even Charles’s libertinism falls short. It is
only with Robert’s final, useless betrayal that divinity is introduced into the work. For, as
Robert himself explains, « Seule la trahison a l’excessive beauté de la mort. Je voudrais
adorer une femme – et qu’elle m’appartînt – afin de trouver dans sa trahison son
excessive divinité » (OC III : 347). According to Robert’s logic, treachery—or, in more
immediately recognizable Bataillean terms, transgression—is thus an expression of
divinity, of sacrality.
The notion that abhorrent objects or behaviors, including betrayal, could be sacred
is by no means new; Durkheim discussed the idea at length in his exploration of the “left
sacred.” According to Durkheim, the word “sacred” simultaneously designates that which
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is pure, beneficent, healthy (the right sacred) and that which is impure and evil,
engendering sacrilege, disease, and death (the left sacred). Even in common parlance, the
French sacré contains both of these seemingly contradictory meanings.118 Robert’s
betrayal, like many of Bataille’s favored heterological objects (feces, urine, blood,
corpses, etc.) belongs unquestionably to the left sacred. Thus, his actions are not evil in
the traditionally understood sense of the word, but rather reflect a restorative evil. If we
think of L’Abbé C. as continuing the work begun in Le Bleu du ciel—the work of
exploring the political consequences of eroticism and inutility—then Robert’s betrayal
would play a similar role as Troppmann’s necrophilia.119
By committing a perfectly useless form of betrayal, Robert evades the servility of
evil done in the name of some gain (the kind of calculated evil Bataille associated with
fascism), instead discovering a purer evil that exists for its own sake, the mal of Bataille’s
1957 volume La Littérature et le mal. But it is not enough to simply transgress; a
transgression enacted in solitude fails to attain sovereignty. It is only in communicating
transgression that transformative action becomes possible. This is a central conceit of the
novel. The significance of communication is conveyed in Charles’ need to publish his
brother’s story (and his fears that he has failed to do the tale justice—hence the necessity
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For example: la musique sacrée, holy or sacred music, versus un sacré menteur, a damned or accursed
liar.
119
Le Bleu du ciel famously ends with the protagonist, Troppmann, a self-professed necrophiliac, making
love in a cemetery while Hitler Youth members march past. In Irwin’s analysis, “Necrophilia may be the
only force that can restore political life. Le Bleu du ciel hints ironically that if in 1934-35 any route to
political revitalization still lies open, that route will pass through the necrophilic focus on death and
expenditure. The revolutionary affirmation of life must recognize itself as entangled with the fascination of
sacrificial death in an impure mixture outside of which all political commitment is illusory. Such a claim
has – as one suspects – significant implications for the nature of political engagement and for the
relationship between politics and literature.” (87) This evaluation holds true for L’Abbé C, only now it is
betrayal that brings us near to death and expenditure on the path to political revitalization.
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of hiring an editor); Robert’s determination to write down his thoughts in his final days,
and to reveal to his cellmate his reasons for betraying his brother; and the editor’s
decision to spend four years crafting his introduction as part of a psychoanalytic
treatment.
The question of how to best articulate experiences like sovereignty and
transgression haunted Bataille throughout his career. And yet, he remained adamant that
communication was essential, no matter how impossible that communication may prove.
The question of communication’s form is therefore key, as evidenced by Bataille’s
inclusion in the novel of numerous metatextual discussions of the uses and forms of
literature. We see, for example, Charles’ anxiety regarding his “thinly-drawn characters”;
his fear that the book is not convincing (it is for this reason that he secures the editorial
aid of his financially-troubled friend); his reflections on the incongruity of memory and
language; and his declaration that the rules of literature render it either ridiculous or false.
L’Abbé C is also marked by the same generic heterogeneity present in Bataille’s
non-fictional writing: journal entries mixed with poetry; sober philosophical reflections
interrupted by manic exclamations; at least three alternating narrators. This collage effect
can be attributed to Bataille’s efforts to work around language’s inability to successfully
render sovereignty and sacrality. Having long attested to the impossibility of poetry (to
such an extent that Haine de la poésie was rebranded L’Impossible in the 1962 edition),
in L’Abbé C he finally settles on a suitable analogy to express the impossibility of
literature:
Mon absurdité imagina, dans ma défaillance, un moyen de formuler exactement la
difficulté que trouve la littérature. J’en imaginai l’objet, le bonheur parfait,
comme une voiture qui foncerait sur la route. Je longerais d’abord cette voiture
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sur la gauche, à une vitesse de bolide, dans l’espoir de la doubler. Elle foncerait
alors davantage et m’échapperait peu à peu, s’arrachant a moi de toute la force de
son moteur. Précisément ce temps même où elle s’arracherait, me révélant mon
impuissance à la doubler, puis à la suivre, est l’image de l’objet que poursuit
l’écrivain : cet objet n’est le sien qu’à la condition, non d’être saisi, mais, à
l’extrémité de l’effort, d’échapper aux termes d’une impossible tension. (OC III:
275)
It is not merely that the object of literature—be it sovereignty, mythic sacrality, or some
other entity—can never truly be grasped; it is that such objects should not be grasped, and
would in fact be tainted by possession. This is how Bataille finally works through the
objections that had, for a time, prevented him from publishing literature and led him to
pursue silence instead: though “true” representation is inaccessible, the “impossible
tension” created during the pursuit of representation is capable of eliciting affective
responses in the reader that may in turn lead to an encounter with the sacred. Writing can
only be sovereign—can only avoid the servility of littérature engagée—by allowing its
object to retain a certain sacred inaccessibility. Just as Bataille advocated assenting to life
to the point of death (but without actually dying), so too must the writer come as close as
possible to naming something without ever succeeding.120
Charles describes this process of approaching, but not attaining, the impossible
summit as a simultaneous affirmation and negation, or a simultaneous writing and
erasure:
Le seul moyen de racheter la faute d’écrire est d’anéantir ce qui est écrit. Mais
cela ne peut être fait que par l’auteur ; la destruction laissant l’essentiel intact, je
puis, néanmoins, à l’affirmation lier si étroitement la négation que ma plume
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As Amy Hollywood explains, “he recognizes that communication cannot be grounded in literal sacrifice,
for death makes communication impossible” (58). Bataille began to explore this idea in Sur Nietzsche, the
third installment in his Summa atheologica, this time using the analogy of the summit: « Comme la château
de Kafka, le sommet n’est à la fin que l’inaccessible. Il se dérobe à nous, du moins dans la mesure où nous
ne cessons pas d’être hommes : de parler » (OC VI : 57).
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efface à mesure ce qu’elle avança. Elle opère alors, en un mot, ce que
généralement opère le « temps », --qui, de ses édifices multipliés, ne laisse
subsister que les traces de la mort. Je crois que le secret de la littérature est là, et
qu’un livre n’est beau qu’habilement paré de l’indifférence des ruines. (OC III :
336)
This self-annihilating writing is the closest Bataille could come to a modern
approximation of the effects created by ancient myths and rituals (hence the claim that
this writing accomplished “ce que généralement opère le temps”). Literature “paré de
l’indifférence des ruines” is literature marked by the ecstasy that emerges when man is in
the presence of death, the ecstasy formerly produced by blood sacrifices. But what does
this self-annihilating writing look like? To what genres does Bataille turn in pursuit of
“l’indifférence des ruines”? And how does it relate to myth?
When Bataille creates equivalencies between poetry and sacrifice, it is tragic
poetry in particular that he singles out: « La poésie tragique, où le thème introduit la
destruction, à bien des égards est une forme de sacrifice » (OC XI: 103-4). His
theorization of community is likewise marked by tragedy, such that community acquires
“meaning in human terms only to the extent that it provides a place for tragedy, to the
extent that it acknowledges the tragic spirit as its own reality” (Winfree 39). Tragedy (a
term Bataille sometimes uses interchangeably with dramatization) takes us out of
ourselves—wounds us—in order to facilitate communication: « Si nous ne savions
dramatiser, nous ne pourrions sortir de nous-mêmes » (OC V: 23). As Kalliopi
Nikolopoulou explains, “Dramatization is the movement by which a happening (a
dromenon, an event) draws us in, in a way that we abandon our solitary selves to undergo
the event in common, to experience compassion.” (100) It is the method of experiencing
community. If Caillois (along with the other members of the College of Sociology)
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rejected the novel as too solitary, tragedy is meant to be experienced communally.
Bataille’s definition of tragedy obviously diverges from standard generic
understandings—to put it simply, he never wrote a play. And yet, inutility emerges as a
shared pursuit of both Bataille’s conception of tragedy and more ancient iterations:
“What lies at the heart of the most classic of the tragedies but the désoeuvrement of
Oedipus as a man of knowledge and action? Tragedy, in a certain sense, is always the
dramatization of such désoeuvrement” (Nikolopoulou 112). Bataille’s approach to writing
sought to recreate the effects (and affects) of ancient drama (the literary corollary of
mythic experience). Tragedy, like myth, is not primarily a form of discourse, but rather a
way of being: « Le dramatique n’est pas être dans ces conditions-ci ou celles-là qui sont
des conditions positives […] C’est simplement être » (OC V: 24). To the extent that we
might call it discourse, it is “a mode of discourse in which the structure and meaning of
discourse itself is sacrificed, sense opens to nonsense, knowledge to nonknowledge.”
(Kendall, Inner xiii) And by exposing readers to this nonknowledge, he hoped to
engender some form of community.
Though the terms “tragedy” and “dramatization” appear infrequently in Bataille’s
writing, he creates clear links between tragedy and eroticism, a pairing that acquires
increasing importance in his later work, most notably Les Larmes d’Eros:
Essentiellement le culte de Dionysos fut tragique. Il fut en même temps érotique,
il le fut dans un désordre délirant, mais nous savons que, dans la mesure où le
culte de Dionysos fut érotique, il était tragique… Avant tout d’ailleurs il était
tragique, et c’est dans une horreur tragique que l’érotisme acheva de le faire
entrer. […] Éros est avant tout le dieu tragique. (OC X: 606-07)
If eroticism represents the personal aspect of sovereignty, tragedy is its public face.
Tragedy as a genre is what allows Bataille to transfer the anguish and ecstasy of eroticism
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and inner experience to a larger community—and ultimately to a political community. In
L’Expérience intérieure, he posits the notion of tragedy as the literary corollary of
torture; it is therefore fitting that the experience of physical torture is the catalyst for
Robert and Charles’s sovereign (i.e. tragic) form of writing.
In L’Abbé C, it is the provocative combination of eroticism and betrayal that
produces tragedy, and that therefore imagines political uses for seemingly non-political
acts. Both tragedy and eroticism are defined by their opposition to actions or projects;
this, however, does not damn them to political impotence. On the contrary, it is the
tragedy/eroticism pairing that carries Bataille’s thought back to the political realm: “the
tragic human being and the lover, respectively, bear more and more the burden of
Bataille’s revolution” (Winfree 37). Winfree goes on to explain that “It is the necessity of
exposure to the blind forces of chance that solicits tragic comportment and separates the
tragic person from the dominant homogenous social order”—and this separation is vital
to enacting political change (39). Tragedy offers Bataille a means of accessing the realm
of political commitment while circumventing Sartre, for “The emotive intellectual
conceives his life entirely at the moment of tragedy; that is his strength or his weakness,
depending upon your view. In any case, it is what will save him after the war from
parading under the banner of engagement raised by Sartre” (Besnier 18).
In Caillois’s reflections on the modern analogues of myth, he identifies first
vacation, then war, as the recipients of the energies formerly directed toward revitalizing
myths and rituals. Bataille held out hope that tragic, mythic writing, as enacted in novels
like L’Abbé C, might help divert those energies back toward (useless) communal ends. Of
course, it is impossible to determine what effect, if any, his writings actually had on the
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postwar political landscape. What is clear is that Bataille, perhaps unwittingly, became a
hero for poststructuralist theorists; in the hands of figures like Foucault, who dubbed
Bataille “l’un des écrivains les plus importants de son siècle,” Bataille’s theorization of
transgression became the linchpin of political thought in the late 1960s and 1970s.
Unfortunately, by focusing their attention on transgression as a purely discursive
phenomenon, at the expense of the affective or mystical facets of Bataille’s thought, one
could argue (as Suzanne Guerlac has done) that the poststructuralists misappropriated
Bataille’s writings.121 I maintain that even if post-structuralism found it expedient to
ignore the more mythical aspects of Bataille’s work, affective, embodied experience, not
writing, was always the object of Bataille’s impossible pursuit.
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For the writers associated with Tel Quel, Bataille’s transgression emerges as a theoretical term that
elaborates a “’transgression of philosophy,’ one performed by literature as it communicates with theory”
(Guerlac 13).
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Chapter Three
No Fantasy, Just Things: Claude Simon’s Politics of Experimentation

“Au départ, il y a cette question posée à Simon –
que l’œuvre de Simon se pose à elle-même: une
littérature d’après-guerre […] est-elle possible?
Et si oui, à quelle condition?”
—Lucien Dällenbach, Claude Simon

When it was announced that Claude Simon had received the 1985 Nobel Prize for
Literature, the reactions ranged from bemusement to unbridled animosity. Abroad, few
readers had heard of him, and many were appalled at his selection over the likes of fellow
finalists Jorge Luis Borges and Graham Greene.122 At home in France, interest in the
nouveau roman had waned; though once lauded as the vanguard of literary
experimentation, it had long ago been outflanked by the more radical Tel Quel group.123
To make matters worse, Simon had garnered a reputation as a “difficult” writer, and this
at a moment when more traditional narrative forms were regaining traction among French
writers. In an interview with The Paris Review, Simon recalled the outraged reaction of
French intellectuals: “In France, in literary circles, it was as though someone had made
them swallow a hedgehog, whole, with all its needles.” He likewise noted that one French
publication went so far as to attribute the Nobel Prize committee’s choice to the work of
Soviet agents, an amusing claim considering Simon had long been criticized for his lack
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The New York Times article covering the announcement declared within the first few sentences: “Mr.
Simon’s work […] is not widely known in the United States.” Though the names of the finalists are kept
secret, Borges and Greene were widely considered front-runners for the prize.
123
Simon is perhaps best known as a nouveau romancier, though he often expressed misgivings about the
moniker.
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of political commitment. The irony was not lost on Simon, who addressed the absurdity
of the accusation in his acceptance speech: “car enfin on a tellement, ici et là, dénoncé
l'égoïste et vaine gratuité de ce que l'on appelle « l'art pour l'art » que ce n'est pas pour
moi une mince récompense de voir mes écrits, qui n'avaient d'autre ambition que de se
hisser à ce niveau, rangés parmi les instruments d'une action révolutionnaire et
déstabilisatrice.”124
Simon was no stranger to opposition and chose to confront many of his detractors
directly in his Nobel speech, mentioning critiques of both his formal predilections and his
political positions. In response to claims that his work was “‘laborieux,’ et donc
forcément ‘artificiel,’” he felt obliged to point out that this last term merely means “fait
avec art,” “qui est le produit de l'activité humaine et non celui de la nature”—a perfectly
apt description of any novel. As for politics, he freely admitted: “je n'ai rien à dire, au
sens sartrien de cette expression. D'ailleurs, si m'avait été révélée quelque vérité
importante dans l'ordre du social, de l'histoire ou du sacré, il m'eût semblé pour le moins
burlesque d'avoir recours pour l'exposer à une fiction inventée au lieu d'un traité raisonné
de philosophie, de sociologie ou de théologie.”125 Yet Simon did resort to fiction, and I
aim to show that it is precisely through his formal literary experimentation—an
experimentation that reveals a preoccupation with myth—that Simon engages with
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The full text of Simon’s speech, in both French and English, is available on the Nobel Prize website
(nobleprize.org). All future references to his speech are taken from that site.
125
He goes on to say: “On parle volontiers ici et là, et avec autorité, de la fonction et des devoirs de
l'écrivain. On a même pu déclarer, il y a quelques années, non sans démagogie, par une formule qui porte
en elle-même sa propre contradiction, que, « en face de la mort d'un petit enfant au Biafra, aucun livre ne
fait le poids ». Si justement, à la différence de celle d'un petit singe, cette mort est un insupportable
scandale, c'est parce que cet enfant est un petit d'homme c'est-à-dire un être doué d'un esprit, d'une
conscience, même embryonnaire, susceptible plus tard, s'il survivait, de penser et de parler de sa
souffrance, de lire celle des autres, d'en être à son tour ému et, avec un peu de chance, de l'écrire.”
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political issues of the postwar period, carving out an alternative to the prevailing models
for “political” writers: Sartrean engagement and socialist realism.
Taking into account his reputation as both laborious and lacking in substance,
Simon may seem a counterintuitive exemplar of mythic discourse and political
commitment. The nouveaux romanciers are hardly a homogenous group (as they have
frequently acknowledged).126 Nonetheless, the genre can be broadly defined by its
antipathy to the nineteenth century realist tradition and, Celia Britton argues, “an equally
fundamental antagonism to the more modern notion of politically committed literature”
(Nouveau roman 12). What the nouveaux romanciers found most objectionable in these
twin enemies is a tendency toward totalizing historical narratives. The “new” novelist
distinguishes himself from the old by a commitment to experimental language and form,
the radical disjunction of time and space, and a heightened sense of ambiguity with
regards to point of view, none of which seem immediately linked to either myth or
politics. However, I aim to demonstrate that these strategies work to subvert reified forms
of discourse and overcome alienation through unconventional community building.
Simon set himself apart from many of the other nouveaux romanciers by
explicitly discussing history and politics in his novels (though often in skeptical or even
satirical ways). La Route des Flandres, La Bataille de Pharsale, and Les Géorgiques all
include some discussion of World War II; Le Palace, Les Corps Conducteurs, and
Histoire address the Spanish Civil War. His decision to foreground such fraught
historical events, rather than embrace pure formalism, indicates a sustained, personal
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The name, coined in 1957, was retroactively assigned to certain “experimental” authors, including Alain
Robbe-Grillet, Michel Butor, and Nathalie Sarraute.
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investment in the recent past that his fellow nouveaux romanciers did not necessarily
share. Though he mocks those writers who assign an overly didactic role to literature,
such criticism should not be viewed as a rejection of any relationship between literature
and politics, but rather an expression of dissatisfaction with the forms that relationship
assumed in the 1950s and 1960s.127
Simon’s style is certainly not intended for the immediate or concise
communication of ideologies. His sentences often continue for pages on end (a fact that
has elicited comparisons to Proust and Faulkner); he uses little punctuation; he frequently
interrupts himself mid-sentence; his dialogues contain few indications of who is
speaking; his narration is decidedly non-linear, jumping between past and present without
warning; he unapologetically eschews clear beginnings and endings. Though he insists
that his work is unphilosophical and that blue collar workers are just as capable of
commenting upon his novels as academics, his readership seems to skew more toward the
latter than the former.128 All of these characteristics put him at odds with both the simple,
concrete nature of myth (often focused on the natural world, basic social rituals, etc.) and
the concision of political slogans. Nonetheless, as Simon maintains (and as I will
demonstrate here), his seemingly abstract stylistics have much in common with the
primordial elements of myth and seek to correct for the overly simplistic ideologies
promulgated in certain postwar literary circles.
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In Le Palace, he satirizes political writers through a description of the Latin American Writers Congress
and their efforts to pen a political manifesto.
128
See Calle-Gruber, Triptyques, p.166.
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The Man, the Myth, the Legend
Born in 1913 in Madagascar and raised in Perpignan, France, Simon lost both his
parents at a young age. His father, a cavalryman, was killed during World War I, when
Simon was barely a year old. His mother died when he was eleven, and as a result he was
sent off to boarding school. After briefly studying in England, where he tried his hand at
painting, Simon embarked on travels in Spain, Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, and
Greece. He was present during the Spanish Civil War, though he denies claims that he
participated in the fighting—despite his republican sympathies, his role was primarily
that of observer. As a cavalryman during World War II, Simon was one of the few to
survive the Battle of the Meuse, was taken prisoner by the Germans, and spent six
months in a camp before escaping and joining the Resistance. Due to an inheritance, he
was able to dedicate himself to writing full-time, publishing his first novel, Le Tricheur,
in 1945. He produced some twenty-odd works before his death in 2005.
Simon’s novels are riddled with autobiographical elements, from his experiences
in Spain and France to excerpts from his ancestors’ notebooks.129 However, the question
remains: why did he choose to recount his exploits during the war in the form of the
nouveau roman, rather than in a more traditional memoir? Reporters frequently asked
about his experiences as a soldier (an interaction that is dramatized in Le Jardin des
Plantes), and he wrote a much more straightforward account of his memories of World
War II in the French newspaper Le Figaro.130 Despite the non-realist style of his novels,
Simon displayed an intense commitment to historical accuracy; the Fonds Simon at the
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It is important to note that, though he often wrote from life, he strongly resisted the autobiographical
label.
130
Témoignage de Simon, published in L’année 1940, vendredi 13 juillet 1990.
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Bibliothèque littéraire Jacques Doucet includes numerous historical documents related to
both World War I and World War II, including official reports on the battle in which his
father was killed, documents from the Archives militaires allemands à Freiburg im
Breisgau, and excerpts from historical tomes such as La France a sauvé l’Europe (1947).
In a letter written to Anthony Pugh in 1984, Simon gives a fairly neutral, un-poetic
account of his activities with the 31st Dragoons with whom he fought during World War
II.131 Nonetheless, La Route des Flandres remains the most fully realized account of his
life as a solider. What was appealing about this more experimental (and, I argue, mythic)
form? What did it offer that more “realist” genres, like journalism, could not?
When Simon first entered the literary scene, countless writers were debating the
possibilities and responsibilities of literature in a post-Auschwitz world, and Simon was
no exception.132 He speaks in interviews about the “degré zéro” to which all of Europe
was reduced in the wake of the war.133 The question posed by Dällenbach – is postwar
writing possible – and its attendant query – what would such a writing look like? –
haunted nearly every thinker of Simon’s generation. In a passage on Pierre Nora’s Les
lieux de mémoire, David Carroll describes the isolation and alienation that dominated the
postwar period:
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The following is a representative sample from the letter: « 16 mai – Décrochage. L’escadron bat en
retraite toute la journée. Organise le soir la défense du village de Joncret. Faible bombardement d’artillerie.
Contact à la tombée de la nuit avec premiers éléments ennemis. Ordre de décrocher vers environ minuit. »
132
Perhaps the most notable example is Theodor Adorno, whose oft-quoted (and misquoted) statement, “To
write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,” became a sort of battle cry for political writers.
133
“All of us were faced by that at the end of the war, this form of tabula rasa, this questioning of all
values. Shortly after the end of the war, my friend, the sociologist Edgar Morin, wrote a book entitled
Germany, Year Zero, a title used by Rossellini for a film. But it wasn’t only Germany that had to start from
scratch. It’s not mere chance that a bit later Roland Barthes wrote Le degré zéro de l’écriture…” (DuVerlie
48)
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Never have people been as distanced or alienated from spontaneous, collective
expressions of memory in their different natural milieux, distanced even from
their own family memories and heritage, without a clear sense of belonging
naturally and unreflectively to a single, unified, unquestioned heritage or national,
ethnic, religious or political traditional or group, all of which had previously
generated, stored and defended their own memories and the identities rooted in
them. (“Thinking” 23-24)
This is precisely why myth becomes important in a postwar environment: the purpose of
myth has always been to create and rejuvenate communities, to open lines of
communication that transcend temporal and cultural barriers. Though the myths of the
prewar era had been irreparably shattered, Simon, I argue, believed that myth could help
us return to fundamentals and thereby evade isolation and despair. For many,
demythification became an imperative of the postwar era due to myth’s reputation as
falsely totalizing and prone to ideological manipulation. Yet, paradoxically, Simon
employs myth itself as a corrective for the totalizing impulses of other grand narratives.
As argued in my introduction, myth is inherently linked to notions of fragmentation,
bricolage, and the destabilization of established forms, all of which allow it to evade the
kinds of instrumentalization to which other discourses were subject.
Though I am hardly the first to recognize mythic or political strands in Simon’s
writing, neither theme has received sufficient attention. Mária Minich Brewer offers a
fairly comprehensive list of the kinds of interpretation to which Simon’s novels have
been subject: phenomenological, modernist, elemental, formalist, realist, new novelist,
and deconstructive, among others (xi). Britton in turn divides the scholarship into two
categories: the first comprises phenomenological interpretations, stressing the themes of
perception, imagination and memory; the second includes more formal readings of his
texts as language-as-play (Writing the Visible 5). Neither myth nor politics fits
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comfortably in either category. Dominique Viart makes important strides toward
rehabilitating Simon as a politically committed figure, but, while acknowledging the
mythic strands in Simon’s thought, he stops short of identifying a mythic mentality as the
key to his engagement.134 The novelty of my contribution is to bring these previously
opposed notions together, and to examine the manner in which Simon’s mythical or
primordial impulses possess political potential. It is not merely that Simon invokes
familiar mythological figures—though he does this in spades. Perseus, Goliath, Leonidas,
Aeneas, Atreus, Achilles, Leda, Diana, Orion, and Orpheus all make appearances in his
novels, as do Ovid, Virgil, and Hesiod. However, my interest lies not in myth as content,
but in myth as form—that is, the ways in which Simon’s textual practices are in and of
themselves mythic, irrespective of his object of inquiry.135
It is difficult to discuss Simon’s novels independently of each other, as he not
only recycles themes—he also repeats images, events, characters, and even whole
passages.136 Nonetheless, my analysis hinges on his so-called “middle period” (which
Britton describes as lasting roughly from 1957 to 1969, with Le Vent (1957) and La
Bataille de Pharsale (1969) marking points of transition).137 Though Les Géorgiques
(1981) postdates this phase by more than a decade, I nonetheless include it as part of the
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See Une mémoire inquiète (2010) et “Sartre-Simon: de la ‘littérature engagée’ aux ‘fictions critiques.’”
Cahiers Claude Simon, no. 3 (2007).
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Dominique Viart explains that, « Contrairement à ce qui se passe avec les textes de Gide, de Cocteau,
d’Anouilh dans la première moitié du siècle, le mythe n’est pas l’objet du texte, il n’y a pas de réécritures
affichées comme telles (pas de 39ème actualisation d’Amphitryon, ni de nouveau Prométhée, bien ou mal
enchaîné). Si le mythe apparaît – et il apparaît effectivement –, c’est avec un autre statut, comme un objet
dans l’objet, une sorte de « thème » second – ce qui ne signifie pas forcément secondaire – dans l’économie
de l’œuvre » (“Mythes” 270).
136
Thus, the events leading up to his capture during World War II, first presented in La Route des Flandres,
reappear in Les Géorgiques; the image of the jealous man listening at the door of his unfaithful lover is
present in both La Bataille de Pharsale and Histoire; etc.
137
Claude Simon, p. 2.
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middle period, as it is widely thought to represent a return to an earlier style.
Furthermore, due to the significance of World War II for this project, I primarily focus on
novels that directly address Simon’s experiences during the war, most notably La Route
des Flandres, La Bataille de Pharsale, and Les Géorgiques.
Beyond merely including World War II as a theme, these novels are pertinent due
to the particular convergence of myth and politics that they enact: coming after the more
realist style of his early novels, yet before the heightened formalism of texts like Leçon
de choses and Triptyque, his intermediate style occupies a liminal space between
representational literature and pure textuality. Furthermore, Mireille Calle-Gruber points
to the period from approximately 1958-1978 as important for Simon for at least three
reasons: the development of a theoretical discourse on the nouveau roman (with
colloquiums held at Cerisy in 1971 and 1975); the push for more overt political action
from intellectuals like Sartre (as well as Simon’s growing tension with Sartre); and the
translation of the Russian formalists, whom Simon greatly admired and cited as an
influence on his own novelistic style (Triptyques 16). Using his novels, as well as
interviews, essays, letters, and other peripheral texts, I will demonstrate Simon’s mythic
and political investments, ultimately concluding that it is myth that allows Simon to
highlight the shortcomings of other forms of political commitment and suggest an
alternative to the cultural dominance of both Sartre and the French Communist party.
Before painting Simon’s mythic mode of cognition as a form of political
engagement, it is first necessary to establish that his style, at least during the “middle”
period, is indeed mythic. As previously mentioned, I am by no means the first to locate
mythic threads in Simon’s work: though other adjectives are sometimes deployed
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(including “primordial” and “sacred”), the terms are all related, and several critics have
identified a mythic regression in Simon’s novels.138 Calle-Gruber, for example, speaks of
“une sorte de régression aux origines mythiques et indistinctes de l’homme et du monde”
(Vies de l’archive 218). Dällenbach, meanwhile, claims that “ce qui anime et propulse, si
l’on peut dire, le texte simonien […] c’est l’espèce de régression infaillible […]
régression à un temps ou à un hors-temps originaire” (Sur Claude Simon 72-73). Brewer
views Simon’s “reappropriation of myth” as “linked inseparably to [his] critique of
narrative and his experimentation with discursive modes and frames” (22). When
preparing for a filmed interview with Simon for German television, Peter Brugger drafted
a question about the link between Simon’s work and modern myths.139 Michel Thouillot
sees myth, rather than history or epic, as the dominant vein in Simon’s novels.140
Building off of these interventions, I shall add the definition of myth set forth in my
introduction and demonstrate that Simon does indeed adhere to each of its constituent
parts: non-linear temporality, non-rationality, community, fusion, and bricolage.

138

In their introduction to the volume Claude Simon: A Retrospective, Jean H. Duffy and Alastair Duncan
highlight the various critics who have drawn on Roger Caillois’s L’Homme et le sacré and on Mircea
Eliade to argue that “Simon’s work is informed by a sense of the sacred, ‘un sacré sans divinité’” (9).
139
“Est-ce que vous confirmeriez l’opinion qu’un tel ordre du monde qui se produit toujours de nouveau
dans le langage, a un certain rapport à la création des mythes (au sens exact du terme) ? Des mythes
modernes, riches en mots, sans noms. Si c’est ainsi, qu’est-ce qu’il en restera dans le court-métrage de
Triptyque où il n’y a pas de paroles ?” Cited in Les Triptyques de Claude Simon, ed. Calle-Gruber, p. 66.
140
“S’éloignant de la tentation du roman historique, comme d’ailleurs de la veine épique, qu’ils dédaignent,
certains récits de guerre simoniens empruntent parfois également une autre voie que l’on pourrait qualifier
de mythique, tant aux plans individuel ou familial que collectif » (85).
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Achilles Running Motionless

“It is, above all, by analysing the attitudes of the
modern man towards Time that we can penetrate
the disguises of his mythological behavior.”
—Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries
Temporal manipulation is a hallmark of Simon’s style.141 From the
superimposition of multiple epochs in La Bataille de Pharsale and Les Géorgiques to the
temporal expansions, contractions, and repetitions that characterize the narration of La
Route des Flandres, Simon consistently resists a coherent, linear temporality. His use of
archaic imagery and his tendency to dissolve landscapes and characters alike into one
undifferentiated primordial ooze transport the reader into an unfamiliar temporal
register—“le temps de la Terre, un temps chthonien” (Janssens 90). Calle-Gruber
characterizes Simon’s narrative logic as combinatory, rather than chronological.142
During an interview with Simon, she draws a parallel between his temporal thinking and
that of Saint Augustine, a comparison he finds fruitful:
MCG : Le rapport de vos récits au temps est en ce sens très proche de
l’expérience phénoménologique décrite par saint Augustin : ‘C’est improprement
que l’on dit : il y a trois temps, le passé, le présent et le futur. Plus exactement
dirait-on peut-être : il y a trois temps, le présent du passé, le présent du présent, le
présent du futur.
CS : Oui. Cela me fait penser aux vers d’Eliot que j’ai placés en exergue de
L’Acacia : ‘Time present and time past / Are both perhaps present in time future, /
and time future contained in time past.’
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Francois Thierry found the theme significant enough in Simon’s corpus to dedicate an entire book to it
(see Claude Simon: une expérience du temps, 1997).
142
« On peut observer comment, dès le début, une logique combinatoire se superpose à la logique narrative
traditionnelle, c’est-à-dire chronologique et téléologique » (Vies de l’archive 101).
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These sorts of temporal contradictions are pervasive in La Bataille de Pharsale, a novel
loosely organized around Zeno’s paradox. The opening epigraph invokes Zeno through
Paul Valéry’s poem “Le cimetière marin”:
Zénon! Cruel Zénon! Zénon d'Élée!
M'as-tu percé de cette flèche ailée
Qui vibre, vole, et qui ne vole pas!
Le son m'enfante et la flèche me tue!
Ah! le soleil . . . Quelle ombre de tortue
Pour l'âme, Achille immobile à grands pas!
The image of Achilles running motionless in the last line is an apt visual representation of
Simon’s approach to time in the novel, wherein stasis intermingles with tremendous
chronological shifts.143
Simon’s temporal manipulation goes beyond merely jumping between past and
present, a technique that was common long before he emerged on the literary scene. He
exaggerates the practice by placing temporal shifts mid-sentence, such that modern-day
trucks suddenly appear alongside a Napoleonic general, or the cries of an old woman in
World War II are simultaneously perceived as the lamentations of antiquity. Furthermore,
the narration does not merely leap into the past of a given character through the work of
memory, but also the past of that character’s ancestors, and even of the earth itself.144
What Simon presents is not the inexorable march of time, but rather a fluid, meandering
temporal model where ancient and modern battles are waged palimpsestically.
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This same image emerges in Les Géorgiques, wherein the narrator describes time as “à la fois statique et
emballé, l’Histoire se mettant à tournoyer sur place, sans avancer, avec de brusques retours en arrière,
d’imprévisible crochets, errant sans but” (382).
144
In La Route des Flandres, numerous parallels are drawn between de Reixach and his ancestor, both of
whom died from a bullet wound to the head. This temporal displacement is augmented even further by the
ubiquitous comparison to ancient rituals, Greek mythology, and primordial landscapes.
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Though Simon’s temporal playfulness assumes numerous forms, repetition is
perhaps the most commented upon. It rears its head on various scales: individuals repeat
actions across a lifetime, sons repeat the behaviors of their fathers, historical events
repeat across the centuries, and nature repeats herself on a geological level.145 In Les
Géorgiques, these various categories of repetition mimic one another, such that historical
repetition (particularly the recurrence of violent conflicts) echoes agricultural repetition
(the cycles of nature).146 Both kinds of patterns require infinite patience:
Quelque chose d’aussi cyclique, d’aussi régulier que le retour des aiguilles d’une
montre sur les mêmes chiffres d’un cadran, mois après mois, saison après saison,
pendant qu’il courait en tous sens d’un bout à l’autre de l’Europe avec ses canons,
ses tables de tir et ses interminables états de matériel. Quoique si l’on y réfléchit
les deux choses ne soient pas tellement contradictoires. Je veux dire en ce qui
concerne les qualités requises. Je veux parler de cet éternel recommencement,
cette inlassable patience ou sans doute passion qui rend capable de revenir
périodiquement aux mêmes endroits pour accomplir les mêmes travaux : les
mêmes prés, les mêmes champs, les mêmes vignes, les mêmes haies à regarnir,
les mêmes clôtures à vérifier, les mêmes villes à assiéger, les mêmes rivières à
traverser ou à défendre, les mêmes tranchées périodiquement ouvertes sous les
mêmes remparts. (440-41)
Even in works that ostensibly address singular historical events, Simon undermines the
notion of uniqueness by positing revolution as repetition rather than rupture. In the
opening epigraph of Le Palace, a novel centered on the Spanish Civil War, Simon defines
revolution as “mouvement d’un mobile qui, parcourant une courbe fermée, repasse
successivement par les mêmes points.” Hence, the cosmic revolution governing the
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In La Bataille de Pharsale, for example, the narrator describes the monumental forces and repeated
cataclysms that have shaped the earth over the course of millions of years: “épaisseurs profondes de la terre
[…] de choses concassées calcinées lentement écrasées par le poids de millions et de millions d’années
forêts englouties pétrifiées fougères de pierre animaux poissons aux arêtes de basalte obscure gestation »
(161). Peter Janssens (glossing Philippe Bonnefis) claims that Simon’s writing is modeled on “plissements
géologiques” (18).
146
This pairing is frequently referred to as “la terre et la guerre,” which was also the title of a 1981 issue of
Critique dedicated to Simon’s work.
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motion of celestial bodies takes precedence over petty political revolutions. This image of
successively passing through the same points can be considered a keystone for Simon’s
novels. In his introduction to Orion aveugle, he describes his writing process allegorically
through the figure of Orion, who blindly crosses and re-crosses the same paths
incessantly: “il tourne et retourne sur lui-même, comme peut le faire un voyageur égaré
dans une forêt, revenant sur ses pas, repartant, trompé (ou guidé?) par la ressemblance de
certains lieux, pourtant différents…” (13-14). In the manuscript for La Bataille de
Pharsale, Simon sketched a series of overlapping paths, providing a visual representation
of the repetition experienced by both his characters (who return time and time again to
seemingly identical fields in search of the site of the titular Battle of Pharsalus) and his
readers.
Simon’s fondness for repetition has led some critics to view him as cynical or
apolitical. If historical tragedies (wars, failed revolutions, etc.) are fated to recur, then
man is little more than a pawn in a larger cosmic game. However, I maintain that
repetition is instead an organizing principle that helps to arrest the chaos he perceives in
human experience, a means of replacing flux with duration, of reintegrating man into
universal rhythms.147 In Les Géorgiques, for example, the repetitions of nature offer a
sense of comfort and constancy amidst the tumults of History:
c’étaient les mêmes chemins, les mêmes mares gelées, les mêmes forêts
silencieuses qu’avaient traversés et retraversés les hordes successives de pillards,
d’incendiaires et d’assassins, depuis celles venues du fond de l’Asie […] et après
d’autres encore, et toujours les mêmes vallées, les flancs des mêmes collines,
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This is also the position taken by Gould in her reading of Simon: “in the face of the apparently pervasive
disorder reflected both in consciousness and in human experience, an underlying continuity persists
throughout Simon’s novels that recognizes the significance of ritual, repetition, and the possibility of
transcendence in the activities of our daily lives” (3).
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escaladées, franchies, ravagées, refranchies, ravagées de nouveau […] les mêmes
ciels de verre limpide, glacés, ou noircis au fusain, les mêmes ondulations de
collines, les mêmes halliers propices aux embuscades. (134-35)
As Karen Gould explains, “These mythic settings appear to be the only stable elements in
an otherwise perpetually changing universe” (4).
To further complicate matters, Simon does not merely describe historical events
in such a way as to highlight repetition over time; different eras actually interpenetrate
one another, so that the divisions between them disappear almost entirely in an
“intolérable promiscuité” (Janssens 52). At the beginning of Les Géorgiques, the three
time periods being described – the Ancien Régime, the Spanish Civil War, and World
War II – are clearly separated from one another by typographical distinctions
(specifically, the alternation of italicized and non-italicized font), yet this distinction
begins to break down as the novel progresses: first, the eras exchange typographical
markers (that which was non-italicized is now italicized, and vice versa); by the end, the
boundaries between the eras have dissolved entirely.148 Simon provides a useful visual
analog to this narrative practice in L’Herbe, wherein Louise compares Sabine’s sense of
time to a dial “apparemment constitué par plusieurs cadrans superposés ou, si l’on
préfère, concentriques, à la façon de ceux de ces horloges astronomiques […] l’aiguille
pointant donc dans le même instant sur plusieurs indications…” (203). If repetition over
time still implies a sort of linear progression, here it cedes to simultaneity and nontemporality.

148

A similar technique occurs in La Bataille de Pharsale, though with even less of a boundary between the
italicized and non-italicized sections. From the beginning of the novel, the two narratives are intercalated
every few words, tangled in a linguistic Gordian knot.
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For Gould, one of the features of Simon’s mythic mode of cognition is the
recognition of “an underlying oneness in past, present, and future environment” (5).
When describing the Gypsies in Les Géorgiques, Simon focuses on their seeming ability
to manipulate time: « investis de ces occultes pouvoirs qui leur conféraient le don non
pas de jeter des sorts ou de prédire l’avenir mais en quelque sorte de le préfigurer, c’està-dire d’accélérer le temps, confondant passé présent et futur dans un même creuset,
assimilant transformant en objets archaïques, primitifs et démantibulés tout ce qu’il
approchaient ou touchaient, restituant au chaos, à la matière originelle… » (214). In the
opening passage of La Bataille de Pharsale, the arrow sailing through the air is described
as simultaneously a recollection of the past and a warning of things to come, thus
confusing temporal registers.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty outlines Simon’s conception of time as follows: « Le
rapport passé-présent n’est pas le rapport d’un espace-temps à un espace-temps. Le
rapport présent-passé est le rapport d’un temps-espace à un autre qui le déchire […] La
simultanéité du temps est cela : la coexistence en lui de présents incompossibles ».149
This simultaneity appears not only in Simon’s fiction, but also in non-fictional accounts
of his lived experiences. Reflecting on his time as a prisoner-of-war, he projects himself
onto a much more ancient image, identifying with the Jewish captives being led to
Babylon:
Voyez-vous, quand, prisonnier, exténué, crevant de faim et de soif, je retraversais
avec des milliers d’autres la Belgique à pieds, ce qui m’a le plus aidé, c’a été de
me dire […]: Je vois donc une chose difficile! et plus même: Je vois une chose de
tous les temps. Parce que je pensais que le cortège des Juifs emmenés en captivité
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From his course notes on Simon, 1961. Cited in Claude Simon: Les Vies de l’Archive, ed. Calle-Gruber,
p. 300.
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à Babylone il y a des siècles, eh bien, hormis les costumes et le paysage, ça devait
être assez exactement la même chose.150
Here, the use of archaic imagery does not cynically underscore the inevitable repetition of
tragedy, but rather provides comfort by projecting the individual out of his isolated
condition and into a collective one that transcends temporal and cultural boundaries.151
Thus, the narrative tension in Simon’s novels does not emerge from the gradual
revelation of plot details (especially given that some of his works barely contain what we
might conventionally call a “plot”). Instead, the momentum comes from his
experimentation with different temporal registers. Every character is simultaneously
present and absent, living and dead: « L’image simonienne a donc cette capacité de
bouleverser et d’intervertir les catégories temporelles et de faire apparaître la mort
comme à la fois déjà advenue et encore à venir, atteignant par là doublement le lecteur »
(Hanhart-Marmor 234). Already in Le Vent (1957), Simon employs two competing
conceptions of time, which Brewer identifies as “the temporal model of rationality,
causality, and continuity” and a temporality that is “discontinuous, reversible, and
aleatory” (6). This formulation is useful insofar as it highlights the relationship between
Simon’s temporal techniques and his approach to rationality (which, as I explain later, he
ultimately rejects as broken).
This “irrational” (that is, non-linear or non-causal) temporality, which at moments
is closer to an absence of temporality, is most salient in Simon’s frequent use of the
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Claude Simon, “Un homme traversé par le travail”, entretien avec Alain Poirson, La Nouvelle Critique,
n 105, juin-juillet 1977.
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This type of comfort likewise emerges in La Route des Flandres, when Georges reflects that he has read
about experiences comparable to his own: « Je lui dirai que j’avais déjà lu en latin ce qui m’est arrivé, ce
qui fait que je n’ai pas été trop surpris et même dans une certaine mesure rassuré de savoir que c’avait déjà
été écrit » (94).
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present participle, which creates the sensation of a perpetual present. Even when
characters retreat into memory, they experience it as the present, thus further
destabilizing the distinction between different temporal registers. Characters are likewise
often thrust into either a non-temporal stasis or a sort of cosmic time (i.e. prehistoric time,
time immemorial) in which nature dominates man and an unfamiliar logic prevails. In Les
Géorgiques, for example, the soldiers experience: « l’état (temps, espace, froid) où devait
être le monde à l’époque des cavernes, des mammouths, des bisons, et autres bêtes
gigantesques chassées par des hommes gigantesques pour prendre leurs fourrures, boire
leur sang chaud, au sein de gigantesques et inépuisables forêts » (118). Though one of the
most pervasive themes in Simon’s work, temporality ultimately (and paradoxically)
ceases to matter due to its fundamental instability. While being transported as prisoners
of war, Blum asks Georges the time, to which Georges responds: “Qu’est-ce que ça peut
faire?” (70) Time is unimportant when events transpire « Comme si tout cela […] ne se
passait pas à l’époque des fusils, des bottes de caoutchouc, des rustiques et des costumes
de confection mais très loin dans le temps, ou de tous les temps, ou en dehors du temps »
(60).

La déesse Raison la Vertu
Like many writers of the postwar era, Simon recognized the limitations of
Enlightenment rationality and the naïveté of an unwavering faith in the redemptive power
of rational humanism. As he put it in an interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy, “Le ‘trou
noir’ d’Auschwitz (sans parler du Goulag) a rendu tout discours ‘humaniste’ simplement
indécent” (qtd. Carroll, “Thinking” 35). Having acknowledged these twentieth-century
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atrocities as an irremediable point of rupture for the Western world and its philosophical
traditions, Simon sought a return to primordial things:
If surrealism was born of the 1914-18 war, post-Second-World-War
developments are linked to Auschwitz. That is often forgotten, it seems to me,
when people speak about the Nouveau Roman. It’s not for nothing that Nathalie
Sarraute has written L’Ere du soupcon, or Barthes Le Degré zéro de l’écriture:
that artists like Tapies or Dubuffet started with graffiti, with walls, or that Louise
Nevelson made sculpture out of rubble. Ideologies were all discredited; humanism
a spent force. […] let’s try to go back to the primordial, the elementary, matter,
things.152
Thus, his rejection of post-Enlightenment rationality goes hand-in-hand with a desire to
return to the concreteness of myth.
One of the most pervasive themes in Simon’s fiction is an attack against History—
that is, an attack against the totalizing narratives that seek to rationalize even the most
radically incomprehensible experiences. In a sort of proto-postmodern gesture, Simon
rejects the belief that History is meaningful, offering an apocalyptic worldview in place
of a historical one.153 A representative example of this antipathy toward “textbook,” or
explanatory, History is provided by Blum in La Route des Flandres: « l’Histoire (ou si tu
préfères: la sottise, le courage, l’orgueil, la souffrance) ne laisse derrière elle qu’un résidu
abusivement confisqué, désinfecté et enfin comestible, à l’usage des manuels scolaires
agréés et des familles à pedigree… » (177) And as Britton explains, a rejection of History
is likewise a rejection of “the belief in progress, the social perfectibility of mankind and
‘la déesse Raison la Vertu’ (RF 312) that stems from eighteenth-century rationalism. […]
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Interview with Marianne Alphant. Cited in Claude Simon. Ed. Celia Britton, p. 54.
As Peter Janssens writes, « C’est une minutieuse négation de l’Histoire que La Route des Flandres
donne à lire. Apocalyptique plutôt qu’historique, le récit ne se fait que heurté, entrecoupé, décentré à la
façon de cette route qui est d’abord rupture » (10).
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What he rejects, in other words, is the belief in civilization and the harmonious progress
of mankind towards reason and virtue, the belief that violence is not – as he thinks it is –
permanent and ineradicable” (Writing the Visible 147). Simon’s attitude toward History is
therefore one of skepticism and negativity: “Simon’s novels […] are testimonies to the
non-recuperable negativity of history and the destruction of progressive, humanist
historical myths and illusions. The novels are skeptical of History’s greatness, and they
bear witness rather to the insignificant experiences and the ‘little stories’ such greatness
necessarily excludes” (Carroll, “Thinking” 34). In his analysis of Les Géorgiques, Viart
foregrounds Simon’s pervasive critiques of Rousseau – “ce Suisse mélomane,
effusionniste, et philosophe” (RF 201) – as well as of more contemporary humanists,
ranging from Rudyard Kipling (in La Route des Flandres) to Graham Greene (in La
Bataille de Pharsale), each deemed equally guilty of naïve humanistic conceptions
(Mémoire 246). Peter Janssens perhaps puts it most succinctly: « ces guerres soufflèrent
les fondements de la culture qui se voulait héritière des Lumières » (9).
According to Britton, the repetitions and wanderings that characterize Simon’s
style are a means of expressing his disillusionment with linear conceptions of history and
demonstrate a certain alliance with the “irrational”:
Movement which never achieves anything and has no definitive goal, ‘errance’
undercuts the rationalist conception of history as progress. Occasionally, in fact,
the text makes a specific causal connection between ‘errance’ and the irrational –
i.e. invisible, ungraspable – nature of historical reality: at the end of Le Palace the
image of history concretized as the invisible, unnamable, monstrous corpse is
what makes the soldiers wander aimlessly round the city, what makes them
regress to the natural, a-historical state of animals – in this case, vultures. (Writing
the Visible 153)
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Errance becomes a powerful political force in an era of mistrust toward linear narratives
and the notion of history as progress. If the heroes of Romanticism and modernism
wander as an expression of either nostalgia for a lost paradise or alienation amidst
unfamiliar urban landscapes, the wandering of Simon’s protagonists is simultaneously
less monumental and more politically engaged. The importance of wandering cannot be
underestimated, especially in light of the numerous titles Simon considered for La Route
des Flandres that allude to roving (including Méandres, L’Errance, Les Pas-Perdus,
Contre-Marche, and Allées et Venues).154 Each emphasizes the non-progressive nature of
a history whose end result is unmitigated slaughter.
One of the most commonly cited examples of Simon’s loss of faith in
Enlightenment values is the discussion of the Leipzig bombings in La Route des
Flandres. Georges’ father writes him a letter decrying the destruction of the Leipzig
library and all of the knowledge it contained, “l’héritage de plusieurs siècles,” to which
Georges responds: “si le contenu des milliers de bouquins de cette irremplaçable
bibliothèque avait été précisément impuissant à empêcher que se produisent des choses
comme le bombardement qui l’a détruite, je ne voyais pas très bien quelle perte
représentait pour l’humanité la disparition sous les bombes au phosphore de ces milliers
de bouquins et de papelards manifestement dépourvus de la moindre utilité” (211).155
Reflecting on that passage during an interview with DuVerlie, Simon comments:
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This list of potential titles forms part of the manuscript for La Route des Flandres at the Bibliothèque
littéraire Jacques Doucet.
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This sentiment echoes Nietzsche’s frustration with the accumulation of books as a replacement for true
knowledge in The Birth of Tragedy: “Our art reveals this universal distress: […] in vain does one
accumulate the entire ‘world-literature’ around modern man for his comfort; in vain does one place oneself
in the midst of the art styles and artists of all ages, so that one may gives names to them as Adam did to the
beasts: one still remains eternally hungry, the ‘critic’ without joy and energy, the Alexandrian man, who is
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All of us were faced by that at the end of the war, this form of tabula rasa, this
questioning of all values. […] About a year and a half ago, I was invited to a
Franco-German colloquium during which the German writers tried to explain to
us just how the generation of twenty to thirty year olds felt itself completely lost
and disoriented at the end of the war, doubting everything after the cataclysm and
horror from which they emerged. And I said to them: “You weren’t the only ones;
everyone in the West was confronted by the same situation, the same total
bankruptcy of 2000 years of ‘humanistic’ thought ending in the Nazi camps, on
the one hand, and the Goulag on the other.” (48)
Faced with this “bankruptcy of humanistic thought,” Simon rejects anthropocentric
models of the universe in favor of ones in which man is reduced to the level of object. He
praises the paintings of Cézanne and Vermeer, for example, for paying “equal attention
[…] to the whole surface of the canvas. What a great blow to humanism!” (DuVerlie 50),
and sets himself in opposition to the art historian Elie Faure (whom he frequently cites in
his novels). Faure, as a devoted humanist, critiques the curious practice among German
painters of devoting equal attention to a leaf and a human figure, a rock and an allegorical
representation.156 Simon is quite happy to return the rock to its rightful place, as an
equally worthy, if not superior, object of representation. By placing everything on the
same plane (a form of chosisme), Simon is able to produce unexpected juxtapositions: the
glory of battle and a soldier’s search for bread;157 religious icons and a chamber pot;158
the execution of the Russian Imperial family and a child’s cold.159

at bottom a librarian and corrector of proofs, and wretchedly goes blind from the dust of books and from
printers’ errors” (113-14).
156
Here is one such example from La Bataille de Pharsale: “O. lit dans une Histoire de l’Art le chapitre sur
les peintres allemands de la Renaissance […] On les voit, dans leurs tableaux, donner la même importance
à une hallebarde qu’à un visage humain, à une pierre inerte qu’à un corps en mouvement, dessiner un
paysage comme une carte de géographie, apporter, dans la décoration d’un édifice, autant de soins à une
horloge à marionnettes qu’à la statue de l’Espérance ou de la Foi, traiter cette statue avec les mêmes
procédés que cette horloge” (238).
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See Les Géorgiques, p. 44.
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See La Bataille de Pharsale, p. 4.
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See Les Géorgiques, pp. 191-92.
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Of course, an attack against rational humanism is not identical to an embrace of
irrationality. Simon did not immerse himself in the irrational in the same manner as the
Surrealists, for example. He showed little interest in the unconscious and its so-called
irrational desires and motivations. His goal was merely to underscore the absurdity of a
belief in transcendental truth and mastery of the world through scientific knowledge.
Some critics, in fact, have located a lingering humanism in Simon’s writing (despite his
own remarks to the contrary); and I admit that he does strive to recuperate some sort of
meaning or goodness from existence, even if History and reason are no longer acceptable
sources of that meaning.160 In an interview published in 1961, Simon explained:
Par un curieux renversement, ce monde usé par le désastre apparaît finalement
plus riche que toutes les formes qu’il détruit. La mort y règne partout ; mais elle
ne peut empêcher une autre puissance – qu’il faut bien appeler la vie – d’avoir le
dernier mot. […] C’est plutôt sa profusion, son lyrisme qui nous écrasent, comme
si, délivrés de croire que nous existons, nous découvrions, dans sa ruine même,
l’obscure et jubilante confusion de l’existence.161
What prevents Simon from fully entering humanist territory is precisely his interest in the
non-rational facets of existence, as well as his emphasis on self-loss as a necessary first
step towards integrating with others.

Of Hybrids and Primordial Ooze
Another trademark of Simon’s style is his tendency to present boundaries as
permeable. Humans and landscapes merge into one another; rocks and trees assume the
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Mortan P. Levitt, for example, places humanism at the center of Simon’s work in his essay “Modernist
Survivor: The Later Fiction of Claude Simon.” Cécile Yapaudjian-Labat likewise considers the multiple
and often ambiguous values that the concept of “humanism” acquires in Simon's novels, and concludes
that, late in life, Simon advanced a quasi-humanist conception of literature, wherein: “la littérature peut
toucher l’homme, le rendre meilleur ou plus heureux. Entreprise solitaire, l’acte d’écriture a une visée
universelle” (115).
161
“Sur la route des Flandres.” Les Temps modernes, 178 (1961).
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same status as men; soldiers fuse with animals or inanimate objects, creating bizarre
hybrid creatures.162 In La Route des Flandres, for example, the narrator describes the
prisoners “comme la couleur même de la guerre, de la terre, s’emparant d’eux peu à peu,
eux, leurs visages terreux leurs loques terreuses, leurs yeux terreux aussi, de cette teinte
sale, indistincte qui semblait les assimiler déjà à cette argile, cette boue, cette poussière
d’où ils étaient sortis et à laquelle, errants, honteux, hébétés et tristes, ils retournaient
chaque jour un peu plus” (162). Georges, the cynical narrator of La Route des Flandres,
alludes to Ovid’s The Metamorphoses while reflecting on his own dehumanized form in
the wagon full of prisoners: « il me semble que j’ai lu quelque part une histoire comme
ça, des types métamorphosés d’un coup de baguette en cochons ou en arbres ou en
cailloux, le tout par le moyen de vers latins… » (94). The quintessential example of this
phenomenon is the recurring image of the dead horse in La Route des Flandres, whose
decaying matter fuses imperceptibly with the mud in which it is encased. Seeing the
horse for the first time, Georges describes it as « déjà à moitié absorbé semblait-il par la
terre, comme si celle-ci avait déjà sournoisement commencé à reprendre possession de ce
qui était issu d’elle, n’avait vécu que par sa permission et son intermédiaire (c’est-à-dire
l’herbe et l’avoine dont le cheval s’était nourri » (26).163 Simon’s description of the
coloration of a postcard in Triptyque provides a useful model for his overall narrative
technique: « L’encrage des différentes couleurs ne coïncide pas exactement avec les
contours de chacun des objets, de sorte que le vert cru des palmiers déborde sur le bleu du
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Lynn A. Higgins offers a fairly comprehensive list of hybrid creatures in La Route des Flandres in her
chapter “Gender and War Narrative in La Route des Flandres” in Claude Simon. Ed. Celia Britton. p. 207.
The most notable is, of course, the centaur; Simon frequently depicts men and their mounts merging into a
single being.
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Janssens dedicates sixty pages of his text Claude Simon: Faire l’histoire to the significance of the horse
in Simon’s œuvre.
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ciel, le mauve d’une écharpe ou d’une ombrelle morde sur l’ocre du sol ou le cobalt de la
mer » (7). As Dällenbach notes, this passage highlights “the extent to which things are
always running into each other in the novel” (“Mise-en-abyme” 151).
The war experience in particular lends itself to a chaotic lack of differentiation:
War renders men indistinguishable from each other, from animals, from objects,
from corpses. The novel teems with hybrids. […] These and literally hundreds of
other examples of disintegration and blending evoke the terror of the uncanny, as
they transgress the boundaries between categories usually reassuringly distinct:
self and other, men and animals, living and inanimate matter. War assimilates
everything to the same colour (the colour of earth) and a single texture: a
disgusting viscosity. (Higgins 207)
However, this “disgusting viscosity” is not a purely negative phenomenon. Ontological
instability may result in confusion and chaos, but it also marks a return to more mythic,
primordial forces, to a time when communion with the world was possible, thus
suggesting an alternative to nihilism or absurdism. In a revision of Rimbaud’s famous
line, “Je est un autre,” Simon suggests instead that, “Je est d’autres. D’autres choses,
d’autres sons, d’autres personnes, d’autres lieux, d’autres temps” (La Corde raide 174).
Fusion likewise presents the possibility of repair in the wake of destruction. In La Route
des Flandres, Simon offers a lengthy description of a drop of water on the edge of a roof:
it breaks off, falls, then immediately reforms—an endless cycle wherein any “rupture” is
instantly mended.164 Ideally, myth offers a comparable system of restoration for fractured
humans.
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« Le phénomène se décomposant de la façon suivante : la goutte s’étirant en poire sous son propre poids,
se déformant, puis s’étranglant, la partie inférieure – la plus grosse – se séparant, tombant, tandis que la
partie supérieure semble remonter, se rétracter, comme aspirée vers le haut aussitôt après la rupture, puis se
regonfle aussitôt par un nouvel apport, de sorte qu’un instant après il semble que ce soit la même goutte qui
pende, s’enfle de nouveau, toujours à la même place, et cela sans fin » (24).
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At times, undifferentiation provides comfort and sustenance to characters who
find the isolation of their individual experiences unendurable. Dällenbach sees these
fusions as a means of reuniting with the cosmos: « se perdre dans l’autre, participer au
rythme binaire primordial, régresser au stade de l’élémentaire, s’incorporer la vitalité
animale ou retrouver la passivité des plantes, se répandre dans le cosmos et laisser le
cosmos le pénétrer, tel est le désir forcené de mue et d’osmose du mort-vivant […] dans
les plus fortes pages de la Route des Flandres…» (Sur Claude Simon 73). Abandoning
the confines of the body thus becomes a form of liberation. The slippage between self and
world — the regression to primordial matter — opens up new possibilities for Simon’s
characters: « les romans de Simon nous donnent non pas la jouissance apollinienne de la
forme close, finie, achevée, mais celle, dionysiaque ou baroque, d’une forme en train de
naître et de prendre possession de l’espace, riche encore de la materia prima, d’où elle a
été extraite, et inséparable de la force qui la génère et la sous-tend » (Dällenbach, Claude
Simon 99). Because these moments of undifferentiation often occur in the midst of
violence, the tendency has been to read the loss of self as a purely negative consequence
of war. Yet the presentation of less rigidly delineated subjects provides a certain degree
of escape from a seemingly inexorable destiny.
Part of this escape involves a return to nature (though Simon’s formulation of the
idea is less sentimental than that of the Romantics). In his correspondence with the art
brut painter Jean Dubuffet, whose work he greatly admired, Simon insists that the image
of man encased in nature is one of the most interesting themes in Dubuffet’s work:
L’une des choses qui me frappe et me séduit (parmi d’autres) c’est, dans ces
variations, cette partition que vous assignez à l’homme, non plus régnant sur mais
englobé, ou plutôt encastré au sein de la nature (minérale ou végétale) qui parfois
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(dans un processus et un mouvement suivant à la fois ceux de la main et des
choses) le submerge, le biffe, l’enveloppe de filets plus ou moins enchevêtrés,
jusqu’à l’effacer en certaines circonstances (pourrait-on dire le ‘digérer’ ?...). Pas
de perspective, pas de ‘loin’ ni de ‘près’ (pas plus qu’il n’en existe dans la
mémoire ou dans la sensation) (57-58).
Given that Simon openly compared his work to that of Dubuffet, we might conclude that
this submersion in nature, the effacement of man’s individual identity, is likewise an idea
that Simon strived to incorporate into his novels.
Though at times Simon seems to undermine his opposition to individuation by
focusing on the particularity of characters and spaces, these seemingly vivid details are
almost always ultimately effaced. Viart points out, for example, that though La Route des
Flandres is rife with references to real geographical locations, upon closer inspection the
reader discovers a false geography. Many of the towns he names are nowhere near the
actual battle (Mémoire 199). Furthermore, words like “même” and “identique” abound: «
aux mêmes lieux, aux mêmes rivages, aux mêmes places fortes, aux mêmes fleuves, sous
les mêmes remparts […] sisyphéen, repassant chaque fois par le même carrefour »
(Géorgiques 239). Thus, specific locations metamorphose into lieux communs. This
commonality allows Simon to emphasize the universal features of the wartime
experience: « Quel que soit l’endroit, l’absurdité, la destruction demeurent les mêmes »
(Viart, Mémoire 200).
Though transformations and mutations occur on both the human and non-human
level, Simon employs many techniques that foreground the interchangeability of various
characters — that is, the oscillation between self and other (and the ultimate dissolution
of the boundary between them). In La Route des Flandres, this occurs through his
misleading use of personal pronouns when recounting the conservations between Georges
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and Blum in the prison camp. The alternation between « et toi… et moi… » (in which it
in unclear which character is the “moi”) gives way to « et Blum (ou Georges)… et
Georges (ou Blum)… » (177) ; Georges finally confesses that he does not know if he’s
speaking to Blum or to himself (176). Merleau-Ponty, in his notes on Simon, likewise
refers to the use of “intermediate pronouns” and “intermediate verbal modes” which have
the effect of displacing subjectivity.165 This slippage between Georges and Blum is
described by Lynn Higgins as a form of bonding, thus reinforcing a positive reading of
the loss of individuality.

The One and the Many
Ultimately, the oscillation between one character and another transitions to the
indeterminacy and interchangeability of entire groups. Simon’s description of the World
War II cavalrymen in Les Géorgiques, for example, makes it impossible to determine
whether multiple soldiers are performing the same actions, or whether a single soldier is
repeating himself: « cela recommence, c’est-à-dire un autre cheval et un autre cavalier
arrêtés (mais peut-être est-ce le même type et le même cheval, ou peut-être que le
cavalier arrêté c’est maintenant lui, et que c’est lui aussi qui, à son tour, émet des bruits
bizarres, méprisables) » (98). This in turn leads to a decentering of individual identity in
favor of a communal one. Mythic decentering, however, should not be confused with
decentering in the postmodern sense, which is predicated upon the absence of a center,
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“We no longer read I or he
Intermediate pronouns are born, a first-second person
Intermediate verbal modes (present participle equals ‘simultaneity’).” From “Five Notes On Claude Simon”
in Claude Simon. Ed. Celia Britton, p. 37.
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and thus an absence of meaning. For Frederic Jameson, “loss of the center equals the
death of the subject, and it engenders a crisis auguring the death of meaning, history,
aesthetic inquiry, and temporality” (Shirvani 292). However, I maintain that the loss of
subjectivity catalyzed by myth and present in Simon’s novels is less fatalistic, retaining
the potential to generate (rather than merely destabilize) signification. If postmodern
decentering provokes anxiety in the face of ever-shifting and conflicting identities,
mythic decentering forges a path to renewed unity. Viart, for example, sees in Simon’s
novels « le sentiment de l’unité [qui] dissout celui de l’individualité du sujet » (Mémoire
219). Characters who feel unanchored, haunted by the conviction that life has no
meaning, are able to locate some sense of comfort in this privileging of community over
individuality.
The violence and traumas that Simon describes are as much about ruptures within
communities as they are about individual suffering. Brewer describes how L’Acacia
progresses from the story of an individual mourning the loss of his father to
a series of attempts by the narrator to repair a severance from and break in the
possibility of community. […] The transition from being an object of sacrifice, a
hunted animal rejected and expelled from the human community, to becoming a
social and ethical person once more, a subject in a community of subjects, is a
difficult one, but becoming Other may be taken as a condition of becoming a
subject in an ethical sense, of recognizing a reciprocity between self and Other. In
a postwar perspective Simon’s writing provides a particularly thoughtful
questioning of what constitutes a reinvention of the social tie or bond. (141)
Myth, then, emerges as a means of reinserting the individual into the social. Individual
identity is recast as merely a fragment of the universal: « Cependant, homme parmi les
hommes, avec mes besoins et mes désirs d’homme, ma réalité, quoique particulière, est
un fragment de l’universel » (Calle-Gruber, Triptyques 161). Gould, in her analysis of
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myth in Simon’s œuvre, claims that, “the role of ritual is to provide a perennial form for
human life, and to project the individual out of his or her particular identity, into a
universal mold” (127). The privileging of the universal over the particular is thus a form
of endurance or preservation. Brewer claims that the mythic images conjured up by
Georges and Blum as they while away the hours in prison in La Route des Flandres
sustain them in the midst of a disintegrating world (22).
In this way, the loss of individuality is not seen as something to be mourned, but
rather as a positive recuperation of community. It is a means of overcoming alienation
and granting universal resonances to the voice of the solitary writer. If Cesare Pavese
struggled to reconcile his desire to participate in a community with the solitary nature of
writing, Simon circumscribes this problem by revealing the communal nature of the
communicative act.

The Cobbler Triumphant
Simon spoke quite openly of his fondness for bricolage; in the introduction to
Orion aveugle, for example, he describes his motivation for writing the book as the “seul
désir de ‘bricoler’ quelque chose à partir de certaines peintures que j’aime” (12). Similar
to collage, briolage describes the assembly of a text from the heterogeneous materials at
hand, without subordinating construction to the constraints of a preconceived project.
Most importantly for Lévi-Strauss, bricolage is the main motivating force of mythic
thought, used to illustrate the link between primitive, mythical ideas and the scientific
rationalism of the industrial world.
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The connection between Simon and Lévi-Strauss is worth stressing, especially
since
Simon admitted to being inspired by Lévi-Strauss’s theorization of bricolage.166 As
Brewer notes,
Simon critics have emphasized writing as formal assemblage at the expense of
Lévi-Strauss’s more interesting discussion of the historicity of the materials and
instruments at the disposal of mythical thought. ‘But the possibilities always
remain limited by the particular history of each piece.’ For Lévi-Strauss the
elements which the ‘bricoleur’ collects and uses are ‘pre-constrained’ because
‘like the constitutive units of myth … they are drawn from the language where
they already possess a meaning, which sets a limit on their freedom of
manoeuver.’ Words and language bear the traces of their previous consignments;
they are marked, or ‘preconstrained,’ by a history of their previous occurrences.
Simon himself insists on this history in language when he states that ‘the writer
works on a material—language—laden with history.’ ‘Our vocabulary,’ he writes,
‘is not a set of inert signs—each word carries a weight that is at once historical,
cultural, phonetic. (20)
Thus, we see yet again that myth and history are not diametrically opposed. On the
contrary, mythic bricolage always involves engagement with historically resonant
materials. It is simply a matter of assembling these materials in different (and therefore
potentially liberating) ways. Its connection to materiality likewise allows bricolage to
circumscribe the problems that Simon ascribes to philosophic abstraction.
Bricolage is a process of decontextualization and recontextualization. Familiar
images and narratives are removed from their usual setting and reassembled in new and
unique ways. This change in perspective is central to Simon’s project: he was drawn to
the Russian formalist definition of the “fait littéraire” as “le transfert d’un objet de sa
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« Oui, j’ai très souvent employé, en parlant de mon travail, le mot bricolage. Je le trouve très très bon.
Ce n’est pas moi qui l’ai trouvé, je l’ai repris de Lévi-Strauss qui lui-même l’avait repris […] C’est un mot
que je trouve très bon parce qu’il oppose justement une conception très artisanale du travail de l’écrivain à
celle éternelle du génie, de l’inspiré. L’écrivain, en somme, c’est, du moins en ce qui me concerne,
quelqu’un qui fabrique un objet, qui le fabrique difficilement » (qtd. Calle-Gruber, Triptyques 36).
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zone de perception habituelle dans la sphère d’une autre perception” (Calle-Gruber,
Triptyques 11). External changes (e.g., political ones) therefore begin with a change in
perception. Like its visual analog, the collage (a genre in which Simon also participated),
bricolage juxtaposes seemingly unrelated objects in novel, “illogical” ways.167 As he
explains in his introduction to Orion aveugle, “les mots possèdent […] ce prodigieux
pouvoir de rapprocher et de confronter ce qui, sans eux, resterait épars” (9). For Simon,
this might involve the pairing of “important” and “unimportant” events, or the creation of
textual collages from pieces of other novels.168 The works of Proust, Elie Faure, and
George Orwell (to name but a few) all appear unexpectedly in the midst of Simon’s
prose, often without quotation marks or other forms of attribution.169 This appropriation
allows Simon to breathe new life into texts by framing them in entirely new ways. Faced
with the impossibility of any “authentic” representation of human experience, bricolage
becomes the most effective tool for remedying disorder: “For Simon, […] there is no
theoretical solution to the perceived chaos of the world, and bricolage represents the only
possible alternative strategy: a kind of muddling through, somehow or other assembling a
representation of the real that is at least relatively more solid than the initial experience of
it” (Britton, “Introduction” 16).
The key difference between the bricoleur and the engineer, both of whom assemble
projects from preexisting materials, is that “the various means at the disposal of the
bricoleur, unlike the engineer, cannot be defined in terms of a project” (Doubrovsky
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Some of Simon’s collages can actually be seen in a filmed interview Simon did for German television,
now available on a DVD included with Calle-Gruber’s book Triptyques.
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As described earlier in this chapter.
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For a more thorough analysis of these intertextual elements, see Mary Orr, Claude Simon: the
intertextual dimension. Glasgow: University of Glasgow French & German Publications, 1993.
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164). The bricoleur does not decide ahead of time what he is creating; the emphasis is
instead on process. Thus, when Simon states in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech that he
never had anything to say in the Sartrean sense, we can take him at his word. The process
of assemblage takes precedence over any preconceived message. To cite again from
Orion aveugle, Simon insists that “Avant que je me mette à tracer des signes sur le papier
il n’y a rien, sauf un magma informe. […] C’est seulement en écrivant que quelque chose
se produit” (7). Not only that, but it is a never-ending process of self-production.170
Bricolage has no telos; there is no steady perfection of the Hegelian spirit—hence the
appeal for Simon.
The assemblages that result from bricolage are not intended as complete, contained,
totalizing narratives that might replace the “false” narratives of nineteenth century
realism. On the contrary, bricolage is more closely aligned with fragmentation, with
dismantling the world into its primordial constituent parts. In her discussion of Simon’s
Le Vent, Brewer insists that it “is not about restoring a unified (mythical) subtext; rather,
it is about tracing the mythical in the text’s gaps and discontinuities. […] The reactivation
of mythic fragments in Simon’s writing cannot be assigned to an archetypal Urnarrative”(14, 19). Instead, myth diverts energy away from master narratives and “serves
as an obstacle to mobilization by inventing a kind of writing that cannot immediately be
recuperated by ideologies of totality” (Brewer 137). Though this sort of fragmentation
might seem at odds with the aforementioned primordial unity that emerges from the
dissolution of boundaries between self and other (or self and world), it is in fact through
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“Bricolage is by definition a never-ending process, as each new structure will in turn be dismantled and
its components used to make yet another one” (Britton, “Introduction” 15).
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fragmentation that we are able to overcome the limitations of individuated forms. In
Lyotard’s reading, Simon’s work is characterized by the search for undetermined (i.e.
unexpected) linkages among disparate elements, which for him have critical historicalpolitical dimensions.171
Simon’s use of fragmentation and bricolage when representing traumatic events
(World War II, the Spanish Civil War, etc.) has often been explained merely as an
expression of the ineffable chaos of tragedy, yet Simon offers a simpler explanation of
fragmentation as our base state of being: « Nous sommes tous constitués des ruines :
celles des civilisations passés, celles des événements de notre vie dont il ne subsiste dans
notre mémoire que des fragments. » (Album d’un amateur 18). However, these ruins are
not meant to induce melancholy, but are ultimately even more majestic than the
“originals” due to their status as survivors of destruction. Nor are they left in their ruined
state; rather, they are gathered and reassembled into new cultural products.172 Janssens
describes this as “une ontologie de la ruine” and concludes: “ruiner n’est pas appauvrir,
c’est ‘ennoblir’” (33).

Abstract Realities and Concrete Myths
Due to the nouveau roman’s defiantly “anti-realist” position, as well as the
common view of myth as opposed to “reality,” it is worth pausing to parse these terms
and determine what “reality” and “realism” mean in the context of Simon’s literary
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For more on this, see Lyotard, Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event (1988).

172

« Les ruines sont des manifestations de la vie dans ce qu’elle a de plus robuste, et tout passé est une
addition de ruines auxquelles le temps, les mutilations confèrent une majesté durable que l’édifice ainsi
ennobli n’avait pas à l’état neuf » (Album 18).
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output. Simon (perhaps surprisingly) self-identified as a realist, though his definition of
the term was decidedly different than that of Balzac or other traditional realists.173 For
Simon, reality is always experienced as fragmentation; thus, a fragmented narrative style
is most accurately “realist”:
Et c’est à l’exemple de Flaubert et du cubisme qu’il explicite le principe du
réalisme littéraire : ‘Tout ce que je peux saisir, non seulement de ma mémoire
mais encore du monde qui m’entoure au présent, ce sont, comme Flaubert l’a bien
senti, des fragments, un monde émietté, disloqué, et à ce titre on pourrait avancer
au passage que les peintres qui ont donné l’équivalent le plus réaliste de notre
perception du monde visuel sont les cubistes et en particulier Picasso, de l’époque
dite ‘synthétique’, où dans leurs tableaux voisinent (ou plutôt pour rappeler
encore Flaubert : se combinent) les fragments d’une guitare, d’un compotier,
d’une manchette de journal, d’un paquet de tabac, etc.’ (Calle-Gruber, Inlassable
34)
It is clear that his notion of realism has little to do with fidelity, nor does he view fidelity
and fictional invention as mutually exclusive concepts:
MCG : Y a-t-il, dans l’écriture qui se souvient, conflit entre une fidélité du
témoignage et l’invention de la fiction ?
CS : Je ne crois pas. Mais, en définitive, peu importe. Encore une fois quelle est la
‘fidélité’ de la peinture (‘représentation’) du visage humain ? Piero, Rembrandt,
Cézanne ? Lequel des trois – ou d’autres – en donne une image ‘fidèle’ ?
(Inlassable 75-76)
Indeed, Simon frequently bemoaned the fact that painters are permitted more leeway than
writers in their use of non-realist techniques: while artists like Dubuffet, Tapies, and
Rauschenberg (with whom Simon closely identified) are rarely accused of being
“unengaged,” overly formalist, or devotees of art for art’s sake, despite their experimental
styles, such labels are applied to Simon for creating what is arguably a literary analog to
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In an interview in 1960, Simon called himself « un réaliste total » (Les Lettres francaises, 6 décembre
1960, p. 5). It is worth noting that Robbe-Grillet also claimed to be a realist—though again, in a manner
that opposed traditional, historical understandings of the term.
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their visual work. Viart attributes this contradiction to the sway that Sartre’s discourse
held over the literary world (Mémoire 253).174
Similarly, while expressing an understanding of the psychoanalytic distinction
between real and imaginary, Simon nonetheless concluded that the opposition was of
little importance (with the terms ultimately bleeding into one another): « Certainement,
ce que vous appelez l’inconscient joue un rôle mais je crois qu’il est important de cesser
de faire une différence entre ce « réel » et cet « imaginaire » que nous distinguons
tellement peu dans notre vie. Il me semble que ce que l’on appelle le réel ou l’imaginaire
se mélange, que tout ça est intimement entrecroisé, interpénétré » (Knapp 186). For
Simon, the tension was not between real and imaginary, but rather between one reality
and another (equally valid) one: « Ce qui est donné avec le monde tel qu’il est, ce n’est
pas une totalité à déconstruire, puisque c’est d’une réalité déjà déconstruite que nous
héritons : c’est une autre réalité à construire – à construire avec les moyens du bord,
c’est-à-dire à partir des décombres de la première, et avec eux » (Dällenbach Claude
Simon 115).
Yet another binary that Simon seeks to undo is that of abstract/concrete—in
particular, the association of the former with myth, and the latter with realism. While
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Sartre was famously dismissive of the political power of painting, stating at the beginning of Qu’est-ce
que la littérature: “Et Le Massacre de Guernica, ce chef-d'œuvre, croit-on qu'il ait gagné un seul cœur à la
cause espagnole?” Simon has a very different take on Picasso’s masterpiece: “Mu par un sentiment
d’indignation, prenant comme « point de départ » une réalité horrible (une ville bombardée, des corps
sanglants et déchiquetés), Picasso peint un tableau où tout n’est qu’ordre, équilibre et beauté. Alors que son
impulsion motrice était l’abomination, sitôt saisi les pinceaux, sitôt qu’il s’est confronté avec son langage,
celui-ci s’est emparé de sa pensée au point qu’à la fin, elle n’a plus été qu’harmonie, architecture,
réminiscences classiques. Picasso a-t-il pour cela « trahi » les morts de Guernica, les a-t-il « exploités »,
c’est-il mis au service (puisque son œuvre fait aujourd’hui l’ «ornement » d’un musée financé par des
« exploiteurs ») d’une classe de privilégiés ? De tout temps les moralistes n’ont cessé de s’indigner et de
stigmatiser ces activités où, apparemment, la morale ne trouve pas sa place” (Calle-Gruber, Triptyques
149).
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common understandings of myth link it to fantasy, fable, and other forms of abstraction
that must be stripped away in order to get at the reality behind it, it is actually (as LéviStrauss reminds us) a science of the concrete. That is, it is concerned with the material,
the primal, with bodies and nature. According to definitions dating back as least as far as
Schiller, myth facilitates a more direct access to “reality,” whereas “realist” discourses
augment the gap between subject and object.175 Thus, by adhering to this mythic devotion
to the concrete, Simon produces a style that Calle-Gruber has characterized as “un
réalisme brutal. C’est l’homme réduit à son corps, à son sexe ; c’est la vie ramenée à ses
gestes, à ses besoins primordiaux, toujours traversée par le drame, toujours vouée à la
dégradation, à la souffrance, à la mort” (Triptyques 61). Viart coins the term
“concrétude” to describe Simon’s methodology; in the wake of World War II, Simon
advocated a return to concrete, material, primordial things, aligning himself with art brut
painters like Dubuffet.176
Due to this commitment to “things,” Viart ultimately attributes to Simon « une
véritable éthique de la matérialité », a « morale du corps » (“Sartre-Simon” 123). If books
were powerless to impede the horrors of World War II (as the passage on the destruction
of the Leipzig library in La Route des Flandres indicates), then the abstractions contained
within them must be abandoned in favor of first principles (that is, materiality). And for
Simon, materiality is best accessed not through a “realist” discourse, but through the
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In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche concludes that “Schiller is right about these origins of tragic art, too:
the chorus is a living wall against the assaults of reality because it—the satyr chorus—represents existence
more truthfully, really, and completely than the man of culture does who ordinarily considers himself as the
only reality. The sphere of poetry does not lie outside the world as a fantastic impossibility spawned by a
poet’s brain: it desires to be just the opposite, the unvarnished expression of the truth, and must precisely
for that reason discard the mendacious finery of that alleged reality of the man of culture” (61).
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See Une mémoire inquiète, p. 253.
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avant-garde. In a 1958 essay, he defined the avant-garde as the search for precision,
exactitude, « une fidélité minutieuse », thus dismantling the notion that fidelity and
aesthetic experimentation are opposed.177 This precision is what he strived to accomplish
in his own art after escaping from captivity: “On my return, after I escaped, I went back
to painting but above all I worked on drawing. I copied leaves, a tuft of grass, a pebble, as
exactly as possible. Somewhat in the spirit of Durer’s drawings which I discovered later.
I had banished from my mind all idea of art. No more cubism, no more fantasy, nothing.
Just things” (Alphant 54). Paul Dirkx et Pascal Mougin claim that Simon’s “réalisme
extrême” stems from “une poétique toujours plus scrupuleusement vouée à transmuer en
langage littéraire, contre l’inertie doxique de la langage et malgré le fait qu’il ‘n’y a pas
d’art réaliste’, certains fragments de réalité sociohistorique que l’écrivain a plus ou moins
enregistrés en certains lieux et à certains moments de son existence, qu’il sait
inexorablement inscrite dans cette même réalité » (18). Poetic (or mythic) language is
ultimately better able to reflect reality than traditional realist discourses.
Even if Simon is not a mythographer in the manner of Lévi-Strauss or even
Roland Barthes, his temporal and spatial manipulation, his use of bricolage as an
organizing principle, his rejection of rational humanism, and his focus on the concrete all
converge to form a mythic logic that governs his literary output. The question then
remains: how does this mythic style relate to the concept of political commitment (of
both the Sartrean and non-Sartrean variety)?

177

“Qu’est-ce que l’avant-garde en 1958?”, first published in Les Lettres Françaises, 24-30 avril 1958.
Now available in Les Triptyques de Claude Simon, ed. Mireille Calle-Gruber, pp. 137-140.
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In Search of a Middle Term: Sartre, Socialist Realism, and the Role of the Writer
Simon critics have shown little interest in the question of his political engagement.
For years, formal criticism, focused on techniques like word play and Faulknerian
stream-of-consciousness, prevailed. At a moment when Sartre’s battle cry of littérature
engagée was dominating the French intellectual landscape, the nouveaux romanciers
were systematically excising history, politics, and other sociological themes from their
works. Though he was just as devoted to experimentation with language and a rejection
of traditional realism as his fellow nouveaux romanciers, Simon’s books nonetheless
contain far more specific historical references than those of his counterparts. If RobbeGrillet omits character names, place names, chronological indications, and other markers
that might allow for a precise socio-historical reading of his novels, Simon explicitly
refers to events of the Spanish Civil War and World War II, thus rendering him more
easily recuperable as an “engaged” writer (or at least, engaged with identifiable people,
places, and things). When Simon was asked what distinguished his voice from those of
the other new novelists, he responded: “Beginning with The Grass, my novels are more
and more based on my life and require very little fiction—in the end, really none at all”
(Paris Review). Yet despite his more obvious alliance with contemporary historical
events, accusations of disengagement abounded.
Reading Simon as apolitical is not without justification. Despite his frequent
inclusion of true historical and political events in his novels, Simon nonetheless insists
that his writing is always produced in the moment of writing—it is never a description of
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that which has come before.178 Nathalie Piégay-Gros underscores the de-historicized,
archaic misery in Simon’s work as proof of his disengagement from History.179 Other
critics have pointed to a prevailing pessimism in his fiction at odds with the revolutionary
thrust toward progress. Patrick Rebollar, who set out to complete a systematic analysis of
political language in Simon’s novels, is forced to conclude that Simon rarely employs a
“political” vocabulary; characters do not discuss their political choices or ideologies; they
almost never engaged in direct political action; even Simon’s soldiers are not politically
motivated.180 One could therefore be forgiven for concluding that Simon is indeed
unengaged, particularly when viewed alongside more politically vocal figures like Sartre,
Camus, and Louis Aragon. Nonetheless, I aim to show that Simon is indeed a
“committed” writer, even if his commitment follows a different trajectory than that of
more prominently political figures of the postwar era. In fact, he insists on the superiority
of his anti-humanism over the empty promises of political parties: « par un extraordinaire
renversement, cet antihumanisme est plus tonique que l’humanisme et ses larmes de
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“Et, tout de suite, un premier constat: c'est que l'on n'écrit (ou ne décrit) jamais quelque chose qui s'est
passé avant le travail d'écrire, mais bien ce qui se produit (et cela dans tous les sens du terme) au cours de
ce travail, au présent de celui-ci, et résulte, non pas du conflit entre le très vague projet initial et la langue,
mais au contraire d'une symbiose entre les deux qui fait, du moins chez moi, que le résultat est infiniment
plus riche que l'intention.” From his Nobel Prize speech.
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« La plus évidente, à mon avis, est que le vocabulaire politique n’est pas ou très peu employé par Claude
Simon dans le cadre d’une action romanesque. Il n’y a pas d’organisation de personnages des romans qui
serait narrativement élaborée sur des choix politiques, avec propositions, discussions, décisions, actions,
réactions, changements, etc., comme on peut le voir chez des contemporains comme Gide, dans Les FauxMonnayeurs, ou Sartre, dans Les Chemins de la liberté. Ainsi, lorsqu’on voit des personnages discuter en
employant des arguments politiques, dans Le Tricheur ou dans La Route des Flandres, il s’agit moins
d’arguments politiques visant à convaincre l’autre et à envisager une transformation sociale par l’action
politique, comme ce serait le cas chez Balzac, Zola ou Jules Vallès, que d’apostrophes ou d’invectives
opposant des positions définitives et inamovibles. En ce sens, il n’y a donc jamais d’intrigue politique chez
Claude Simon, sauf peut-être dans Orion aveugle et Les Corps conducteurs où un réel suspense existe
relativement aux motions discutées et adoptées en réunion… » (Rebollar 125-26)
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crocodile, que la SDN et ses promesses mirifiques, que l’ONU et son cynisme effarant »
(210-11).
In applying the moniker “engaged” to Simon, I do not intend to place him in
Sartre’s camp. On the contrary, the two thinkers exchanged biting critiques on more than
one occasion. In one interview, Sartre dismissed Simon as a mere imitator of Proust
(Louette 63). Simon, in turn, in an interview for The Paris Review, unapologetically
declared, “I consider the writings of Camus and Sartre to be absolutely worthless.
Sartre’s work is, above all else, dishonest and malevolent.” Britton insists that, despite
sharing similar political views, the nouveaux romanciers were almost as antagonistic to
littérature engagée as they were to realism (Nouveau Roman 12). In response to Sartre’s
famous comment on the inadequacy of literature in the face of a starving child, Simon
accused Sartre of misunderstanding the purpose of literature (which is not to solve world
hunger) and used his own experiences as a starving prisoner of war as counter evidence
to Sartre’s claims, describing his insatiable craving for books in the midst of his corporeal
hunger (Louette 67).181 Ultimately, he concludes that engagement is at odds with liberty:
« On voit donc que l’engagement est la conséquence d’une inaptitude à saisir la liberté,
d’une volonté de s’abriter contre le doute; et non la forme concrète de la liberté, comme
le voulait Sartre » (77). He likewise objects to the heroic mythology surrounding the
notion of engagement (a very different kind of mythology than that which characterizes
Simon’s writing) (Viart, “Sartre-Simon” 120). If one is truly devoted to offering freedom
to all men, Sartrean engagement is not, according to Simon, the best path.
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“En face d’un enfant qui meurt de faim, La Nausée ne fait pas le poids.” Cited in Les Ecrits de Sartre,
Gallimard, 1970, p. 398.
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Simon objected just as fervently to socialist realism, and for many of the same
reasons: its instrumentalization of language, its replacement of “reality” with ideology,
etc. In fact, Simon viewed socialist realism as just as much a threat as traditional,
bourgeois realism insofar as it “inhibits the process of social change because it reinforces
the formal stereotypes of narrative order” (Britton, Nouveau Roman 27). For Simon,
socialist realism is ultimately reactionary rather than progressive.182 Like its Balzacian
counterpart, it is guilty of the totalizing impulse that Simon finds untenable in a postwar
landscape. Simon proves himself unwilling to subordinate his art to externally imposed
political aims: “social revolution and revolutionary art (i.e., innovative, experimental art)
are actually antagonistic to one another. The Revolution has to subordinate everything to
the one overriding aim of the liberation of the proletariat, whereas the artist, even if he is
fully committed, qua citizen, to the aims of the revolution, cannot allow his work as an
artist to be subordinated to any external aim or directive” (Britton, Nouveau Roman 14).
A key example of the sort of committed writing that Simon finds indefensible is
George Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia, several passages of which appear in Les
Géorgiques. Simon mocks Orwell’s attempts to produce a “credible,” “authentic,” and
“neutral” account of the Spanish Civil War, describing on numerous occasions the
mendacious steps that Orwell takes to produce his so-called true version of events:
pour mieux convaincre, il s’efforce (feint ?) de se borner aux faits (par la suite
seulement il tentera d’en donner un commentaire), étayant son récit de juste ce
qu’il faut d’images pour que celui-ci n’ait pas la sécheresse d’un simple compte
rendu, lui conférant plus de persuasion, de crédibilité, par plusieurs notations de
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Britton argues that this is also Barthes’s position: “Barthes’s original claim that socialist realism was as
reactionary as the most reactionary texts of bourgeois realism broadens into a general condemnation of
realism per se. Any representational text—any text, that is, which asks to be read as a representation of
reality—is now seen as complicit with bourgeois ideology” (Nouveau Roman 86).
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ces détails, de ces ‘choses vues’ dont tout bon journaliste sait qu’elles constituent
les meilleurs certificats d’authenticité d’un reportage, d’autant qu’elles d’insèrent
dans une forme d’écriture qui se présente comme neutre (il recourt à des phrases
courtes, il évite dans la mesure du possible les adjectifs de valeur et d’une façon
générale tout ce qui pourrait ressembler à une interprétation partisane ou
tendancieuse des événements, comme s’il n’y avait pas été étroitement mêlé mais
en avait été un témoin sans passion, seulement soucieux d’information). En fait, il
est constamment préoccupé de l’effet produit. Assis là à sa table, ce sera comme
s’il parlait tout haut dans le silence… (309)183
Simon’s lack of regard for the mandates governing political writers is likewise made
apparent in his farcical introduction to Leçon de choses:
Sensible aux reproches formulés à l’encontre des écrivains qui négligent les
« grands problèmes », l’auteur a essayé d’en aborder ici quelques-uns, tels ceux
de l’habitat, du travail manuel, de la nourriture, du temps, de l’espace, de la
nature, des loisirs, de l’instruction, du discours, de l’information, de l’adultère, de
la destruction et de la reproduction des espèces humaines ou animales. Vaste
programme que des milliers d’ouvrages emplissant des milliers de bibliothèques
sont, apparemment, encore loin d’avoir épuisé. Sans prétendre apporter de justes
réponses, ce petit travail n’a d’autre ambition que de contribuer, pour sa faible
part et dans les limites du genre, à l’effort général.
He goes on to question the privileging of certain themes as more properly political than
others: « Est-ce que le travail manuel, par exemple, la journée de deux maçons, ou une
promenade d’amoureux, ne sont pas aussi importants qu’un épisode de guerre ? » (CalleGruber, Triptyques 164).184 Thus, it is clear that any political commitment on Simon’s
part will not follow mainstream programs.
Concomitant with Simon’s loss of faith in rational humanism came a loss of faith
in many forms of political participation. The events to which he bore witness in Spain led
him to view the Communist revolution as a naïve dream: “The most woeful ingredients of
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Simon goes on to facetiously compare Orwell’s style to “ces auteurs qui se divertissent à plonger le
lecteur dans la confusion en attribuant plusieurs noms au même personnage ou inversement” (335), an
obvious reference to the practices of the nouveaux romanciers.
184
This statement bears some resemblance to Bataille’s claim that, « Le monde des amants n’est pas moins
vrai que celui de la politique » (OC I: 532). See Chapter Two.
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the Spanish civil war were its selfish motives, the hidden ambitions it served, the
emphasis on hollow words used by both sides; it seemed to be a comedy—terribly
bloody—but a comedy all the same” (Paris Review). His experiences as cannon fodder
during World War II only reinforced these feelings of political pessimism. Simon was
skeptical of the individual’s capacity to intervene in global historical events, and
especially skeptical of the artist’s ability to oversee such interventions. At a colloquium
in Vienna in 1967, he declared definitively: “Il convient de mettre fin à une légende:
jamais aucune œuvre d’art, aucune œuvre littéraire n’a eu, dans l’immédiat, un poids
quelconque sur le cours de l’Histoire.”185 Britton insists that “Simon is sarcastic about
man’s arrogant belief that he can intervene in the historical process – or indeed, the
comforting belief that history is intelligible, because rational and hence susceptible of
moral justification, or that progress is possible” (Writing the Visible 144). She goes on to
point out the uneasy reaction of critics on the left to this nihilistic attitude, and their
“tendency to minimize his cynicism or to explain it away” (144). I nonetheless maintain
that he is not so much nihilistic as skeptical of certain forms of political intervention.186
Simon was wholly in sympathy with the anti-Stalinist shift among the postwar
intelligentsia. “But whereas the dominant response was to build up a ‘new left’ outside
the Party, he saw this as futile. To him […] the formation of a new non-Stalinist socialist
movement could only be yet another dangerously illusory and self-congratulatory attempt
to achieve the impossible: that is, to make history” (Britton, “Introduction” 3-4). Simon
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For the full text of Simon’s intervention, see Les Triptyques de Claude Simon, ed. Mireille Calle-Gruber,
157-61.
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It is perhaps worth noting that the Nobel Prize committee, in their press release justifying their choice of
Simon, also located a hopeful thread in his work: “something hopeful, in spite of all cruelty and absurdity
which for that matter seem to characterize our condition and which is so perceptively, penetratingly and
abundantly reproduced in his novels.”
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wholeheartedly rejects this notion of “making history” in the epigraph to L’Herbe (a
quotation from Boris Pasternak): “Personne ne fait l’histoire, on ne la voit pas, pas plus
qu’on ne voit l’herbe pousser.” And yet, I would argue that man’s inability to make
history is not equivalent to pure fatalism. If we are unable to make history (that is, direct
sweeping movements that will lead to “progress”), we nonetheless retain the potential to
intervene in small yet vital ways. For, as Simon himself insists: « au sein de l’immense et
incessante gestation du monde, et dans l’ensemble des activités de l’esprit, toute
production de celui-ci, à condition d’apporter quelque chose de neuf, joue son rôle, le
plus souvent de façon invisible, souterraine, mais cependant capitale » (Calle-Grube,
Triptyques 158-59, italics mine). I argue that the mythic mood of Simon’s novels
provides some semblance of comfort, order, connection, and repair in the midst of what
Viart calls “la catastrophe de toute référence” (Mémoire 215).
Raymond Jean was one of the first critics to attempt a political rehabilitation of
Simon (and of the other nouveaux romanciers).187 At the Cerisy colloquium in 1971, he
delivered a piece titled “Politique et ‘Nouveau Roman’” in which he referred to Le
Palace as “la plus politique des œuvres du « nouveau roman »” (364) and systematically
listed the many references to revolution in the nouveau roman. Discussing both Simon
and Estelle Faye, he concluded that « ils « citent » (je donnerai volontiers à ce mot le sens
qu’il prend en tauromachie), chacun à sa manière, la réalité politique de leur temps,
considérée non pas comme un ornement ou un épiphénomène, mais comme une des
parties les plus actives du discours que le monde tient devant eux » (366). He sees the
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Lucien Goldmann had initially penned a political reading of the nouveau roman in Marxisme et Sciences
humaines but later recanted that position.
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nouveau roman as engaged in the subversion, negation, and/or reversal of bourgeois
values. While Jean Ricardou insisted on the irremediable opposition of the political and
literary orders, Raymond Jean viewed this opposition as an over-reaction to the twin
threats of socialist realism and Sartrean engagement and ultimately concluded that these
movements need not result in an all-out rejection of politically inflected literature. While
he conceded that the nouveau roman is not absolutely political, he likewise pointed to the
absurdity of absolutely denying its political potential. Viart is likewise able to make
inroads into Simon’s rehabilitation as a politically motivated writer by identifying three
separate spheres of Simonian engagement: 1) his engagement as a citizen (for example,
by signing the “Manifeste des 121 insoumis”); 2) his critique of other forms of
engagement (including socialist realism); and 3) engagement through form, such that his
literary experimentation produces political resonances (Mémoire 235). Though the first
two categories do not necessarily bear on his literary output, I remain invested in the
third, wherein a seemingly apolitical formalism results in oblique yet irrefutable political
interventions.
If Simon resisted traditional political action, he nonetheless viewed writing itself
as a form of engagement, an active “doing,” rather than a passive “being.” In his Nobel
Prize speech, he cites Paul Valéry on this subject: « si l'on s'inquiète (comme il arrive, et
parfois assez vivement) de ce que j'ai voulu dire (...), je réponds que je n'ai pas voulu dire
mais voulu faire et que c'est cette intention de faire qui a voulu ce que j'ai dit ». CalleGruber goes so far as to claim that this “doing” has revolutionary potential: « tout roman
est […] révolutionnaire. Que ce ne sont pas les (grandes) idées qui révolutionnent mais le
faire artisan qui dessine, chaque fois unique, le trajet d’une révolution » (Inlassable 28).
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Though Simon refused to position art and literature as principal movers in
political upheaval, he nonetheless acknowledged their interrelatedness: « Kandinsky en
Russie, les cubistes en France précèdent de quelques années la grande révolution
bolchevique. Il serait évidemment absurde de prétendre que les premiers sont des artisans
de la seconde : il serait tout aussi risible de soutenir que peinture abstraite, cubisme et
Révolution d’Octobre sont des phénomènes sans aucune espèce de liens entre eux »
(Calle-Gruber, Triptyques 158). Simon insists that aesthetic revolutions have their role to
play, as well as political ones, even if the political side seems to take precedence, and at
times even set itself in opposition to aesthetic change.

From Experimentation to Engagement
« Chaque fois que le monde est dit de façon un
peu différente (que ce soit par la science ou les
arts) il se transforme. »
—Claude Simon
If Simon opposes both socialist realism and littérature engagée, what form of
engagement, if any, is left to him? Retreating into a purely aesthetic realm as a remedy
against historical deficiencies is not an adequate solution, as David Carroll demonstrates:
Along with their repeated critique of History (most frequently found in Simon’s
work with a capital ‘H’), and more specifically of the coherent, continuous,
progressive form of History found in history books, Simon’s novels also reject
essentialist, aesthetic recuperations of the loss of historical transcendence and
meaning. In general, Simon refuses to situate his work as a novelist within a postromantic literary tradition that proposes to supplement the deficiencies of
historical knowledge and representation by means of the creative or aesthetic
imagination. (“Thinking” 29)
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As early as 1936, Walter Benjamin warned that the aestheticization of violence risked
ushering in war (a prophecy that proved all too true).188 Myth, however, does not attempt
to transcend tragedy through aesthetics. Simon approaches the violence of his generation
through a mythic mode as a means of acknowledging the insufficiencies of grand
historical narratives, but without merely replacing one totalizing tale with another.
Instead, he deploys his particular brand of literary experimentation, related to the
nouveau roman and yet also distinct from it, as a scaled-down, non-ideological form of
political intervention.
Britton, in discussing the nouveau roman at large, claims that, “Conscious
experimentation with literary form is in itself a kind of political ‘engagement’” (Nouveau
Roman 26). If so, then the dichotomy of nouveau roman/littérature engagée is a false
one. Roland Barthes actually sought to dismantle the opposition between the two groups:
Barthes himself saw no contradiction between his definition of ‘engagement’ and
the writing of the Nouveau Roman; when in an interview in 1964 he is asked why,
with his view of writing as commitment, he approves of ‘uncommitted’ writers
such as Robbe-Grillet and Butor, he replies: ‘ces écrivains eux-mêmes vous ont
répondu souvent qu’ils ne se considéraient nullement comme étrangers ou
indifférents à leur temps, à l’histoire des hommes parmi lesquelles ils vivent.
Entre l’histoire et l’œuvre, il y a de nombreux relais, à commencer précisément
par l’écriture. (Britton, Nouveau Roman 28)
Britton concludes that the antipathy between Sartre and the nouveaux romanciers was
tied less to their political values than to their respective attitudes toward language: “What
made Sartre’s idea of literature impossible for the Nouveau Roman to accept was not so
much the importance he attached to political reality as the definition of language that
followed from it” (Nouveau Roman 103).
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“[T]he logical outcome of fascism is an aestheticizing of political life…All efforts to aestheticize
politics culminate in one point. That one point is war” (Selected Writings v. 3, 121).
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Jean Ricardou, who long dominated Simon criticism, makes the provocative claim
that it is because modern literature does not obey the rules of socialist realism or Sartrean
engagement that it can have a true engagement with politics, rather than being a mere
ideological illustration.189 In his eyes, both socialist realism and Sartrean engagement
become, paradoxically, myths (in the negative, propagandistic sense of the word),
whereas the mythical mode of cognition that emerges in the experimental language of
modern literature is better able to evade heavy-handed political grandstanding. Thus, it is
the transformation of linguistic structures that will ultimately lead to social
transformation.
For the nouveaux romanciers, grappling with language is its own form of
engagement, as Robbe-Grillet insisted in Pour un nouveau roman:
Redonnons donc à la notion d’engagement le seul sens qu’elle peut avoir pour
nous. Au lieu d’être de nature politique, l’engagement c’est, pour l’écrivain, la
pleine conscience des problèmes actuels de son propre langage, la conviction de
leur extrême importance, la volonté de les résoudre de l’intérieur. C’est là, pour
lui, la seule chance de demeurer un artiste et, sans doute aussi, par voie de
conséquence obscure et lointaine, de servir un jour à quelque chose – peut-être
même à la révolution. (47)
Unsurprisingly, this transformation of language necessitated new forms. Simon had
already begun experimenting with form in the wake of World War II as a means of
grappling with the tension between the (false) order of language and the disorder of the
world: “From that experience of chaos springs the suspicion of all ordered forms of
writing, the invention of new forms from the exploded fragments of experience and
myths, and the uncanny melancholy of memory searching for points of reference and rest
in an unstable world” (Duffy 8). It is necessary to reiterate, however, that this
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See his comments from the 1971 Cerisy conference in Nouveau roman: hier, aujourd’hui, v. 1, 1972.
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engagement with new forms is not an abandonment of old forms, but rather a
restructuring of those forms, the creation of new assemblages from the detritus of the old,
which allows Simon to remain situated within history even while critiquing it. As Simon
insisted, “The role (the function) of the artist seems to me to be to participate in and
partake of History (in other words, to be in and of this incessant transformation of the
world) by producing new forms” (Birn 286). Simon’s experimentation is not art for art’s
sake, empty formalism, or passive nihilism.190 It is a dynamic engagement with form.
What, then, do these new forms look like, and what do they offer over and above
the ones they are rejecting? First and foremost, they attempt a compromise between
previously dichotomous terms—between history and literature191 (or history and writing
more generally),192 between the avant-garde and tradition,193 between order and
disorder.194 Their efficacy stems from their ability to unite seemingly disparate
elements.195 Simon was attracted to language’s ability to assemble seemingly
incompatible objects; by turning away from representation, Simon was able to highlight
other potentialities within language. Though this practice does not aspire to any ultimate
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« D’une part, Simon ne prône pas un nihilisme passif : sa pratique artistique est un acte positif ; d’autre
part, son formalisme n’est pas un art pour l’art. S’il a pu proclamer n’avoir rien à dire, il écrit pourtant
quelque chose » (Yapaudjian-Labat 108-09). This final statement refers to Simon’s Nobel Prize acceptance
speech, in which he claimed to have never had anything to say in the Sartrean sense.
191
Johan Faerber claims that “Simon voudrait alors trouver un moyen terme entre littérature et histoire, un
troisième terme d’où surgirait l’écriture qui se ferait hors des livres et qui dirait l’histoire des hommes… »
(85)
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Britton speaks of the “prominent and conflictual juxtaposition of history and writing” (Writing the
Visible 161).
193
“Il n’est ni d’avant-garde ni de tradition; il a opté pour la ‘tradition de nouveau’ qui est la seule tradition
en art, selon le mot d’Harold Rosenberg qu’il cite. Ce qui implique des domaines de travail toujours ‘en
crise’, ‘en révolution permanente’” (Calle-Gruber, Inlassable 11).
194
Simon was fond of quoting Valéry: “Deux dangers ne cessent de menacer le monde: l’ordre et le
désordre.”
195
See his introduction to Orion aveugle.
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transcendence of fragmentation (fragmentation being our natural and irreparable state), it
nonetheless retains the ability to reorder the fragments in politically potent ways.
The disparate elements that Simon brings together are often culled from
“traditional” discourses: Latin grammar exercises, history textbooks, newspapers, the
writings of Julius Caesar, Ovid, Proust, George Orwell, etc. Indeed, Simon argues that all
subversion must take tradition as its starting point:
La tradition est, au contraire, dynamique. Nous existons et nous créons en
fonction de la tradition qui nous a formés et dont nos actions découlent, même –
et peut-être surtout – lorsqu’elles prétendent le nier. Comme on l’a très bien dit :
pour qu’il soit possible de dessiner des moustaches sacrilèges à la Joconde, il
fallait qu’auparavant elle ait été peinte. Il est à cet égard significatif que les
dadaïstes qui recommandaient de brûler les musées n’aient pas été des paysans ou
des ouvriers illettrés mais au contraire des jeunes gens issus de milieux bourgeois
et possédant une vaste culture. (qtd in Calle-Gruber, Triptyques 157)
For Simon, an all-out rejection of bourgeois ideology is less politically effective than
assemblages created from repurposed pieces of that ideology. By employing a language
that resists fixed forms, Simon’s texts remain dynamic, constantly shifting, re-writing
themselves and thereby evading closure within externally imposed ideologies. His
frequent use of expressions like “ou plutôt… ou plutôt” or “c’est-à-dire… c’est-à-dire,”
as well as his questioning of his own word choices, demonstrates his opposition to the
type of reified ideas being promulgated along official political channels.196
This experimental style based on bricolage is likewise effective in recuperating
marginalized stories, those excluded from traditional narratives. Even when addressing
well-documented events like the Spanish Civil War or World War II, his focus is on
peripheral details and characters. It is not the generals or heroes who concern him, but
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In Les Géorgiques, for example, Simon calls into question the stability of meaning by offering alternate
word choices: “s’efforce (feint?)” (309).
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rather the pitiful idiots led to slaughter, the cuckolded husbands, the inscrutable old men
drinking at nondescript cafes, the women glimpsed only momentarily behind a curtain.197
It is not that Simon is uninterested in history; on the contrary, it is a constant
preoccupation. However, he is dissatisfied with existing historical discourses and, as
Johan Faerber claims, seeks a middle term between literature and history that would give
a voice to those excluded from official History: « dans ce présent infini d’après le
désastre, Simon cherche en fait des histoires, presque immobiles, sous le regard, des
histoires à pente faible, à savoir l’histoire des hommes quelconques perdus dans
l’histoire, une histoire des hommes sans histoire, une histoires où, sous ‘les vestiges d’un
langage incohérent’ comme il est encore dans Histoire, on retrouverait l’homme » (85).198
For all of his interest in fragmentation and the subversion of fixed forms, Simon
nonetheless remains invested in formal structure. In an interview with Calle-Gruber, he
describes his consternation upon hearing a fellow writer describe the purpose of his
profession as the creation of anarchy: « J’ai, non sans stupeur, entendu à New York, lors
d’un congrès, Mario Vargas Llosa déclarer que la fonction de l’écrivain était de créer
l’anarchie. Or, c’est exactement le contraire, écrire consistant à apporter un ordre, des
priorités … d’établir une hiérarchie » (Inlassable 77). His obsession with rhythm reveals
a stable structure undergirding his seemingly chaotic prose. One need only look at the
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Simon often speaks of the irremediable disconnect between History (that which is inscribed in books)
and the experiences of individuals. The narrator of Histoire laments the fact that his actions in Spain feel so
far removed from what he imagined revolution to be—removed, that is, from grand historical change. A
similar sentiment is described in Les Géorgiques: « il lui semblait de moins en moins probable qu’il
participât à une action historique : en tout case, si action il y avait, elle apparaissait sous une forme,
bruyante certes et tapageuse, de non-action, à moins d’admettre (ce qui était après tout possible mais peu
exaltant) que l’Histoire se manifeste (s’accomplit) par l’accumulation de faits insignifiants, sinon
dérisoires, tels que ceux qu’il récapitula plus tard… » (299-300)
198
The clash between “official” historical discourse and the stories of marginalized figures is also central to
my reading of Elsa Morante in the next chapter.
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manuscript for La Route des Flandres to be convinced of the highly ordered nature of his
projects. While outlining the novel, he assigned a different color to each character and
carefully mapped out the order of their appearances and the number of pages dedicated to
each, such that the recurrence of each motif was properly spaced out, in the manner of a
musical score. It is Simon’s ability to carefully navigate the realms of both order and
disorder that renders his novels so compelling. For, as Valéry wrote, “Deux dangers ne
cessent de menacer le monde: l’ordre et le désordre.”

Vertical Repetition and the Escape from Destiny
In response to Dällenbach’s question (“une littérature d’après-guerre est-elle
possible?”), Simon develops « un engagement dans une forme privilégiant cela seul qui
reste, le primordial » (primordial being more or less synonymous with mythic)
(Yapaudjian-Labat 108). Patrick Rebollar in turn characterizes Simon’s method of
engagement as « une vision transhistorique de la politique involontaire de l’espèce
humaine, beaucoup plus organique qu’intellectuelle » (130). As previously mentioned,
Simon turned to myth due to his loss of faith in rational humanism, a reaction to the
trauma of World War II (among other things). Myth proved an attractive alternative due
to its investment in fragmentation and bricolage, its resistance to totalizing narratives and
ossified bourgeois values, and its capacity to creatively re-imagine history. Furthermore,
for Simon, myth was a means of overcoming tragedy, of reactivating common cultural
frameworks in order to rebuild fractured communities. Finally, myth’s simplicity makes
it ideal for a return to fundamentals, to things, to the concrete, material world, all of
which Simon viewed as the only means of continuing in the wake of World War II. The
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primordial brings some sense of order to an otherwise chaotic existence. However, I
would like to conclude by expanding on the importance of mythic repetition for his
project.
Simon’s repetitions (a key aspect of his mythic methodology) do not imprison us
in endless cycles of violence, as some critics have claimed, but are paradoxically
liberating insofar as they are repetition with a difference. Brewer points to a sort of
“catastrophic repetition,” or traumatic repetition, in Simon’s work, yet trauma implies
imprisonment in a retroactive (and therefore inevitably fruitless) effort to prepare for
catastrophe.199 If Simon returns again and again to the same episodes—the failure of the
Spanish Revolution, or the annihilation of the cavalrymen at the Battle of the Meuse—he
nonetheless presents the scenes with slight variations each time. Though the events
themselves may not change, the contexts, and the connections that Simon draws to other
events, do. Melina Balcázar Moreno dubs this practice “vertical repetition,” of the sort
described by Gilles Deleuze in Différence et répétition:200
Il y a, pour Claude Simon, comme pour le philosophe [Deleuze], une répétition
qui sauve et une répétition qui enchaîne : « Si la répétition nous rend malades,
écrit encore Deleuze, c’est elle aussi qui nous guérit ; si elle nous enchaîne et nous
détruit, c’est elle encore qui nous libère, témoignant dans les deux cas de sa
puissance ‘démoniaque’. » La répétition devient dans ce roman une force
transgressive qui donne à Simon l’occasion de sauver les événements du passé et
peut-être de trouver, grâce à l’écriture, son propre salut. (99)
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See Narrativities Without Narrative, p. 88.
Moreno explains: « Tout au long de son œuvre, l’écrivain a cherché une nouvelle technique d’écriture
capable d’articuler, à chaque fois d’une manière nouvelle, inouïe, les événements pour les libérer. Mais ce
travail d’écriture pourrait sembler paradoxal : comment libérer les événements en les soumettant à la
répétition, celle des cycles de la nature, celle de la révolution ? C’est peut-être cette « passion »,
profondément liée à la vie et au désir, qui le dirige vers la répétition. Celle-ci n’apparaît pas dans sa forme
négative, « celle des mots ordinaires qu’on redit » par défaut. La répétition dont il est question chez Claude
Simon est cette « répétition verticale », identifiée par Gilles Deleuze, celle « des points remarquables » qui
porte le sens des mots redits à la « nième » puissance » (99).
200
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Repetition in the form of eternal recurrence is undoubtedly linked to fate, inevitability,
and therefore despair. Yet Simon’s attitude toward repetition has more in common with
Deleuze than with Nietzsche. Indeed, he associates history, not myth, with the
vicissitudes of fate.201 To ignore the cycles of violence throughout history would be naïve
or even mendacious, yet an acknowledgement of repetition need not end in a paralyzed
political position.202 In fact, Carroll insists on the distinction between Simonian repetition
and eternal return: “the form and sense of history in Simon’s novels is […] repetitive and
not cyclical, the return of difference rather than identity » (Subject 139).
An examination of the baroque elements in Simon may help to further explicate the
particularities of his repetition. As Wolfram Nitsch explains: “Le mouvement du baroque,
c’est la spirale. C’est-à-dire le retour de la même ligne, sur la même génératrice, mais
avec à chaque fois un décalage de niveau” (48, italics mine). Thus, to reiterate, Simon’s
repetition is not identical, but rather creates a gap that can be mobilized toward political
ends. According to this formulation, there is room for change within repetition; there is
room, that is, to insert the contingent (and the political) into an otherwise timeless
unchanging landscape. For Britton, this is “repetition as aggressive or playful
transformation” rather than “the repressive, deadening dictation/dictatorship of fixed
repetition” (Introduction 122). The differences are therefore critical, rendering repetition
dynamic, malleable, and applicable to political aims.
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« Et il était en train de s’y employer quand l’Histoire (ou le destin – ou quoi d’autre ? l’interne logique
de la matière ? ses implacables mécanismes ?) en décide autrement » (Géorgiques 347).
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Michel Deguy identifies Simon’s political position precisely as paralysed, a conclusion I find overly
hasty. “One understands that Claude Simon’s political position – a paralysed position that is in fact more
common than you might think – is likely to be uncomfortable, also that it is bound to have enemies on all
sides: being neither ‘on the right’ given its demystification (as they say) and cynicism, nor ‘on the left’,
since it is not in any way progressive” (75).
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It may also be useful to consider the role of repetition in ritual (a phenomenon
closely linked to myth) to decipher why Simon posited repetition as dynamic rather than
tragic. The purpose of ritual is to repeat some originary event (such as the separation of
the cosmos or the founding of a city).203 Each iteration of the ritual superimposes itself
onto all other iterations, taking us back to a prehistorical, or nonhistorical, moment. For
Roger Caillois, ritual (or the festival) is a return to cosmic time as a means of
rejuvenating or repairing our world, which is subject to the vicissitudes of time. In this
sense, repetition is both desirable and necessary. By symbolically returning to a state
before forms became reified, ritual displays reparative potential.204
For all of Simon’s objections to abstraction, philosophy, and humanist thought, he
nonetheless remained invested in writing—and more specifically, in writing as a form of
political commitment. His prose rejects traditional, realist models of narration and
representation in favor of an experimental, formalist model in which narrative is
produced in the moment of writing and remains inexorably linked to the materiality of
language. The interventions that Simon proposes as a remedy for the oppressive weight
of destiny almost always take the form of writing, and these acts of writing are in turn
dramatized in his novels (Histoire; La Route des Flandres; Les Géorgiques). Though one
of the soldiers in Les Géorgiques bemoans the inability of literature to serve as a guide to
the horrors in which he is embroiled, this should again be read as a critique of a specific
kind of literature, rather than an outright dismissal of the value of writing (and
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Margaret Mead, for example, defines ritual as “the repetition of those symbols which evoke the feeling
of that primordial event which initially called the community into being with such power that affects our
presence at that event – in other words, represents the primordial event.” (1972, p. 127)
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This link to ritual is not merely incidental; one of the titles Simon considered for La Route des Flandres
was Carnaval, which, in his notes, he accompanies with the following definition: “Littré: Temps où l’on
enlève l’usage de la chair. Fonds Simon, SMN Ms 5, p. 463.
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reading).205 Indeed, words are the only phenomenon capable of bridging the isolation
inaugurated by catastrophe.206 His ancestor’s notebooks, though worthy of scorn in some
regards, also create a bridge between two epochs, foregrounding common experiences
across generations.207 For “ce qui est souvent sans rapports immédiats dans le temps des
horloges ou l’espace mesurable peut se trouver rassemblée et ordonné au sein du langage
dans une étroite contiguïté” (Orion aveugle 9-10).
Simon’s approach to the history and politics of postwar France, though certainly
unconventional, nonetheless struck a chord with many readers. Christophe Honoré writes:
“j’ai l’impression qu’il prend en charge l’expérience de la guerre vécue par tous ces
écrivains, même s’ils ont eu des expériences différentes » (261), thus lending a certain
universality to his partially autobiographical texts. Régis Debray echoes this image of
Simon as representative of an entire generation grappling with the war and its attendant
disappointments and tragedies:
Je crois que l’œuvre de Claude Simon, même si elle n’a pas été tout de suite
appréciée ou comprise (il y a quelques propos cruels à son encontre), est un
véritable microcosme du siècle : la déconstruction de l’Histoire, la perte du sens,
la perte de la finalité, le déroutement de l’ancien sens de l’Histoire et la primauté
du signe sur la chose, ces tendances et ces problématiques ont traversé tout son
siècle. (34)
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« Toutefois aucun des auteurs sélectionnés par Penguin ne s’était apparemment soucié d’écrire un
ouvrage (il devait pourtant exister) traitant de cette sorte de situation et qui lui eut permis d’affronter le
problème qui se posait, c’est-à-dire de comprendre le pourquoi de ce qu’il était en train de faire là, assis
jour après nuit et nuit après jour… » (297)
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In “Fiction mot à mot,” Simon posits a certain kind of metaphor as an approximation of prelapsarian
unity: « le langage ne distingue pas non plus entre ce que l’on appelle le « réel » et l’ « imaginaire » […] il
m’a donc semblé que supprimer le mot comme, c’est-à-dire, en somme concrétiser en quelque sorte la
métaphore, c’était peut-être, d’une certaine façon – sans doute illusoire, mais que faire ? – se rapprocher de
cet Éden dont il nous sépare » (91).
207
The notebooks are primarily objectionable because of his ancestor’s unmitigated love of Rousseau and
his naïve lists of commercial transactions, of horses bought and sold, all of which proved meaningless in
the face of political upheaval.
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It is for this reason (among others) that the Nobel committee saw fit to bestow the prize
on Claude Simon, locating a hopeful thread amidst the horrors he presented: “Against
these grim descriptions are contrasting elements of another kind - of tenderness and
loyalty, of devotion to work and duty, to heritage and traditions and solidarity with dead
and living kinsmen.”
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Chapter Four
“Once Upon a Time There Was an S.S.”:
Politics from Inside the Fairy Tale Chamber
When Elsa Morante’s novel La Storia was published in 1974, no one could have
anticipated the firestorm of criticism that would consume the Italian literary community
for the next three years. Einaudi had circulated a few advance copies, and the reviews
were almost uniformly positive; Natalia Ginzburg, a famed novelist in her own right, was
practically euphoric in her endorsement of the work. However, approximately three
weeks after the book’s release, a scathing letter appeared in the popular Communist
newspaper Il Manifesto, dismissing Morante as a “scrittrice mediocre” who displayed the
“ostentata mistica della rassegnazione.”208 The letter was so vicious that the editor printed
an apology. Other condemnations soon followed—Rossana Rossanda, for example,
lamented that, “vender patate è meglio che vender disperazione”—and by the end of the
year, almost every newspaper, regardless of its political affiliation, was involved in the
debate.209 The avalanche of reactions became so complicated that whole articles were
devoted to simply summarizing prior critiques in order to get readers up to speed.
Morante was front-page news.
The obvious question is: why did La Storia elicit such incensed reactions? Much
of the answer is tied to the political climate in Italy at the time. The early 1970s marked
the peak of political optimism and advancement among the Italian left. Gregory Lucente
writes that in such an environment, “An acknowledgement of social and political
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Nanni Balestrini, et al. “Contro il ‘romanzone’ della Morante.” Il manifesto. July 18, 1974.
“Una storia d’altri tempi.” Il manifesto. August 7, 1974.
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engagement became […] a prerequisite for any public utterance or gesture” (“Scrivere”
230). Furthermore, among so-called “committed” writers, experimental, nonrepresentational art was considered the most appropriate vehicle for social change.
Though La Storia is hardly representational in the vein of nineteenth-century bourgeois
novels, it does draw on classic, representational strategies, which did little to endear
Morante to her more revolutionary peers. Furthermore, the philosophical foundation of
the novel savors more of Christian mysticism and utopian poetics than Marxism, a
decidedly unorthodox position for an intellectual of that period.
Clocking in at an intimidating 665 pages, La Storia is difficult to summarize. The
novel traces the lives of Ida Ramundo, a naïve Jewish schoolteacher, and her children
from the years 1941-1947. Ida is raped by a German soldier and bears his child, a strange,
quasi-mystical boy named Useppe who prefers the company of animals to that of people
and who suffers from unnamed maladies. Her other son, Nino, is a wild yet joyful
adolescent whose shifting political alliances—from Fascist to partisan to black market
war profiteer—reflect the fuzzy political boundaries of the era. Ida survives the constant
threat of deportation, the Allied bombing of Rome, and a wide array of deprivations, only
to lose both children in rapid succession shortly after the liberation. Overcome with
despair, she slips into a catatonic state and lives out her days in a sanatorium.
Structurally, the novel alternates between didactic, textbook-style introductions to each
section, which coldly list the dates for various political events and their corresponding
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statistics, and the personal tale of Ida, peppered with transcriptions of children’s songs
and excerpts from popular folk culture.210
Focusing on plot might lead one to believe that La Storia is a grim, realist
reflection on wartime Italy; but while grim themes certainly abound, the novel is
ultimately more utopian than dystopian, and has more in common with myths and fairy
tales than the Holocaust memoirs of Bruno Piazza or Primo Levi. Though Morante takes
as her starting point the realities of World War II, she lends an air of enchantment to an
otherwise bleak, war-torn landscape with her clever inclusion of lullabies, nursery
rhymes, dragons, gnomes, genies, and magical eggs, to cite just a few examples. Pier
Paolo Pasolini, whose negative review of La Storia cost him his friendship with Morante,
accused her of retreating to a fairy tale chamber, and thus failing to confront real political
problems.211 However, I contend that the enchanted elements do not detract from the
gravity of the historical backdrop or ignore the sociopolitical exigencies of postwar Italy.
Rather, enchantment emerges as a new form of political engagement, created in response
to the failure of other revolutionary practices. This chapter will explore the ways in which
Morante’s unique amalgamation of myth and politics collides with the utopian poetics of
figures like Ernst Bloch and Simone Weil and offers an alternative to the definitions of
committed literature that prevailed in 1970s Italy. Morante insists that reason alone
cannot achieve revolutionary change; poetry and imagination are equally (if not more)
important for stirring men and women to action. Grappling with the distinction between
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One example of this textbook approach to history reads: “Gennaio-Febbraio 1943: l’Armata Rossa libera
Leningrado. Il numero dei cittadini morti durante l’assedio è di 630 mila” (141).
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The expression "la camera delle favole" (a fairy-tale chamber) was used by Pasolini in a conference
presentation entitled "E.M." read in Aci in 1972.

197

merely representing history and actually changing it—between writing and doing—she
ultimately concluded that they are one and the same, with “true” poetry assuming a
material, worldly power.

Who’s Afraid of Elsa Morante?
Reading Morante’s biography, there are few indications that she would dominate
the Italian press so thoroughly in the mid-1970s. Born on August 18, 1912 in Rome,
Morante, like the protagonist of La Storia, was the daughter of a Jewish schoolteacher.
She began writing at a very young age, though her first book-length collection wasn’t
released until 1941. That same year, she married novelist Alberto Moravia, and the two
were active in many of the leading literary and political circles in Rome. When World
War II broke out, Morante and Moravia fled the city, fearing the repercussions of their
Jewish heritage. Their experiences in Southern Italy during the war feature prominently
in both authors’ subsequent works, including Morante’s La Storia and Moravia’s La
Ciociara.
Following the war, Morante published a series of successful novels, including
Menzogna e sortilegio (1948), recipient of the Viareggio Prize, and L’isola di Arturo
(1957), for which she became the first woman to win the Strega Prize. Morante and
Moravia separated in 1961, but she continued to write sporadically, publishing Il mondo
salvato dai ragazzini, a poetry collection, in 1968, and La Storia in 1974. Her final novel,
Aracoeli, was published in 1982, three years before her death, and was awarded the Prix
Médicis étranger.
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Though her novels sold well (better, in fact, than her husband’s), and though she
accumulated a number of literary prizes, she was by no means the leading writer of the
day, and she never really achieved international renown.212 In fact, Morante faded into
semi-obscurity during the last decades of the twentieth century and remains under-read
today. Granted, there has been some renewal of scholarly interest in her work in recent
years.213 In 2012, a new collection of her letters was published, and the Biblioteca
Nazionale Centrale di Roma, conservators of her manuscripts, held exhibitions about her
work in 2006 and 2012. Nonetheless, the furious reactions to La Storia seem odd when
viewed from a 21st-century perspective. In fact, La Storia might have passed by without
remark if not for the particular convergence of literary and political concerns that defined
Italy in the 1970s—concerns that can be traced back to World War II, but that also reflect
the new threats of the postwar era.

History and Herstory
One of the most common critiques of La Storia targeted her use of “child-like”
genres—fairy tales, fantasy, and myth, among others—which were viewed as frivolous or
irresponsible. However, as with the other authors considered in this project, it is not
simply the presence of mythic tropes that made Morante an object of antipathy. Instead, it
was the superimposition of myth onto an otherwise “realistic” portrayal of a painful
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In a New York Times story from 2008, Alan Riding writes, “Twenty-three years after her death, she is
still remembered in Italy, but elsewhere in Europe, and certainly in the United States, she is known — if at
all — as Alberto Moravia’s wife.”
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Specifically, there has been an uptick in English-language Morante scholarship in the past decade. See,
for example, Elsa Morante’s Politics of Writing: Rethinking Subjectivity, History, and the Power of Art, ed.
Stefania Lucamante (2015). Lily Tuck also published an English-language biography of Morante in 2008.
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period in Italian history.214 Furthermore, her decision to focalize large-scale tragedies not
only through a mythic lens, but also through the lens of a perfectly ordinary woman, was
shocking to critics. Granted, many wartime tales feature an everyday individual rising to
extraordinary heights due to the pressures of her time.215 However, even the most devoted
fans of La Storia would surely agree that Ida is, by all accounts, an unremarkable woman.
She’s not particularly intelligent, nor exceptionally beautiful;216 she does her job well, but
she’s hardly Robin Williams in Dead Poets’ Society;217 her suffering evokes empathy, yet
she suffers less than many in that same era.218 As the narrator relates, she belongs neither
to the rich nor the poor, but to “una terza specie. È una specie che esiste (forse, in via di
estinzione?) e passa, né se ne dà notizia, se non a volte, eventualmente, nella cronaca
nera” (481). Why, then, did Morante create this figure to stand in for an entire nation’s
tragedy?
I maintain that Ida’s ordinariness is precisely the point. Ultimately, the novel is
remarkable less for its plot (which, though moving, is fairly conventional in tone) as for
the ways in which Morante undermines conventional, patriarchal understandings of
History by privileging the personal over the historical, women and children over men, the
poor over the wealthy, and oral traditions over written ones. This anti-historical stance put
her at odds with self-proclaimed “committed writers,” who, as Marxist critics, relied on a
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The title of this chapter, for example, is an excerpt from a fairy tale that Davide, the tortured young
anarchist of the novel, recounts to Useppe. In the story, he recalls his own experience brutally kicking a
young German soldier to death, albeit through the framework of fairy tale tropes and vocabulary. See La
Storia, p. 604.
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See Schindler’s List (1993), Defiance (2008), and The Zookeeper’s Wife (2017), among others.
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“D’intelligenza, era mediocre; ma fu una scolara docile, e diligente nello studio, e non ripeté mai una
classe” (21). When Ida first appears in the novel, she is described as a “donnetta d’apparenza dimessa ma
civile” (20).
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“È ovvio che il suo insegnamento non era mai stato un modello d’avanguardia!” (475)
218
Because she is only part Jewish, she manages to avoid deportation when the ghetto is emptied.
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more didactic form of historical materialism. Morante instead turns to the so-called
“primitive” folk culture of rural Italy as a means of rehabilitating a sense of the sacred in
the midst of a corrupt modernity.219
Morante begins her version of the war not with the violence of battles, but with a
rape. It’s an intimate form of violence—violence against women, rather than men. This
move forces readers to immediately reorient their understanding of the war and their
expectations of its representation. If Morante’s goal was to dismantle the patriarchal and
oppressive structures of History, then her protagonist had to be a woman. Not only a
woman, but also a Jew; a single mother; a rape victim; a sufferer of epilepsy; a
superstitious and perpetually frightened individual. La Storia was meant to give a voice
to all the marginalized figures who were not being served by existing political
organizations (not even by the most well-meaning Communists).220 And this political
goal in turn explains her proclivity for myth: for Morante, women, children, the
uneducated, etc. are more in touch with nature; they experience the world in a visceral or
affective manner, rather than rationally. They are thus better served by myth (which
likewise privileges affect over reason) than by the kinds of political discourses circulating
at the time, including avant-garde poetry and highly theoretical Marxism. Myth was
familiar, and thus a means of discussing politics with poor or illiterate citizens in a
language they would understand (La Storia’s dedication reads: “Por el analfabeto a quien
219

This interest in folk culture links Morante to such figures as Cesare Pavese, Elio Vittorini, and Carlo
Levi who all shared an investment in the mythology and mysticism that continued to govern life in rural
Italy (particularly in the South) even after the explosion of post-war capitalism.
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By the 1970s, it was clear that the PCI was inordinately invested in industrial workers and students, to
the detriment of other disenfranchised groups. Thus, far-left organizations like Lotta Continua began to
consider the possibility that women, the unemployed, and other marginalized figures (rather than the “mass
worker”) might comprise the “real proletariat.” For more on this, see Jan-Werner Müller, “The Paradoxes
of Post-War Italian Political Thought.”
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escribo”). Ernesto de Martino’s ethnographic work has shown that mysticism and magic
retained a powerful hold over many Italians well into the 1970s, especially in rural Italy.
Morante viewed this as an untapped vein of political potential.221
However, in Italy, perhaps even more than in France, politics and myth were
considered poor bedfellows. Thus, in order to understand the intensity of the reactions to
La Storia, it is first necessary to flesh out the political and literary landscapes of Italy in
1974. To current readers, the novel may come across as unremarkable. Yet viewed in
context, I argue that it is an anticonformist masterpiece.

The Lead Years
Like most European nations, Italy grappled with the ideal relationship between art
and politics in the postwar period: in the 1940s, disagreements centered on Zhdavonism;
in the ‘50s, it was neorealism versus literary decadence. By 1974, however—the year of
La Storia’s publication—the tide had turned in favor of “experimental writing, drawing
from French writers like Alain Robbe-Grillet, Philippe Sollers, and Italo Calvino and
their experience of the Oulipo” (D’Angeli 189). Some of the best-known examples of this
experimentation came from Gruppo 63, an avant-garde literary movement founded in
October 1963 in Palermo. Though members were not guided by any clear formula (they
never published a manifesto), Gruppo 63 defined itself in opposition to traditional literary
models, most notably neorealism, and showed a strong predilection for Marxism,
structuralism, and militant social commitment. For Nanni Balestrini, one of Gruppo 63’s
founding members, modern meant experimental, and experimental meant non221

For more on de Martino’s ethnographic research in Southern Italy, see chapter 1.
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representational. This literary experimentalism was in turn aligned with social
commitment. For them, changing the system of linguistic signs was a prerequisite to
changing the system of organization and power in society. Representational literature was
therefore seen as the repetition of an undesirable past rather than a catalyst for change.
Despite their literary contributions, the members of Gruppo 63 were perhaps best known
for their public denunciations of well-established and beloved Italian writers, including
Carlo Cassola, Giorgio Bassani, Vasco Pratolini, and, of course, Elsa Morante, who they
dismissed as bourgeois and decorous.
1974 was also a tumultuous year for Italian politics. The Christian Democrat
party, rocked by a series of scandals, was waning in power, while the election of Enrico
Berlinguer as secretary of the Italian Communist Party took the Communists back to the
center of Italian politics after years in the wings. Against all expectations, a referendum
on divorce succeeded by a wide margin, thus igniting optimism for a secular and
progressive Italy. At the same time, the OPEC oil crisis essentially destroyed the Italian
economy in 1974, marking the beginning of a decade of stagnation and mass
unemployment. That year is also firmly entrenched in the era of rising terrorism,
exemplified most notably by the Brigate Rosse (who, in 1978, assassinated Prime
Minister Aldo Moro). These were the anni di piombo, or Years of Lead; between 1969
and 1981, nearly 2,000 murders were attributed to political violence in the form of
bombings, assassinations, and street warfare between rival militant factions. Given the
unique convergence of political optimism and violence during this period, it is all the
more surprising (and, for many readers, disappointing) that Morante chose to set La
Storia in an earlier epoch. In the eyes of many critics, this signaled a refusal to engage
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with the urgent political issues of the day and reminded readers of a shameful past they
would have preferred to ignore. In a review for the Times Literary Supplement, Russell
Davies declared: “the time is past for wallowing in the seductive anarchy of the war
years” (qtd. Traldi 246). In the end, Morante was too “pessimistic” and “depressing” for
an Italian left riding on the surge of political optimism.

Peddling Despair
The attack against La Storia was led by three main fronts: those who favored
experimental writing; a Marxist contingent, devoted to the notion of “committed”
literature; and critics who no longer believed in aesthetic expression and regarded books
as expendable merchandise (Berardinella 32). The latter group labeled Morante’s novel a
“bestseller” in the worst sense of the word (that is, as populist drivel). Indeed, all three
categories of Morante’s opponents decried the “unscrupulous” editorial practices that
contributed to La Storia’s financial success—namely, Einaudi’s efforts to “hype” the
novel years in advance by mounting extensive advertising campaigns.
In terms of generic classification, La Storia was received as a realist (or
neorealist) novel by many readers. Such a structure may have fared well in the 1950s
alongside works like Calvino’s Il sentiero dei nidi di ragno, but as previously mentioned,
both the political and literary climates had shifted in the intervening decades, such that,
by 1974, neorealism was considered woefully outdated. Georg Lukács probably didn’t do
Morante any favors when he dubbed her one of Europe’s foremost contemporary
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realists.222 However, Stefania Lucamante insists that critics at the time misunderstood
Morante’s incorporation of neorealist styles and themes; rather than being an
anachronistic move, she claims that, “Morante indeed resumed Neorealist forms, but only
to deconstruct them into a web of narratives bearing her own distinctive mark. […] La
Storia adopts the novel genre in order to overthrow its presuppositions and to elicit how
Neorealism (and all the –isms) are insufficient to describe the complexities of the world”
(Forging 156-57).223 La Storia was not the first of her works to be accused of realism
(and thus anachronism); following the publication of her first novel, Menzogna e
sortilegio, “Morante was frequently accused, in a spirit of partisan and superficial
criticism, of anachronism, of writing a great nineteenth-century novel when there were
more pressing concerns in the re-establishment of the nation and of a national culture”
(Lucamante and Wood 3). De Luca explains that the “anachronistic pathos and popular
melodramatic effects” of the novel placed it in closer proximity to “nineteenth-century
feuilleton than to the ideologically charged works of that highly politicized period” (175).
In some cases, she was even condemned by the very size of her novel, long, winding
narratives having gone out of fashion. Among his other critiques, Balestrini famously
declared: “Allora, compagni: oltre che dai decretoni, cominciamo a difenderci anche dai
romanzoni.”
The ideological critiques were the most common, and the most scathing. As
222

In her early review of the novel, Natalia Ginzburg likewise compared Morante to Dostoevsky: “non
riuscivo a vedere nessuna differenza apprezzabile fra ‘La storia’ e ‘I fratelli Karamazov.’” Respected as
Dostoevsky was, committed writers of the period were uninterested in repeating nineteenth-century
realism.
223
Morante herself was rather critical of neorealism. Bérard describes how the unfinished novel draft of
Senza i conforti della religione “depicts the failure of neorealism and of an engagé movie project about the
Bikini nuclear tests; and finally, articulates the conflict between commercial ambitions and ethical and
political motivations” (“Senza” 141-2).
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Sharon Wood explains, “One of the many criticisms leveled against Morante’s La Storia
was its failure to align itself with an identifiable political left, its perceived refusal to
engage directly and openly in the struggle against contemporary capitalist structures of
power in the late 1960s and 1970s that sought to exploit the working class in the pursuit
of profit” (“Excurses” 75). In fact, because she failed to openly condemn capitalism,
Morante was even accused of aiding the enemy’s cause; Balestrini yet again weighed in
to declare, “A noi ‘La Storia’ non sembra altro che una scontata rassegnazione, un nuovo
discorso delle beatitudini, che l'ideologia della classe sfruttatrice trova del tutto
funzionale al proprio attuale progetto economico.” Her representation of marginalized
workers was received as a “sanctification of poverty and destitution” (“Excurses” 75).
Critiques of Morante’s ideology can be further subdivided. One group comprises
critics who felt she lacked any sort of political commitment. As previously mentioned,
the novel was frequently dismissed as pessimistic, and pessimism in turn was equated
with a refusal to engage with the political.224 The other group contains those who
acknowledged that La Storia contained political themes, but who disapproved of the
particular politics to which Morante was committed. Lucente writes, “There was no doubt
that Morante's novel was ‘engaged,’ that it was the fruit of a storyteller who was not only
extremely resourceful but also avidly committed. But therein lay the problem: committed
to what?” (“Scrivere” 238) Responses varied, ranging from Christian utopianism, to
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Sinibaldi outlines two forms of prejudice leveled against Morante: “Il primo è che il pessimismo
comporti l’accettazione dell’esistente, l’impossibilità di battersi, insomma il rifiuto della politica. Una
concezione tragica della storia e dei limiti della modificabilità del mondo invece è utile alla definizione dei
confini, dei limiti della politica” (216).
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anarchism, to the victory of the innocent of the earth, to the post-Historical reign of
poetry itself (238).
Of course, not all of the reviews were negative—particularly if we expand our
time frame. In addition to the praise she received preceding the novel’s official release
(which some dismissed as mere “hype”), Cesare Garboli writes in the introduction to the
1995 re-publication of La Storia: “Ricordavo un romanzo indignato, ribelle, polemico,
ideologico. Non un romanzo ma, come diceva la stessa Morante, un manifesto, un’azione
politica. La sconsacrazione, la condanna della Storia. […] La Storia ne usciva come un
romanzo di ribellione sessantottesca, di protesta” (vii-viii). Garboli is particularly
committed to rescuing Morante from the accusations of political disengagement,
underscoring the protest interwoven with a seemingly sentimental and outdated story.
Sinibaldi goes so far as to argue that the “lack of ideology” in her work—the absence of a
reassuring vision of the world—makes Morante more radical and more honest than her
political counterparts.225
The third strand of opposition involved the perils of popularity. Balestrini was one
of several critics to denounce La Storia as a romanzone (a populist, consumerist work).
Though Morante and her defenders argued that these critics, as part of the intellectual
elite, simply failed to understand a novel geared toward the masses, Lucente calls this
claim into question: it was common, he tells us, “to argue either for or against a
Gramscian assessment of the novel as a romanzo popolare. […] What sense does the term
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“Essere senza ideologia, privarsi di una compiuta e rassicurante visione del mondo non è meno ma è di
più (più radicale, più estremista ma anche più vero, più fedele al compito di verità che lo scrittore – il poeta,
per usare la parola adatta per la Morante – deve proporsi, ma che non dovrebbe essere estraneo a nessuno,
tantomeno al politico)” (217-18).
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‘popular’ have if the novel is in fact both narrated from and geared to a perspective that,
far from being ‘popular’ in Gramsci’s sense, is in fact thoroughly middle-class,
commercially ‘acceptable’ (i.e. highly marketable) and, in its very language, culturally
and intellectual elitist?” (“Scrivere” 238) It is difficult to know how to respond to this
“bestseller” critique; on the one hand, she was lampooned for failing to address the
political priorities of average Italians; on the other, she was condemned precisely because
so many average Italians bought her book (it sold over 600,000 copies, an unheard of
number at a time when the Italian publishing industry was struggling). As Lucamante
tells us, “critics’ overreactions […] did not stain La Storia’s positive reception by the
general public” (Forging 156). What is perhaps most intriguing (and most frustrating) are
the contradictions among the negative reviews. Everyone disliked her for a different
reason: some claimed she was too much of a realist, others that she was too mystical or
fantastical; some accused her of being out-of-touch with the times, while others said she
played too much to popular tastes; some denounced her consolatory tone, others her
pessimism.
It should be clear by now that much of the criticism leveled against La Storia had
more to do with the rigidly dualistic political thinking that dominated the intellectual
landscape in 1970s Italy than with the content or style of the novel. As Flavia Cartoni
observes, “At the time of the publication of La Storia, I believe that much of the criticism
raised was primarily by those who believed fervently in the validity of the two different
economic systems of the time: communism and liberalism. Nowadays, given the defeat of
these two systems that once upheld, divided, subdivided, and dominated the world, we
can see beyond those criticisms” (244). From our current vantage point, we can see the
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shortcomings of judging all art according to such narrow labels. And in fact, the failure of
this binary was precisely what Morante sought to underscore with her novels. If critics
viewed Morante as politically naïve or behind the times, she in turn viewed much leftist
thinking as ineffective and out-of-touch with the masses. Thus, she didn’t hesitate to
defend La Storia by turning the critiques back against the left.

Morante Strikes Back
Around 1970, Morante began work on an essay titled “Piccolo Manifesto dei
Comunisti (senza classe né partito),” composed of thirteen points in which she voices a
spirited critique of the state of the left at that time. In the very first line, she declares that,
“Un mostro percorre il mondo: la falsa rivoluzione,” and goes on to define this false
revolution as one based on violence or power. Indeed, one of Morante’s main objections
to the leading political groups of the day involved their use of violence to effect social
change. She was a firm pacifist who opposed all violence, even in the name of freedom or
equality. “For Morante […] all human action must respect life. A revolution that uses
violence in order to achieve its goals is false and can only lead to the establishment of a
totalitarian society. For these reasons, Morante rejects both the ideology and the actions
of the 1968 Italian protest movements, and, a decade later, the violent campaigns of the
Red Brigades” (Karagoz 258).226 Given the push toward radical action during the 1970s,
pacifism was a minority position, to say the least.
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She went so far as to draft a letter in 1978 condemning the Red Brigades, though she never sent it. It was
published posthumously in 1988.
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Second, Morante did not believe in the revolutionary force of avant-garde
aesthetics. “Morante had long understood instead that ‘esoteric forms of writing had by
then lost any transgressive charge’ and realized how a different kind of historical novel
was needed to describe the world in its historical changes” (Lucamante, Forging 158).
She was dismissive of the nouveau roman, littérature du regard, and other forms of
literary experimentation, condemning in particular those writers who strived to appear
“modern” at all costs.227 Though experimental forms may have been inspiring for a small
number of intellectuals, they failed to resonate with the working class, women, children,
and other marginalized groups that Morante hoped to target with her novel.228 Morante
felt that, though the left claimed to speak for the common worker, it ultimately failed to
reflect the beliefs and desires of its constituency, employing a language out-of-sync with
individuals only recently thrust into modernity. Here, Ernst Bloch’s notion of
nonsynchronism is illuminating; as Jack Zipes explains, “Bloch emphasized the failure of
left movements to recognize the huge gaps that modern technology and industrial change
had created in people’s lives. He maintained that ‘progress’ brought about disorientation,
especially for the agrarian and petit-bourgeois classes, and that the longing for bygone
days, for the old ways of life, for solid traditions, was a direct result of this disorientation
and not simply reactionary” (xviii). This was particularly true in postwar Italy, where
rapid industrialization and commercialization, combined with the trauma of the war, had
led to intense feelings of alienation. Leftist intellectuals derided the superstition and
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“Un’altra caratteristica certa, che distingue i mediocri e falsi romanzieri, è le preoccupazione—la
intenzione programmatica—di apparire ai propri contemporanei, a qualsiasi costo, ‘nuovi,’ ‘moderni,’
‘all’avanguardia,’ ecc.
[…] Il vero romanziere non si preoccupa, né tanto meno si impone per programma, di apparire nuovo e
moderno: eppure, lo è sempre” (Pro o contro 60).
228
As previously mentioned, she dedicated La Storia to the illiterate.
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nostalgia of the working class, unwilling to acknowledge the need for familiar traditions
in the wake of tremendous upheaval. It was these traditions that Morante sought to
resurrect in her work—though, as I will later explain, not in order to wallow in empty
nostalgia, but in order to adapt elements of the past to the postwar environment.
Morante also recognized a serious gap in the official World War II narrative being
circulated in the postwar period—a narrative that, like in France, valorized the Resistance
while largely ignoring Italy’s role in the Holocaust. As Lucamante explains, “Too many
Italians were intellectually monopolized by the narrative of Italian communism and
Resistance and neglected their responsibilities toward the Italian Jewish community”
(Forging 159). In the struggle to topple capitalism, the tragedy of deportation became a
blind spot in the national consciousness. La Storia addresses this blind spot explicitly;
when describing the Jews returning to Rome from the camps, the narrator explains:
Presto essi impararono che nessuno voleva ascoltare i loro racconti […] Difatti i
racconti dei giudii non somigliavano a quelli dei capitani di nave, o di Ulisse
l’eroe di ritorno alla sua reggia. Erano figure spettrali come i numeri negative, al
di sotto di ogni veduta natural, e impossibili perfino alla commune simpatia. La
gente voleva rimuoverli dale proprie giorante come dale famiglie normali si
rimuove la presenza dei pazzi, o dei morti. (377)
It was this kind of amnesia that led Morante to resist the dominant political trends of the
day. For radical leftists, creating a new future meant abandoning the past, a position that
Morante was uncomfortable adopting.
The leftist figures within La Storia also offer a great deal of insight into Morante’s
opinion of youthful “revolutionaries.” Nino joins the Communists on a whim (having
joined the Black Shirts for equally arbitrary reasons); for him, the party’s appeal is linked
to his romanticization of the outlaw life. Ultimately, his political goals lie much closer to
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those of capitalists (or gangsters). Speaking of the impending revolution, he declares, “E
famo un ponte aereo Hollywood-Parigi-Mosca! E ce sbronziamo de whisky e de vodka e
li tartufi e er caviale e le sigarette estere. E viaggiamo sulle Alfa da corsa e sul bimotore
personale. […] e famo l’orge co l’americane e ce scopiamo le danesi, e ar nemico je
lassamo le seghe…” (214) Even Davide, who espouses a much more fully formed
anarchic philosophy, succumbs to drug addiction and despair, reduced to delivering
feverish rants in taverns full of workers more concerned with their card games than with
his theories about fascism. The futility of his revolutionary aims reflects Morante’s
skepticism of other young anarchists—though again, without rejecting politics outright.
In her 1959 essay “Sul romanzo,” Morante offers a direct response to the
countless accusations of political evasion:
E tanto più, dunque, suonano equivoche e stonate le voci de certi piccoli recensori
dei romanzi, i quali parlano arbitrariamente di impegno e di evasione,
dimostrando soltanto, coi loro poveri criterii, la loro deficienza critica e umana.
Essi evidentemente ignorano che un romanzo bello (e dunque, vero) è sempre il
risultato di un supremo impegno morale; e che un romanzo falso (e, dunque,
brutto) è sempre il risultato di una evasione dal primo e necessario impegno del
romanziere, che è la verità. (Pro o contro 48-9)
She goes on to turn the label “non impegno” against her accusers: “Supremi esempi di
non-realismo, di non-impegno, e di evasione, a me sembrano certi prodotti del realismo
socialista (così nominato), o del (così nominato) non-realismo contemporaneo” (50).
Furthermore, many of those judging the political commitments of other artists,
she claims, are themselves disingenuous adherents of their own political philosophies:
In compenso, si discute moltissimo, oggi, in Occidente e più ancora in Oriente,
dei compiti, dei doversi, della responsabilità degli scrittori!, e i propagandisti della
buona arte indicono perfino dei congressi internazionali su questo argomento. Ma
purtroppo, simili propagandisti, nella maggioranza dei casi, appartengono – in
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qualità di funzionari, o di impiegati, o di commessi, o di semplici devoti – proprio
a quelle industrie del sonno, di cui si diceva. (Pro o contro 71)
Rather than obsessing over the question of commitment, Morante defines revolutionary
art as anything that increases vitality: “Il fatto è che una vera opera d’arte […] è sempre
rivoluzionaria: giacché provoca un aumento di vitalità, appunto. Per questo tutti i
reazionari d’ogni partito preferiscono l’arte falsa, la quale non provoca altro che il
benvenuto sonno della ragione” (Pro o contro 72).
In Italy (and elsewhere), the 1970s were a period of disenchantment (in the
Weberian sense of the word). For committed writers, this was both necessary and good;
disenchantment signaled freedom from dangerously naïve or utopian visions for the
future. For Morante, however, disenchantment marked a loss of innocence and was
therefore a source of modern ennui and despair. She objected to the overly mechanistic
Marxism of these so-called committed writers and feared political revolution would lead
to cultural amnesia, with cherished traditions abandoned in favor of “innovation.” Given
these critiques of the left, then, what did she offer instead? What did she hope to
accomplish with her “anachronistic” and “disengaged” novels?

An Accusation against All Fascisms of the World
In 1976, following censorship of La Storia in Spain, Morante explained her goals
for the novel at a union-sponsored cultural conference in Rome: “Prima ancora che
un’opera di poesia (e questo, per grazie di Dio, lo è!) il mio romanzo ‘La Storia’ vuol
essere un atto d’accusa contro tutti i fascismi del mondo. E insieme una domanda urgente
e disperata, che si rivolge a tutti, per un possibile risveglio commune” (“La censura”).
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Thus, though she was accused of removing art from the political sphere, she in fact
viewed the battle against fascism and the battle for poetry as inextricably linked. As
Lucente explains, “Her book represents, for her, what Useppe had represented within her
narrative, a worldly example of the force of poetry, of creative imagination at work in the
world, and a key to the understanding and the salvation of human society gone wrong,
which is to say, to the understanding of history and History” (Beautiful Fables 263). The
problem with political ideologies (fascism and Communism alike) is that they anonymize
individuals in favor of abstract historical theories. For Morante, any understanding of
History writ large must begin with an understanding of the lowliest participants. Myth
thus becomes a useful framework insofar as it affects dictators and peasants alike,
granting equal weight to all sectors of society and thereby serving as a sort of equalizing
force.
Garboli argues that one of the main appeals of La Storia was simply the fact that
it offered something different; critics accused her of lazily imitating dusty historical
novels, yet Morante in turn saw a troubling degree of conformity emerging in intellectual
communities. As such, “La Storia era un romanzo controcorrente, d’ispirazione anarchica
e di grande leggibilità…Per molti, moltissimi, lettori il romanzo si presentava come una
liberazione da opinioni conformiste e costituite. Ma in alti ambienti, nell’establishment,
quell’onda di consenti fu sentita come un pericolo” (Garboli, “Introduzione” ix). In short,
leftist intellectuals sought to control public opinion and were upset that Morante had
established a direct line of communication with readers, one that spoke to them in their
language and encouraged them to think for themselves, instead of relying on intellectuals
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to interpret the world and disseminate messages.229 Perhaps Morante already sensed the
disillusionment and loss of momentum that would cripple the Communist party in the late
‘70s and therefore sought to create something more durable than momentary violence in
the streets.
In the end, La Storia did intervene in key social, political, and cultural debates in
the early and mid 1970s, “confronting head-on such topics as sociopolitical oppression
and victimization, potentially non-Freudian, spontaneous love, and the relation between
utopian anarchism, Marxism, and millennial Christianity” (Lucente, Beautiful Fables
261). However, she presented these themes in ways that required reader reflection and
interpretation, rather than offering straightforward ideological positions, which proved
confusing for the public of that time. Morante’s “strange mixture of representational
responsibility, ironic withdrawal, and pathos” only served to further complicate her
reception (261). Accused of being both too historical and not historical enough, realistic
and mystical, pessimistic and naïve, Morante’s uniqueness lies in bridging these binaries:
she imbeds myth and superstition within realist discourse; she plants seeds of utopian
longing in pessimistic soil. And these acts, I argue, have undeniable political resonances.
Breaking away from the party line in order to communicate directly with “uneducated”
readers was, in many ways, a revolutionary act.
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As Lucente explains, “That Morante’s overtly representational novel would be met with such
extraordinary enthusiasm on the part of the great preponderance of the literary establishment as well as the
public must have seemed to Balestrini and his group, therefore, not only an affront but also a threat, not so
much a challenge to open combat as the victory cry of their opponents (and now successors)—and so,
despite the reversal of the ages of those involved, their own death knell” (“Scrivere” 234). The idea of
speaking to the masses—and particularly to excluded social groups—through folk wisdom or common
sense resonates with Gramsci’s views on the role of the “organic” intellectual. Though critics were divided
on whether or not La Storia qualified as a properly Gramscian text, it seems clear that Morante shared with
Gramsci a resistance to the “traditional” intelligentsia.
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In her essay “Pro o contro la bomba atomica,” Morante identifies the atomic
bomb as the natural expression and extension of contemporary society; faced with the
alienation of modern existence, humans feel a hidden longing for disintegration.230 Her
goal was simply to create a work that could combat that impulse. “For her, only art and
poetry could prevent the self-destruction of mankind and its tragic and ultimate
distintegration” (Bérard 146). And the particular form that her art assumed was a mythic
one. Myth’s non-linear temporal structure allowed her to disrupt the flawed notion of
history as progress; it provided a vehicle for readers to reconnect with communities and
nature in the wake of national tragedy; and it offered an alternative to rigid political
ideologies (on both the left and the right). Thus, in Morante’s hands, mythic discourse
became decidedly political.

The Scandal of History
Given that the title of her best-known novel is La Storia, it is unsurprising that
history—and therefore temporality—is a central concern for Morante. In Italian, of
course, storia means both “history” and “story,” and this double meaning is explored at
length in the novel, with Morante alternating between “historical” sections, which take a
birds-eye view of events, much in the style of standardized textbooks, and the personal
tale of Ida and her children. Critics agree that Morante ultimately privileges the personal
over the more properly historical, and even uses the former to critique the latter: her goal
230

“La nostra bomba è il fiore, ossia l’espressione naturale della nostra società contemporanea, così come i
dialoghi di Platone lo sono della città greca; il Colosseo, dei Romani imperiali; le Madonne di Raffaello,
dell’Umanesimo italiano; le gondola, della nobiltà veneziano; la tarantella, di certe popolazioni rustiche
meridionali; e i campi di sterminio, della cultura piccolo-borghese burocratica già infetta da una rabbia di
suicidio atomico. […] l’umanità contemporanea prova la occulta tentazione di disintegrarsi” (Pro o contro
99).
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is to reveal the inaccuracies, omissions, and fictions that plague “official” accounts of
history. In particular, she populates her novel with the kinds of characters most likely to
be overlooked by History: women, children, old men, prostitutes, Jews, wannabe
revolutionaries, and even soldiers (who, though present in history books, are thoroughly
anonymized). Thus, her efforts to disrupt linear temporality go hand-in-hand with her
objection to the notion of History as progress—a definition of History that she rejects as
oppressive, exclusionary, and a threat to humanity’s very existence. As Davide declares
during one of his political diatribes, “tuta la Storia l’è una storia di fascismi piú o meno
larvati” (566). As such, “History itself, or perhaps linear time, is itself the scandal”
(Wood, “Excurses” 76). Though the novel is primarily focalized through Ida and her
family, the relentless march of History continues long after they are crushed; the final
“documentary” section of the novel relates events until 1967, with the last line ominously
declaring: “…a la Storia continua…” (656). Thus, Morante’s political aims are to
undermine, interrupt, or otherwise impede this historical thrust. And her method for doing
so relies on a revisionary historiography “that is no longer oblivious to women’s
experiences in history. Not only does fiction alter and integrate the existing record by
recounting the alternative deeds of marginal figures, it also experiments with forms of
representation that question the primacy of historical chronology as a linear succession of
discrete, meaningful episodes” (Della Coletta 118).
Morante offered numerous alternatives to historical time: prehuman time,231
magmatic time,232 inverted time,233 suspended time,234 queer time,235 women’s time,236

231
232

Mussgnug 35.
Gragnolati 215.
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messianic time,237 omni-time,238 animal time,239 sacred time240—and, of course, mythic
time.241 As Berardinella writes:
Il romanzo diventa una lotta contro il tempo: un andare a ritroso, un fermarne lo
scorrere, una immobilizzazione spaziale dello scorrere del tempo. Come se il
tempo, procedendo, si curvasse anche su se stesso, e il suo procedere lineare
volgesse impercettibilmente in movimento circolare, in un movimento immobile.
Storia, cronaca e biografia, per Elsa Morante […] possono essere liberate dalla
corrosione dell’Irrealtà solo se entrano in una temporalità diversa: quella del
sogno, del mito, nella ciclicità di un mandala. (20)
By strategically deploying repetition, suspension, anachronism, and prophecy—the tools
of myth—Morante is able to interrupt (if not altogether defeat) a model of History closely
linked with fascism—though born long before that particular social system.242

The Irreducible Vitality of Repetition
As with Pavese, Bataille, and Simon, repetition assumes a variety of forms in
Morante’s fiction: the deterministic repetition of history; generational repetition; the
cycles of nature. But she also shares with these writers an investment in repetition with a
difference. Circularity can either be a sign of tragic fate or an indication of continuity
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In La Storia, the character Davide goes on a long rant against History, in which he defines fascism as
follows: “La parola fascismo è di conio recente, ma corrisponde a un sistema sociale di decrepitudine
preistorica, assolutamente rudimentale, e anzi meno evoluto di quello in uso fra gli antropoidi […] simile
sistema si fonda infatti sulla sopraffazione degli indifesi (popoli o classi o individui) da parte di chi tiene i
mezzi per esercitare la violenza. In realtà, fino dalle origini primitive, universalmente, e lungo tutto il corso
della Storia umana, non sussiste altro sistema fuori di questo. Recentemente, si è dato il nome di fascismo o
nazismo a certe sue eruzioni estreme d’ignominia, demenza e imbecillità, proprie della degenerazione
borghese: però il sistema in quanto tale è in atto sempre e dovunque (sotto aspetti e nomi diversi, e magari
contrarii…) sèmpar e departút dall’inissio della Storia umana” (565-66).
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with ancestors and cultural precedents. Repetition with a difference allows Morante to
reinvent history in the present. As Lucamante and Wood insist, “The circularity of the
work is not, to use a psychiatric terminology, compulsive repetition. By definition,
compulsion condemns the subject to death and Morante’s work manifests an irreducible
vitality” (13). Indeed, for Morante, the circularity of memory is productive (and thereby
disruptive).243 Morante privileges cyclicity as a more “natural” state of affairs,
characterizing the linearity of human history as an irreparable rupture from our intended
state of being. Lucamante goes so far as to associate this rupture with “evil”: “Life
without history is an idyll between nature and human beings. When history breaks the
cyclical and natural relationships that ensure continuity to human beings, evil unfolds in
all its destructive force because the individual has lost her conscience” (Forging 179-80).
To understand Morante’s investment in circular notions of time, it is useful to
introduce Julia Kristeva’s concept of “women’s time.” Despite its name, women’s time is
not defined by gender; instead, it is a temporality that relates anything traditionally
suppressed from historical representation.244 It is also fundamentally opposed to the time
of history: “History is exclusively conceptualized in terms of linear time, ‘time as project,
teleology, departure, progression and arrival.’ Kristeva relates linear time to the time of
language in its ordered, syntagmatic sequence of words” (Della Coletta 137). Women’s
243

“For Morante, memory has a dimension which disrupts temporality and dislodges the certainty of
progressive time which moves smoothly from A to B. Memory is not a matter of extension but an image of
enclosure, entrapment, and circularity. In her notion of time, nothing passes and nothing is forgotten. To
experience time is to experience pain, and the conscious recollecting mind is inevitably a suffering one. It is
memory which gives a sense of identity, of continuity through time” (Wood, “Bewitched” 319).
244
“Expressing these notions of time means accessing the archaic or mythical memories and the
intrasubjective and corporeal experiences ‘left mute by culture in the past.’ In this sense, the notion of
‘women’s time’ is less a matter of gender than a method—accessible to both women and men—of relating
to what is traditionally suppression from common conceptualization and, consequently, historical
representation” (Della Coletta 138).
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time, on the contrary, comprises the cyclical time of repetition and the monumental
dimension of eternity—and as demonstrated in previous chapters, repetition and eternity
are likewise hallmarks of mythic temporality.245
At times, repetition emerges through Morante’s use of historical analogy; the Nazi
occupation of Rome, for example, is described as a plague of old. Just as Pavese
superimposed Fascist violence onto more ancient rituals in La Luna e i falò, so too does
Morante depict Mussolini’s fascism as merely the most recent iteration of a much older
form of violence—a single link in a historical chain that Morante describes as “uno
scandalo che dura da diecimila anni.”246 Even Nino, who fails to exhibit any selfreflection or political understanding, acknowledges the repetitions of history: “Noi siamo
la generazione della violenza! Quanno s’è imparato er gioco delle armi, ce se rigioca!
Loro s’illudono de fregacce en’artra vorta… I soliti trucchi, il lavoro, i trattati,… le
direttive… i piani centenari… le scuole… le galere… il regio esercito… E tutto
ricomincia come prima! Síííí…?! Pum! pum! pum!” (442) Like Claude Simon, Morante
plays with the definition of “revolution,” using it to denote circulation around a fixed
point and return of the same.247 It is for this reason that both Nino and Davide, with
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“On the one hand, there are cycles, gestation, the eternal recurrence of a biological rhythm which
conforms to that of nature and imposes a temporality whose stereotyping may shock, but whose regularity
and unison with what is experienced as extra-subjective time, cosmic time, occasion vertiginous visions
and unnamable jouissance. On the other hand, and perhaps as a consequence, there is the massive presence
of a monumental temporality, without cleavage of escape, which has so little to do with linear time (which
passes) that the very word ‘temporality’ hardly fits [as it is] all-encompassing and infinite like imaginary
space” (Kristeva 16).
246
This was the subtitle printed on the cover of the first edition.
247
“E le sue pretese ‘rivoluzioni’ si possono intendere solo nel senso astronomico della parola che
significa: moto dei corpi intorno a un centro di gravità. Il quale centro di gravità, sempre lo stesso, qua è: il
Potere. Sempre uno: il POTERE…” (568)
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disparate strategies yet equal fervor, fail to effect political change. Theirs is repetition as
determinism.
Generational repetition, however, represents a more positive version of cyclicity.
Ida’s self-actualization, for example, is closely linked to her gradual attachment to the
Jewish ghetto in Rome. Ida, though half-Jewish, has always hidden this portion of her
identity—a fact that helps her avoid deportation during the war. However, despite her
best efforts to be “properly Italian,” she finds herself drawn again and again to the ghetto:
“Riconosceva il richiamo che la tentava laggiú […] I suoi ritmi irresistibili somigliavano
a quelli con cui le madri ninnano le creature, o le tribú si chiamano a raccolta per la notte.
Nessuno li ha insegnati, stanno già scritti nel seme di tutti i vivi soggetti a morire.” (337)
There, for the first time, she finds herself part of a community with roots reaching back
thousands of years: “In the ghetto, Ida is in touch with a set of mental representations that
surpass the time and space frames of single individuals; thus she unconsciously and
emotionally profits from the experiences and knowledge accumulated by entire
generations” (Della Coletta 132). Arguing that ignorance of the past is one of the sources
of naïve political optimism, Morante underscores the necessity of reconnecting with past
knowledge in order to intervene in the political realm.
Though numerous critics pounced on repetition as the source of Morante’s
pessimism, it has also been used to justify her enduring political relevance. Fabrizia
Ramondino argues that La Storia should be read “non solo perché è un grande libro, ma
perché ‘purtroppo’ è sempre attuale—quella storia infatti si ripete all’infinito nello spazio
e nel tempo” (186). If Morante seems to be repeating stories that belong to a previous era
(hence the accusations of anachronism), it is because those stories are always repeating,
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and are thus always current—always politically relevant. This, too, helps to explain the
appeal of myth: it can be adapted to multiple cultures and epochs, such that it, too, is
always current, repeating enduring truths in ever-changing forms. Repeating familiar
mythic tropes allows Ida to locate a community—even an imaginary one—amidst the
violence and instability of war-torn Rome.

The Eternal Present
La vraie générosité envers l’avenir
consiste à tout donner au présent.
—Albert Camus, L’Homme révolté
Though repetition is one of the most common forms of non-linear temporality
employed by Morante, her work also disrupts linear time through the use of
atemporality—that is, the blurring of past, present, and future into one utopically eternal
present. It may seem counterintuitive for a utopian writer to bury herself so thoroughly in
the present; after all, utopian longing is future-oriented. It involves anticipation of a better
world. But as the epigraph from Camus suggests, investment in the present has
undeniable political dimensions, insofar as present actions determine future states.
Morante accomplishes this temporal suspension through both thematic and formal
means. Her digressions, for example, are very purposeful—“a halting of narrative time, a
moment of contemplation before the character is returned to the maelstrom of ‘history’”
(Wood, “Excurses” 77). In his famous analysis of The Odyssey, Erich Auerbach describes
the way in which Homer’s digressions suspend ordinary temporality; the only time is the
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present of the narration, which can be expanded indefinitely.248 This is precisely the sort
of temporal dilation that permeates La Storia. At the moment Ida encounters Gunther, the
German soldier who will ultimately rape her and father Useppe, her fate is delayed by an
extended digression wherein we learn about Ida’s parents, her childhood in Calabria, and
her roles as wife, mother, and widow. In short, the moment of her violation is forestalled
by the power of narrative and memory. A similar technique can be found later in the
novel, when we are reintroduced to a tortured Davide. As we begin to learn about the
horrors of his wartime experience—his entire family was killed in the concentration
camps—the narrator takes the reader on a side journey to relate the final days of Santina,
a prostitute whom Davide frequented, thus delaying, however briefly, Davide’s untimely
demise. A single afternoon for Santina’s pimp expands until it seems to fill the duration of
an entire lifetime, whereas cataclysmic political events transpire in a single moment, a
form of temporal manipulation that upends historical hierarchies. These efforts to
essentially halt time align with Walter Benjamin’s theorization of Jetztzeit, or time that
has been detached from the continuum of history: “It is by focusing on rupture,
intermittence, interruption that the “other history,” the history of the oppressed, can be
made visible. […] In order to grasp the movement of history, its flow must be brought to
a halt. The Jetztzeit is exactly the moment that cuts through history, the ‘now’ that blasts
its continuum open, thus disrupting and contradicting history’s claimed completeness”
(Boscagli 165-66). Unfortunately, Jetztzeit is not naturally occurring; it requires the
intervention of the artist or revolutionary to blast it free from the ceaseless flow of
history. Thus, once Morante’s characters have expired, historical time is once more
248

See “Odysseus’ Scar” in Mimesis: The Representation of Reality (1946).
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ascendant, to the point that time actually accelerates: in the final section of the novel, four
years pass by in a single page, with alienation and oppression increasing exponentially.249
For Morante, History is a fatalistic machine whose forward thrust ruthlessly
crushes figures like Ida and Useppe; dilation of the present therefore offers a brief respite
in which characters can at least imagine, if not actualize, a different—and utopian—
future. Useppe in particular is able to achieve happiness through a unique experience of
temporality; while conversing with animals or when hidden away in his Edenic grove,
time essentially disappears. Even Useppe’s poetry exists in a sort of eternal present.
When Davide asks to read one his poems, Useppe confesses: “Io non voio scivere… le
poesie io le penso… e le dico… Io le penso, e subito me ne scordo.” (522) The
impermanence of his art is not tragic, however, but rather allows him to respond to the
world in spontaneous and unmediated (i.e. non-historically determined) ways.
Morante often turns to animals to metaphorize the temporal experiences of her
characters. One of the best-known examples involves the odd tale of the lesser panda:
Esiste nell’Asia un piccolo essere detto panda minore, di an aspetto fra lo
scoiattolo e l’orsacchiotto, il quale vive sugli alberi in boschi di montagna
irraggiungibili; e ogni tanto scende in terra in cerca di germogli da mangiare. Di
uno di questi panda minori si diceva che trascorresse dei millennii a pensare sul
proprio albero: dal quale scendeva in terra ogni 300 anni. Ma in realtà, il calcolo
di tali durate era relative: difatti, nel mentre che in terra erano passati 300 anni,
sull’albero di quel panda minore erano passati appena dieci minuti. (282)
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Though the narrator includes critiques of History throughout the “textbook” sections, her antipathy, if
not all out hatred, towards the powers that be is even more pronounced in the final section: “Nelle nazioni
avanzate, si estende lo sviluppo progressivo e mastodontico delle industrie, che vanno succhiando le
migliori energie e accentrando in sé tutti i poteri. In luogo di servire all’uomo, le macchine lo asserviscono.
Lavorare per le industrie e comperarne i prodotti diventano le funzioni essenziali della comunità umana”
(655).
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The narrator likens Useppe to the lesser panda insofar as both are beings “out of time”
whose thinking fails to align with the rigid goose-step of history. When thinking, “il
tempo comune degli altri per lui si riduceva quasi a zero” (282). This is partly a technique
for passing long stretches of time alone, but it also suggests that time is malleable and
subject to human manipulation. Ida, so traumatized by Useppe’s premature death that she
lapses into a coma, is likewise compared to the lesser pander at the novel’s conclusion:
“quella che per noi fu una durata di nove anni, per lei fu appena il tempo di una
pulsazione. Lei pure, come il famoso Panda Minore della leggenda, stava sospesa in cima
a un albero dove le carte temporali non avevano più corso. Essa, in realtà, era morta
insieme al suo pischelletto Useppe” (648-49). Here, the temporal alteration emerges as a
last line of defense against a trauma that is impossible to face—as a form of escapism.
Yet the fact remains that time, in Morante’s hands, is rendered susceptible to the powers
of imagination.

Living in Prehistory
Regardless of the particular label selected—mythic time, magmatic time,
women’s time—the one quality shared by all of Morante’s characters is an experience of
being “outside” of time—or rather, out of sync with History. This leads to moments of
anachronism and nonsynchronism. Ernst Bloch coined the term nonsynchronism to
denote the time lag, or uneven temporal development, produced in the social sphere by
the processes of capitalist modernization. “Not all people exist in the same Now. They do
so only externally, by virtue of the fact that they may all be seen today. But that does not
mean that they are living at the same time with others” (22). Though Bloch used the term
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in an attempt to grasp why fascism had such great appeal for the German people, it is
equally useful in the Italian context.
Though La Storia takes place in Rome, Morante is deeply invested in the “rural”
mindset that lingered in the many Italians who had migrated to the cities for work but
retained their pre-capitalistic traditions. When describing Ida’s origins, the narrator
relates that, “L’avvento dell’era atomica, che segnò l’inizio del secolo, certo non si
faceva sentire in quelle regioni; e nemmeno lo sviluppo industriale delle Grandi Potenze,
se non per i racconti degli emigrati. L’economia del paese si fondava sull’agricoltura, in
successivo decadimento per via del suolo impoverito. Le caste dominanti erano il clero e
gli agrari” (28). Furthermore, “L’organizzazione burocratico-tecnologica del mondo stava
ancora a una fase primitiva: non aveva, cioè, contaminato ancora, senza rimedio, la
coscienza popolare. I più vivevano ancora, in certo modo, nella preistoria” (91).
Ida is one such “prehistoric” figure: she hails from Calabria, in Southern Italy, and
maintains the superstitions and traditions of that area. She doesn’t trust electricity and
believes in premonitions. The Marrocco family, with whom Ida and Useppe live for a
spell, are natives of the Ciociaria region, which even today is known for the strength of
its folkloric traditions. The grandfather complains endlessly that one can’t see the sky in
Rome for all the buildings, and the others display an unwavering belief in the power of
fortunetellers. One friend scoffs: “Solo delle cafone come loro possono credere in questi
imbrogli delle carte,” yet she herself has great faith in the Madonna’s protection and
believes that her brother’s medal of the Madonna will save him from the Russians (322).
The narrator describes how, compared to Ida, “Tutto il resto del mondo era
un’insicurezza minatoria per lei, che senza saperlo era fissa con la sua radice in chi sa
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quale preistoria tribale. E nei suoi grandi occhi a mandorla scuri c’era una dolcezza
passiva, di una barbarie profondissima e incurabile, che somigliava a una precognizione”
(21). But for Morante, barbarism is no insult; on the contrary, it is meant to indicate that
Ida is more in touch with nature and her ancestral heritage than the rabble whose souls
have been destroyed by either capitalism or fascism. This is precisely the sort of existence
that Morante felt was not sufficiently acknowledged by Marxist ideology, which was
inordinately focused on the future of industrial life, rather than maintaining the traditions
of agricultural communities.

Community, communitas, communis
L’unica felice possibile: non essere sé, ma tutti.
—Elsa Morante
Though La Storia zeroes in on the lives of individuals, rather than viewing history
as enacted by monolithic blocks of people (the Italians, the Germans, the Americans),
Morante consistently privileges community over the individual. Ida, for example, feels
isolated and powerless until she connects with her fellow Jews in the ghetto. After her
apartment is destroyed during an air raid, Ida and Useppe are forced to reside in a hovel
of sorts provided to refugees. She shares the one-room building with several other
families, most notably “The Thousand” (“I mille”), a half-Roman half-Neopolitan tribe
whose exact numbers are difficult to pinpoint. The Thousand are described as possessing
a single body and a single soul; despite the bickering common to everyday life,
particularly in such a small space, theirs is a community so perfectly harmonized as to
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transcend bodily boundaries. Though Ida, so accustomed to being alone, is initially
frightened by this perfect unity, she eventually comes to admire the Thousand. Useppe,
too, views them as a sort of beautiful, undifferentiated mass: “Senza dubbio, per lui non
esistevano differenza né di età, né di bello e brutto, né di sesso, né sociali” (185). He
literally presses his bodies against theirs in an effort to become one with this community.
Morante’s privileging of the many over the one can be linked to Simone Weil,
whose notebooks Morante read voraciously throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Weil
emphasized duties toward others over individual rights and sought to deconstruct the
category of person in favor of the impersonal. The goal for Weil was “decreation”—an
undoing of the self.250 Through decreation, we deny the self in favor of total dedication to
God. And this “undoing of self” is likewise central to Morante’s political project. The
character of Davide, for example, (who is often considered an avatar of Weil), fails to
fulfill his revolutionary aims because he cannot let go of his individual identity, despite
his purported Communist sympathies.251 He desperately wants to form a communion with
the common worker, but his bourgeois upbringing and physical weakness create an
insurmountable rift between him and the individuals he hopes to lead into a revolutionary
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The seminal definition of decreation can be found in La Pesanteur et la grâce, though the concept
emerges even earlier in Weil’s notebooks. It should be noted that she makes a clear distinction between
decreation and destruction, thus precluding the possibility of a nihilistic reading of her position.
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Weil famously went to work in a factory in Paris. Not satisfied to merely speculate about labor
conditions, she wanted to experience the life of the worker herself in order to refine her philosophy. In La
Storia, Davide attempts the same feat, though he scarcely makes it few weeks. He knows the work will be
challenging, but he imagines those hardships will be tempered by camaraderie with his fellow workers.
Instead, the noise of the factory and the assembly-line nature of the work means that workers have little
contact with each other, and are too exhausted to spend their evenings talking of revolution. This
disillusionment bears a striking similarity to Weil’s experience: she initially believed that she would
discover something of human dignity in the workers’ stoicism and in their own interpersonal relations, but
that expectation was brutally destroyed. Davide also shares Weil’s socioeconomic background: both come
from wealthy, intellectual families, ready to rescue them from the hardships of working class life should
they so desire.
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future. Though he strives for communion with men, rather than with God, the central goal
of breaking down the self in order to create room for another remains the same.
The vitality of community bears equal weight inside and outside of the novel. For
Morante, poetry and art not possible in isolation from others. As Claudia Karagoz
explains:
Morante maintains that the artist or writer, although tempted to ‘tell everyone off’
from time to time, will ultimately reject isolation because, ‘by his very nature, he
needs others, especially those who are different from himself…Thus, he will stay
in the game.’ In Morante’s view, artists see themselves as vital members of their
societies, joined to others by an inescapable duty: ‘the function of poets, which is
to open to reality their own conscience, and the conscience of others, is today
more urgent and necessary than ever before. No poet, today, can ignore the
desperate plea…of other human beings.’ (264)
Thus, for Morante, the Romantic image of a poet scribbling away in isolation, shunning
society in favor of nature’s inspiration, had no place in postwar Italy. With humanity’s
very existence threatened by atomic disintegration, poets (a term Morante uses
interchangeably with writers) emerge as a final line of defense against destruction and
despair.252 In short, poets serve the same function as the myth tellers in ancient Greece:
both have a duty to aid social cohesion through the dissemination of a shared cultural
heritage.
If writers like Balestrini located community amongst protestors in the streets, Ida
finds it amongst the ghosts of the Ghetto and the banal habits of those forgotten by
History.
Even after the Ghetto has been evacuated, Ida feels an irresistible urge to return; in fact,
the knowledge of the Jews’ fates “was lost amid reminiscences and older habits”—amid
252

“Nel mio vocabolario abituale, lo scrittore (che vuol dire prima di tutto, fra l’altro poeta), è il contrario
del letterato” (Pro o contro 97).
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her continued desire for community (338). While wandering through the abandoned
apartments she experiences an auditory illusion:
Dapprima la sorprese un silenzio irreale del luogo. E in questo i suoi orecchi,
ronzanti dai digiuni, incominciarono a percepire delle voci. Non fu, invero,
propriamente un’allucinazione, perché Ida si rendeva conto che la fabbrica di
quelle voci era dentro il suo cervello, anzi lei stessa non le avvertiva altrove. Però,
l’impressione che ne riceveva era che si irradiassero nei suoi canali auditivi da
qualche dimensione imprecisata, la quale non apparteneva né allo spazio esterno,
né ai suoi ricordi. Erano voci estranee, di timbri diversi ma femminili in
prevalenza, slegate una dall’altra senza dialogo né comunicazione fra di loro. E
pronunciavano distintamente delle frasi, ora esclamative ora distese, però tutte di
ordinaria banalità, quasi spezzoni raccogliticci della vita comune di ogni giorno.
(340)
It is worth noting that the voices she hears are not only Jewish, but also women’s
voices—voices that have been doubly marginalized and now risk erasure. Ida is called as
a kind of witness to their existence, which is already being written out of History. The
banality of their words is likewise key, as Morante insists on the value of even the most
everyday utterances—the utterances least likely to be included in official accounts of
history. The ordinary is what ultimately connects us across temporal and geographical
divides and allows Ida to approximate a community, transitory though it may be.

Integration and Disintegration
Eravamo integri, prima della Genesi; […]
Gli dei non sono maciullati dalla macchina
dei sensi. Sono integri. Passato presente e
future – tenebre e luce – morte e vita – i
multipli e gli addendi – i diversi e i contrari
– per loro sono tutti uno. Forse il nostro
traguardo è QUELLO.
–Morante, Aracoeli
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If Morante privileges community over the individual, her writing likewise
frequently depicts the fusion of self and world—another key tenet of myth. Fusion (as
distinct from community) is about integration as a means of combating the disintegration
of the atomic age: “The atomic bomb impacts man’s ability to experience spiritual
totality. The purpose of art, in Morante’s estimation, is to return to audiences the integrity
of reality denied to them in their daily lives, ‘in their daily, and exhausting, and alienating
interaction with the world’” (Lyons 251).253 Identity is frequently fragmented in her
novels, but this is not a negative phenomenon (that is, it is not disintegration in the atomic
sense); it is fragmentation as a prerequisite for fusion with the world, with nature, and
with God. Breaking apart emerges as the first step toward becoming whole again.
Indeed, Morante’s works are rife with unstable boundaries: between outside and
inside, between public history and internal psychic structures, between subject and
object.254 This disintegration of barriers often results in characters seeping out into the
world, or, conversely, the world seeping into them. The images are frightening—
sometimes even grotesque—but ultimately pleasurable. Pain resolves itself as liberation.
While pregnant with Useppe, for example, Ida experiences bizarre interactions with
commonplace objects: “D’un tratto, tali oggetti parevano incorporarsi nella sua stessa
sostanza, fermentandovi in un lievito di amarezza. […] E nell’atto che, costretta, si
riduceva a vomitare, le pareva che il passato e il futuro e i suoi sensi e tutti gli oggetti del
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“La nostra bomba è il fiore, ossia l’espressione naturale della nostra società contemporanea, così come i
dialoghi di Platone lo sono della città greca; il Colosseo, dei Romani imperiali; le Madonne di Raffaello,
dell’Umanesimo italiano; le gondola, della nobiltà veneziano; la tarantella, di certe popolazioni rustiche
meridionali; e i campi di sterminio, della cultura piccolo-borghese burocratica già infetta da una rabbia di
suicidio atomico. […] si direbbe che l’umanità contemporanea prova la occulta tentazione di disintegrarsi”
(Pro o contro 99).
254
For more on this, see Della Coletta, Plotting the Past (1996).
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mondo girassero in un’unica ruota, in un disfacimento che era anche una liberazione”
(85). The goal of all of Morante’s characters, from Ida’s attacker to Davide to Giuseppe
Secondo, is dissolution of the self: through sex, through unity with the mother, through
shared consciousness, or through a prehistorical unity with nature.
Despite these lofty goals, moments of fusion almost always appear in banal
contexts; for example, Nino, Useppe, and Blitz (the dog) are described as three bodies in
one spirit as they gallivant around town (163). Lying in bed shortly after giving birth to
Useppe, Ida describes the world as “un maro salato e tiepido nel quale il suo corpo si
discioglieva” (96-97). As the novel progresses, the boundaries between dream and reality
become increasingly fluid, such that by the end, Ida’s dreams seem more real to her than
the streets of Rome. The outside world also bleeds into the oneiric realm; after Davide
shows up for the first time at the refugee shelter, his moans seep into Ida’s dreams (201).
Useppe’s movements likewise change the course of Nino’s dreams as he tries to curl up
next to him in the night (228). For Useppe in particular, distinctions between objects are
almost nonexistent, such that all sounds and forms coalesce into a single unified
experience (532). Though certainly a less positive experience, Ida even experiences a sort
of fusion in the wake of her rape—a fusion that inscribes the violent act within a cosmic
order:
Quell’altro corpo ingordo, aspro e caldo, che la esplorava al centro della sua
dolcezza materna era, in uno, tutte le centomila febbri e freschezze e fami
adolescenti che confluivano dalle loro terre gelose a colmare la propria foce
ragazza. Era tutti i centomila animali ragazzi, terrestri e vulnerabili, in un ballo
pazzo e allegro, che si ripercuoteva fino nell’interno dei suoi polmoni e fino alle
radici dei suoi capelli, chiamandola in tutte le lingue. Poi si abbatté, ridiventando
una sola carne implorante, per disciogliersi dentro al suo ventre in una resa dolce,
tiepida e ingenua, che la fece sorridere di commozione, come l’unico regalo di un
povero, o di un bambino. (70)
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Davide, too, experiences something like fusion with the world when, in the midst of a
political rant, he realizes, “il borghese era lui… e la puttana era lui… e la canaglia era
lui… e l’origine di tutta l’oscenità era lui” (594). The rigid boundaries that structure
bourgeois culture never quite take hold for the marginalized characters of La Storia.
Useppe, as the mystical child par excellence, is able to meld with the world
through his connection with animals: his consciousness fuses with the precognition of
dogs, birds, and other creatures, thus offering him privileged insight into the world.255 His
ability to transcend individual human consciousness in favor of other, more “natural”
perspectives is important insofar as animals possess an innocence and wholeness that is
missing from humanity:
tutte le altre specie viventi, almeno, non hanno regredito: sono rimaste dov’erano
il primo giorno: nell’Eden, allo stato di natura! mentre l’umanità lei sola ha
regredito! e si è retrocessa non solo dal suo grado storico di coscienza, ma anche
dal grado della natura animale. Basta ricapitolare la biologia, e la Storia… Mai,
prima, nessuna specie vivente aveva prodotto un mostro al di sotto della natura
come quello partorito nell’epoca moderna dalla società umana… (574)
As the Marrocco grandfather never ceases to remind us, for many Italians separation from
the natural world was still a fairly recent trauma. The fact that Useppe is able to
commune with that world, discovering a hidden woodland oasis in the middle of Rome,
underscores the central role that nature plays in mythic consciousness and achieving unity
with the world.
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“La sua coscienza assomiglia, più che alla soggettività individuale umana, alla ‘precognizione’ animale,
alla ‘prescienza oscura’ del vitello, alla ‘memoria antica’ e alla ‘millenaria saggezza’ di Bella, alla
‘cognizione impossibile’ degli uccelli migranti. Nella vicinanza di Useppe al mondo animale risiede la sua
innocenza assoluta” (D’Angeli 124).
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It is within this forest hideout that he most effectively achieves the euphoria of
shared consciousness; the most notable example occurs when the silence “speaks” to him,
with all sounds across time and space converging into one joyous song:
Il silenzio, in realtà, era parlante! anzi, era fatto di voci le quali da principio
arrivarono piuttosto confuse, mescolandosi col tremolio dei colori e delle ombre,
fino a che poi la doppia sensazione diventò una sola: e allora s’intese che quelle
luci tremanti, pure loro, in realtà erano tutte voci del silenzio. […] Però dentro ci
si distinguevano che sa come, una per una, tutte le voci e le frasi e i discorsi, a
migliaia, e a migliaia di migliaia: e la canzonette, e i belati, e il mare, e le sirene
d’allarme, e gli spari, e le tossi, e i motori, e i convogli per Auschwitz, e i grilli, e
le bombe dirompenti, e il grugnito minimo dell’animaluccio senza coda… e ‘che
me lo dài, un bacetto, a’Usè?...’ (510)
The fact that Auschwitz is folded into other, much more quotidian events suggests the
way in which Morante envisions mythic unity as a response to the trauma of the war—a
means of rendering tragedy legible through its proximity, and possibly even resemblance,
to other experiences.256 Useppe’s perception of the silence brings him into contact with
the totality of human experience, thereby banishing (albeit temporarily) the alienation of
modernity.

The Monsters of Reason Produce Sleep
Morante’s staunch opposition to History (as linear, patriarchal, and oppressive)
goes hand-in-hand with an opposition to rationality. In “Pro o contro la bomba atomica,”
she defines History as irrealtà (unreality) due to “its absurd brutality and its illogical
obsession with evil” (Della Coletta 123). When reality becomes a grotesque nightmare,
fiction—even the most “irrational” fiction—becomes a tool for combatting the tragedies
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This moment can be compared to Ida’s auditory hallucination in the Ghetto, wherein we also see the
tragedy of deportation commingling with everyday utterances.
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that reason produces. Following the failure of Enlightenment rationality, then, the use of
irrational or unreal genres becomes a means of reimagining an ethically or politically
engaged position in the midst of postwar disillusionment.257
If Adorno and Horkheimer upended the traditional understandings of myth and
Enlightenment in their text Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), Morante, for her part,
inverted the premise of Goya’s well-known painting, “The Sleep of Reason Produces
Monsters,” insisting instead that the monsters of reason produce a deadly sleep. As
Morante herself explains, “Perfino le macchine prodotte dalla scienza, che dovrebbero
rappresentare i monumenti della ragione, si riducono, invece, a dispensieri inerti di
questo sonno senile. Ed è logico, allora, che, dentro una simile industria del sonno, la
vera arte sia guardata come un’intrusione sovversiva, e poco raccomandabile” (Pro o
contro 70). Morante’s solution to the modern ennui bred by so-called reason is to awaken
readers to the kinds of relationships and experiences previously accessible but now
largely lost—experiences generated by myth and ritual. And “unreason” her is method for
doing so.
So, what does this “unreason” or “irrationality” look like in Morante’s work? One
of her strategies is to privilege analogical and metaphorical patterns over purposeoriented speech, or Lacanian language, which is founded on difference (Della Coletta
136). Useppe’s poems, for example, are built on resemblances, rather than rational
associations. Davide tells him, “Tutte le tue poesie sono centrate su un COME…
Dovunque si guardi, si scopre un’unica impronta comune” (523). When Useppe first
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In the tradition of Benjamin, Bloch, and other members of the Frankfurt School, Morante’s goal was to
“transcend the rationalism of the Enlightenment and provide more intuitive means for understanding
experience and dealing with such problems as alienation” (Zipes xv).
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begins to learn language, he applies the same word interchangeably to any number of
objects, such that the light bulbs in the house, the derelict flowers that Ida brings home
from school, the hanging clusters of onions, the door knobs, a fly on the wall, swallows,
and a gob of spit are all “stars” in his estimation (120). Useppe’s world involves an
endless proliferation of objects seen as if they were something else (something more
miraculous), rather than a rational evaluation of things as they are.258
Another non-rational strategy involves Morante’s choice of genre.259 By relying
heavily on dreams, fairy tales, fables, and myth—“irrational” literary forms—she breaks
with the logic of Enlightenment rationality and propagandistic political discourse, hinting
instead at mysterious, affective forms of knowledge. Furthermore, the proliferation of
conflicting discourses contributes to her anti-historical efforts: “Tragedy, epic, comedy,
and the lyric, high and low registers, the sublime and the grotesque are irreverently mixed
[…] in a (con)fusion of voices which once again reflects the author’s wish to question the
patriarchal regimentation of human history and art” (Re 371). If reason is closely linked
to arrangement and categorization, Morante’s works subvert reason by grouping objects
according to a different kind of logic, or by eliminating categories altogether.
However, in the end, Morante (like the authors discussed in previous chapters)
doesn’t advocate a wholesale embrace of the absurd. The opposite of reason is not chaos
or madness. Instead, the ideal that she pursues is a marriage of reason and imagination:
“Difatti, lo scrittore di poesia, e il romanziere in ispecie (uguagliato, in questo, forse
soltanto dal poeta tragico), rappresenta, nel mondo, la compiuta armonia della ragione e
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In fact, the phrase “as if” [come se] is ubiquitous in the novel.
Genre is discussed more thoroughly in the following section on bricolage.
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dell’immaginazione: e cioè l’intera e libera coscienza umana, l’intervento che riscatta la
città umana dai mostri dell’assurdo” (Pro o contro 67). In La Storia, Morante equates a
lack of imagination with death, claiming that, “nessuna immaginazione viva potrebbe, coi
propri mezzi, raffigurarsi i mostri aberranti e complicati prodotti dal suo contrario: ossia
dalla mancanza totale d’immaginazione, che è propria di certi meccanismi mortuari” (9091). Her project for an alternative historiography presents the writing of history as “a
source of freedom, releasing the powers of fantasy and imagination” and posits
imagination as a powerful weapon against oppression and disintegration (Della Coletta
122). In a world where “no documentation, no records have been kept, how can the
historian fix the traces, register the presence of those who have been silenced and deleted
from history except through an act of imagination?” (Boscagli 168) Thus, introducing
imagination into history is not an irrational betrayal of facts, but rather the only way to
disrupt reified political structures and create a space for marginalized voices.

What is a Novel?
Morante’s novels, while undeniably “novelistic” in many ways, also trouble
traditional understandings of the genre, incorporating elements of poetry, children’s
stories, psychological-focused family sagas, realism, magical realism, fantasy, myth, epic,
legend, folklore, fairy tales, Arthurian romance, tragedy, and autobiography. When
questioned about the genre of L’isola di Arturo, Morante “pointedly blurred generic
distinctions, equating the novel with epic and romance, prose with poetry” (Cornish 73).
Even if we limit our discussion to La Storia, we find within those pages songs, poems,
nursery rhymes, fables, Biblical quotes, and political speeches, among other textual
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allusions. The constant shift in cultural touchstones has a destabilizing effect on the
reader, but for Morante, this is productive insofar as it unearths previously neglected
perspectives on familiar events.
In her essay “Sul romanzo,” Morante offers a fluid definition of the novel; after
all, the word “romanzo” designates not only a literary genre, but also matters of feeling
and passion (i.e. romance in the affective sense) and the tradition of old chivalric tales
and legends à la Ariosto. The convergence of these three registers is what in turn gives
rise to her mythic sensibilities. Critics were understandably at a loss as to how to
categorize her style; “Una parte dei critici […] lo hanno situato fra i classici del realismo
sociale; mentre altri lo hanno sistemato nel regno onirico della fiaba e dell’inconscio, o
dentro le fantasie nere alla Poe” (Berardinella 18). Yet her writing reveals a constant
slippage, such that no single generic category will suffice. “The product is a polyphony
that serves the author in a project that is neither Neorealist nor avant-garde but simply—
and as always—her own” (Lucamante, Forging 160).
This is relevant to the present study for two reasons: 1) this strategy, which I am
calling bricolage, places her in even closer contact with myth, and 2) Morante’s generic
hybridity has precise political aims, as well as literary ones. In La Storia, for example,
Morante’s presentational style (the constant alternation between historical facts, folk
culture, and Ida’s narrative) “breaks the conventions of the historical novel in a way that
is far more thoroughgoing, and ultimately far more disruptive, than merely dividing the
text into two completely discrete types of discourse” (Lucente, Beautiful Fables 259).
The juxtaposition of such vastly disparate accounts of political events (disparate in both
scale and affective register) renders the shortcomings of “objective” History even more
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salient, underscoring the elements that are typically left out of official discourse. If critics
were shocked, and even offended, by the superimposition of schoolyard songs onto the
deportation of Jews, the shock was intentional; only by juxtaposing these discordant
genres is she able to create a bridge between History and history—between the global and
the personal.
For Morante, it’s not simply a case of drawing from different genres (which
would be true of just about any writer); rather, she breaks genres apart and recombines
them in innovative, and often subversive, ways. The key for Morante, as for her utopian
counterpart, Ernst Bloch, was not to dismiss bourgeois literature out of hand, but rather to
repurpose it for utopian ends.260 Those who dismissed La Storia as an uninspired
throwback to neorealism, or even bourgeois realism, are guilty of a superficial reading of
the novel which fails to account for the ways in which realistic gestures are often invoked
tongue-in-cheek in order to dismantle the very structures they imitate.261 Sergio Parussa
explains that:
When old concepts and images are used in contexts that are distant and different
from the ones in which those concepts and images were conceived, […] they
encounter new meanings: they come back to life in the present by becoming
different. Old notions carry with them echoes of the past, traces of their history,
vestiges of an ancient meaning or of old usages. They carry a vision of the world
that is distant and different fro the current one, but that, precisely by virtue of that
distance, and of that historical depth, can speak beyond the speaker’s, the
260

In his introduction to a collection of Bloch’s essays on utopianism, Jack Zipes describes Bloch’s “belief
that bourgeois philosophy, art, and literature could no longer express the questions and problems necessary
for pushing forward the socialist experiment. But by no means was the bourgeois heritage to be dismissed.
Rather it was to be reutilized in a manner that would allow its utopian undercurrents to be realized. Only
through the reorientation, revitalization, and reutilization of language, and only through experimentation
with what had already been designed to fill humankind’s deeply felt lack could the socioeconomic crisis of
ossification, staleness, and degeneration be overcome” (xxviii).
261
Serkowska argues that La Storia is much more an anti-historical novel than a historical one insofar as it
“does not aim at charting relationships between the past and present—whether in terms of opposition or of
analogy—nor does it aim at teaching her contemporaries a ‘historical lesson’” (“About One” 383).
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storyteller’s, and the writer’s intentions and generate new meanings, new life in
the present: both for those distance and different concepts as well as for the
present text that hosts them (141).
Just as myths are reinterpreted and rewritten in each subsequent age, adapted to the
political demands of the day, so too does Morante strive to repurpose familiar concepts as
a means of ensuring continuity and community in an era of alienation.
At times, Morante is explicit about the links between the novel (or her personal
vision for the novel) and myth:
Liberato, così, da certi superflui schemi, e meglio inteso secondo le sue origini e
le sue ragioni poetiche, il romanzo non può restringersi nella misura di un genere
letterario, fissato da convenzioni scolastiche o determinato da contingenze
culturali. Il gusto di inventare la storia inesauribile della vita è una disposizione
umana naturale, comune a tutte le epoche e a tutti i paesi (perfino le leggende
mitologiche e popolari sono già una specie di romanzo collettivo). (Pro o contro
45-6, italics mine)
Furthermore, she favored the novel precisely for its ability to transport readers to a sort of
“mythic” era: “Elsa Morante ha visto nel romanzo la forma letteraria moderna per
eccellenza. Moderna anche per la sua potenzialità magnetica di ripercorrere a ritroso la
propria storia borghese, per risalire a origini pre-borghesi, all’epica antica e a quella
cavalleresca, nonché ai grandi cicli fiabeschi occidentali e orientali” (Berardinella 25).
Thus, while strategies of montage and bricolage are employed by some authors with the
aim of creating hyper-modern or postmodern texts (bricolage is often cited as a defining
characteristic of the postmodern novel), Morante favors it as a means of reinvigorating
ancient cultural traditions and literary practices with which we have lost touch. As
Bernardinella explains, “Quasi che il romanzo, per conquistarsi il suo ormai contrastato
diritto di esistenza, avesse bisogno, dopo crisi e catastrofi, di fare appello a remote fonti
di legittimazione, di ritrovare fondamenta profonde e stabili, evocano, con un atto de
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strenua magia artigianale, tutte le forme più solide e preziose del suo glorioso passato, sia
moderno che pre-moderno” (32). For Morante, the path to political change did not
involve a radical rupture with the past, but rather a meaningful engagement with it—not
in order to repeat past mistakes, but to resuscitate tried and true strategies for generating
community, thereby combatting the dangers of a hyperindiviudalized modernity. In the
midst of the “crisis of the novel,” she successfully renewed the narrative tradition, not (or
not only) by drawing on classical literary traditions, but by reaching back to “radici più
antiche: al mito” (“Introduzione” 7).

Gnomes and Maidens and Dragons (Oh My!)
Il romanzo è un modo di rivivere, scrivendo,
costruendo un completo e complesso
edificio, la propria vera storia e il proprio
mito. Celebrare quel mito e interpretarlo.
Celebrarlo e demolirlo.
−Alfonso Berardinella
Though Morante undoubtedly adheres to the five tenets of mythic thinking
outlined in this dissertation, one needn’t work so hard to position Morante as a “mythic”
writer. On the contrary, the word “myth” makes frequent appearances in her novels.
Vilma, the prophetic old woman Ida encounters in the ghetto, is described as a mythical
creature; Useppe is frequently portrayed as a magical gnome; Ida is compared to the
maiden who slays the dragon in tales of old. Even Bella the dog is likened to “una
vecchia di migliaia d’anni, di memorie antiche e sapienza superiore” (437). Morante
scholarship is likewise rife with references to myth. Abby Cornish describes the story of
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L’isola di Arturo as “universal and recurring, like epic myths” (74); Della Coletta writes
of the mythical memories resuscitated in La Storia (138); Serkowska highlights the
irreconcilability of mythical and historical worlds in L’isola di Arturo, claiming that
“Morante, time and time again, prefers the myth to the historical or the real world”
(“Arturo” 153-54).
However, I disagree with the notion that myth is somehow opposed to the
historical or “real.” Or rather, if that was true in L’isola di Arturo, by the time we get to
La Storia, and especially in her later work, myth has undeniable historical and political
dimensions. This is most salient in her essays in Pro o contro la bomba atomica, where
her opposition to the atomic bomb is expressed in mythic terms; she compares “la
funzione del romanziere-poeta a quella del protagonista solare, che nei miti affronta il
drago notturno, per liberare la città atterrita” (107). Though some critics were dismissive
of Morante’s attempts to discuss pressing political concerns with whimsical fairy tale
images, Berardinalla argues that:
la trasformazione del saggio ideologico in favola e racconto d’avventure, con lotte
infantili fra il bene e il male, era in realtà un modo di scoprire la sostanza mitica
che alimenta ogni azione agonistica e un modo di custodirne il potenziale
simbolico al di là della contingenza. La favola ideologica raccontata in Pro o
contro la bomba atomica risulta oggi più realistica e più politicamente nutritiva
dell’intera collezione dei Quaderni rossi. (30)
This last phrase underscores not only the political potential of Morante’s mythic mode of
writing, but also the inadequacy of more explicitly political systems.
It is important to keep in mind that Morante’s definition of myth deviates from
classical understandings of the term; this is not merely a recycling of figures from Greek
and Roman traditions (even if iconic figures may occasionally appear). For example, she
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is careful to specify that the Jews returning from the camps were not greeted like Ulysses
returning to Ithaca; Manuel, the protagonist of Aracoeli, is described as “un finto Ulisse
di terra” whose quest is not at all the traditional journey found in chivalric poetry (130,
italics mine). For Morante, myth is simply that which defies the categorizations common
to modernity; that which can’t be “counted” in the capitalistic sense; that which is
eternally recurring, even when there no longer seems to be a place for it. Myth emerges
as a way of dealing with the modern crisis of conscience and loss of identity. And though
not all of her readers were persuaded of the political efficacy of the mythic mode, they
nonetheless acknowledged myth as a key dimension of her work.
Morante explains in “Sul romanzo” that, “La psicologia moderna ha insegnato che
spesso l’angoscia, nella sua estremità, cerca una medicina e un riposo nella riduzione
spettrale del mondo, e nel ritorno al disordine dell’informe e del prenatale. Anche nei
miti, le lotte coi draghi infernali, le discese sotterranee, e le traversate dell’irrealtà
notturna rispecchierebbero questa esperienza psicologica comune” (66). Thus, myth is
not at all a form of escapism from pressing political concerns; instead, it offers a means
of grappling with contemporary political tragedies—and, potentially, of transforming
them. In this sense, it is closer to reality than the abstract political philosophies
promulgated by many so-called “committed” writers. The imagination that undergirds
myth is ultimately more concrete—more “real”—than so-called reality.
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Il sogno dei sogni
Notre vie réelle est plus qu’aux trois
quarts composée d’imagination et de
fiction.
−Simone Weil
The question of “reality”—and the degree to which Morante engages with or
represents reality in her fiction—was of central importance for critics from the start. As
previously discussed, reception of her work was greatly influenced by debates about her
position vis-à-vis realism, neorealism, social realism, and other related -isms. These
debates in turn hinged on shifting definitions of realism and reality.
Thus, in order to determine the degree to which Morante addressed “reality” in
her fiction, we must first trace her definitions of the term and her statements on the
relationship between reality and imagination. What most people would call reality,
Morante instead dubbed irrealtà, or unreality. To quote Garboli, “La realtà è sempre in
gioco, sempre in bilico. E sempre insicura” (“Introduzione” xvi). Reality is “il sogno dei
sogni” (“Prefazione” xxvii). The images most closely associated with the “reality” of the
war—valiant partigiani, evil Germans, the liberation of Rome—are almost entirely
absent from La Storia. Nino and his partisan friends resemble kids playing soldier; the
Nazi soldiers are likewise presented as children, more interested in stealing wine than
pursuing the enemy; and Ida is so exhausted from trying to hunt down food for Useppe,
she sleeps right through the arrival of the Allies. The familiar narratives of the war are
replaced by a landscape populated by mystical prophets, magical gnomes, and talking
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animals; yet these figures ultimately reveal a truer account of the war—at least for certain
segments of the population—than any official report.
What Morante dubbed reality was something that could only be located through
the use of imagination—something often hidden beneath a surreal or fairy-tale veneer:
“Often it is the most surreal and visionary path […] that reveals the ‘reality’ of life”
(Lucamante, “Teatro” 248). Novels, then, are not escapist. On the contrary, “Un vero
romanzo è sempre realistico, anche il più favoloso!” (Pro o contro 50) She defined the
novel as “ogni opera poetica, nella quale l’autore […] dà intera una propria immagine
dell’universo reale (e cioè dell’uomo, nella sua realità)” (44). “Realism” in a novel is not
a question of verisimilitude, but rather emerges when “la realtà corruttibile” is
transformed into “una verità poetica incorruttibile” (49-50).262 Thus, it is in fiction—and
a quasi-mystical fiction at that—that she locates authenticity. Faced with the destructive
potential of modern technology, Morante views art as the only weapon capable of
combatting the encroaching threat of unreality: “Difatti, nella laida invasione dell’irrealtà,
l’arte, che viene a rendere la realtà, può rappresentare quasi la sola speranza del mondo”
(Pro o contro 105).

Scrittore, poeta, fanciullo divino
If poetry is the last line of defense against unreality, then how does Morante
understand poetry, and more specifically its relationship to politics? And how does poetry
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The full line reads: “Ma al romanziere (come a ogni altro artista) non basta l’esperienza contingente
della propria avventura. La sua esplorazione deve tramutarsi in un valore per il mondo: la realtà corruttibile
dev’essere tramutata, da lui, in una verità poetica incorruttibile. Questa è l’una ragione dell’arte: e questo è
il suo necessario realismo” (Pro o contro 49-50).
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connect with myth? In 1974, the idea of using language—specifically poetry—as a
subversive political tool was hardly a new one. Indeed, this was the logic guiding the
works of Balestrini and other members of Gruppo 63. At first glance, their respective
theorizations of the function of poetry would seem to suggest a consensus; yet this was
the same group that published some of the most scathing critiques of La Storia. How,
then, does Morante’s definition of poetry differ from that of more properly “engaged”
writers of the day?
First off, Morante defines a writer as “un uomo a cui sta a cuore tutto quanto
accade, fuorché la letteratura” (Pro o contro 97). What does it mean for a writer to
concern himself with everything but literature?263 The questions of reality and
imagination discussed in the previous section are relevant here; I believe that, in
separating the identity of the writer from the idea of literature, Morante wishes to
underscore the fact that writing is never a purely aesthetic or imaginative endeavor.
Fantasy and imagination are merely the tools used to communicate truths with a concrete
impact on human lives. If this characterization of writing seems familiar, that’s because
it’s remarkably similar to Sartrean or Gramscian definitions of committed literature;
though Morante avoids explicit discussions of politics, there are undeniable political, or
“committed,” resonances to her articulation of the writer’s responsibilities: “Quello che
conta è la fedeltà disinteressata a un unico impegno: interrogare sinceramente la vita
reale, affinché essa ci renda, in risposta, la sua verità” (Pro o contro 44-45).
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Morante’s formulation cannot help but call to mind Paul Verlaine’s famous line: “et tout le reste est
littérature.”
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Morante is likewise drawn to poetry because, like myth and ritual, it effects
cultural rejuvenation through constant reinvention of tired materials, freeing us from the
restrictive forces of habit. In her notebook for Menzogna e sortilegio, Morante writes:
È compito dei poeti di rinnovare continuamente il mondo agli occhi degli uomini,
che l’abitudine rende ciechi e distratti davanti alle cose, di rispiegare loro le cose
con sempre nuove immagini, questo è il compito dato ai poeti quel sabato in cui
Egli, finita la creazione si riposò. Io ho creato il mondo—disse—voi dovete far sì
che esso sia giovane e nuovo per gli uomini in eterno—Da qui l’immortale
necessità della poesia, senza poesia l’uomo muore di inedia. (qtd. in Zagra 31)
This is precisely the sort of repetition with a difference that allows cyclicality to emerge
as a productive force. Change, Morante argues, does not require us to utterly abandon the
past—even an oppressive one. We merely need to alter existing structures to reveal new
or forgotten connections. When the world becomes static, poets are tasked with
revitalizing it, lest this stagnation descend into disintegration.
We can also gain some insight into Morante’s beliefs about the ideal relationship
between language and the world by turning to Useppe, La Storia’s tiniest poet-prophet;
Lucente explains that, “Like Vico’s first men [Useppe] perceives the world and expresses
those perceptions first in poetry rather than in prose. At the same time, his poems are not
‘fictional’ or feigned, since they represent real, direct perception of his world: Vico’s vera
narratio and Useppe’s truthful fables are two aspects of the same manner of discovering
and naming daily—yet also wondrous—surroundings” (Beautiful Fables 251). With his
unmediated experience of the world, Useppe’s mindset is reminiscent of that of the
German Romantics—though with more of a social dimension. Like the Romantics, he
insists on a direct relationship between word and thing: “Si capiva che le parole, per lui,
avevano un valore sicuro, come fossero tutt’uno con le cose. […] E perfino capitò a volte
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che in una parola lui già presentisse l’immagine propria della cosa, pure se questa gli era
ignota, così da riconoscerla al primo incontro” (130-31). Re likens Useppe’s poetic
discourse to “a language that restores the natural link between names and things before
the Fall of humankind into History” (Re 369).
Overall, Useppe rejects symbolic representation; he isn’t able to recognize the
images in newspaper photographs, and indeed sees newspapers merely as raw material
for the construction of paper hats. Ida notes that “il libro e il quaderno rimanevano, per
lui, degli oggetti estranei; e forzarlo pareva un’azione contro natura, come pretendere che
un uccellino studiasse le note sul pentagramma” (446). Davide likewise privileges the
immediate and the concrete over symbols during his speech on the differences between
Christ the man and Christ the symbol:
Perché qua bisogna intendersi: quello là [il cristo di Galilea, crocifisso] non va
confuso con lo spettro omonimo che la Storia mette sugli altari, e in cattedra e sul
trono… e… e lo incolla sulle insegne pubblicitarie dei suoi soliti bordelli… e… e
mattatoi… e banche di ladri… sempre per nasconderci sotto il suo solo, vero
idolo: il fantoccio del Potere! Il Cristo non è uno spettro; è l’unica sostanza reale
in movimento… E quel cristo là storicamente fu un vero Cristo: ossia un uomo
(ANARCHICO!) che non ha mai rinnegato la coscienza totale, a nessun patto!
(589)
Abstraction, then, is a tool of the oppressor; only by engaging with concrete reality can
these characters hope to impede History.264
The renewal of the world, which Morante identifies as the poet’s task, depends on
a particular orientation or worldview—on the ability to see the world as other than it is.
Fascistic and capitalistic oppression are equally skilled at stamping out this power to
fantasize; Useppe’s purpose, therefore, with his anti-patriarchal, anti-Lacanian, and anti264

As discussed in Chapter 3, Claude Simon (echoing Lévi-Strauss) identifies myth as the science of the
concrete.
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rational language, is not to single-handedly lead the world to salvation as some sort of
prophet, but rather to model a particular form of engagement with language and the world
which readers can imitate in order to effect change themselves. Though La Storia was
demeaned for its “pessimistic” tone, the point is not Useppe’s demise, but rather his
relentless optimism during his few short years on the Earth. In her essays, too, Morante
sought to articulate the optimism that is characteristic of all true art:
La qualità dell’arte è liberatoria, e quindi, nei suoi effetti, sempre rivoluzionaria.
Qualsiasi momento dell’esperienza reale e transitoria, diventa, nell’attenzione
poetica, un momento religioso. E in questo senso, si può parlare di ottimismo […]
Se la sua coscienza non sarà discesa nell’irrealtà, ma anzi l’orrore stesso gli
diventerà una risposta reale (poesia), nel punto in cui segnerà le sue parole sulla
carta, lui compierà un atto di ottimismo. (Pro o contro 108)
Here she foregrounds the necessity of not giving in to horror but instead responding to it
(and thereby overcoming it) with art. The effects of poetry can disrupt systems of death
and horror by locating moments of happiness amidst tragedy and carving out a space for
alternative futures. Redemption, then, lies not in the more properly historical sections of
the novel (which are undeniably pessimistic), but in Useppe’s infantile poetic efforts,
which, as proleptic projections of his desires, undermine the grim determinism of history.
For Morante, all poetry was optimistic insofar as it resisted the horrors of history and
unreality, and therefore her much maligned effort to present an enchanted vision of some
of the war’s forgotten victims assumes the status of a potent political intervention.
Ultimately, the question of political commitment, or committed literature,
revolves around the notion of honesty, or verità poetica. Useppe’s poems are praised not
for any particular aesthetic or ideological properties, but for the unblemished truth they
communicate. In “Pro o contro la bomba atomica,” Morante asks: “Ma infine, che razza
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di romanzo o di poesia dovrà scrivere il Nostro per fare, come dicono i giornali, la sua
lotta? La risposta è semplice: scriverà, onestamente, quello che gli pare. ‘Ai poeti’ ancora,
disse, Umberto Saba ‘resta da fare la poesia onesta.’ Però, basterebbe dire la poesia;
perché, se è poesia, non può essere che onesta” (116). Of course, defining honesty and
determining which works adhere to—or deviate from—that definition is no
straightforward matter. At the very least, it’s fair to say that, for Morante, honesty is more
likely to occur among figures excluded from, or oppressed by, mainstream sociopolitical
structures. Women, the poor, the uneducated, animals, and, most importantly, children
retain a mythical connection with nature and the world which in turn offers them
privileged access to truth.

From the Mouths of Babes
…thou hast hid these things from the
wise and prudent, and hast revealed
them unto babes…for so it seemed
good in thy sight.
–Luke 10:21
Useppe is not the only child to occupy a privileged position within Morante’s
fiction. Most of the characters in La Storia exhibit at least some child-like tendencies: Ida
is described as child-like;265 Gunther, Useppe’s father, is still more or less a child, despite
the rape which inaugurates the novel;266 Carulina, a mother herself, nonetheless retains
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“E difatti, Ida era rimasta, nel fondo, una bambina, perché la sua precipua relazione col mondo era
sempre stata e rimaneva (consapevole o no) una soggezione spaurita” (21).
266
The narrator calls him a “mammarolo” [mamma’s boy], and as he wanders the streets, he kicks stones
like a child (17-18).
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her powers of childish fantasy;267 Nino, even as a soldier or gangster, displays the
boundless enthusiasm and care-free demeanor of a child;268 even Giuseppe Secondo,
though nearly sixty years old, has a “comically infantile face” as he proclaims that the
revolution is nigh (218). In her criticism of the corruption of the modern world, Morante
often turns to children as a redemptive force. Though they inhabit the realm of the
imagination, they are paradoxically better positioned to access “reality.” It is for this
reason that Morante claims writers locate their kindred spirits not among adults, but only
among the youngest: “Infine, rimane che le sue compagnie più vere lo scrittore le trova
poi quasi sempre fra persone di età estremamente giovane, o infantile addirittura. Soltanto
loro, difatti, riconoscono e frequentano ancora la realtà. Per legge universale, e peggio
che mai nel sistema, la maggioranza degli adulti sono contaminati più o meno
dall’irrealtà, e quindi, ostili” (Pro o contro 115).
Of course, Morante is not proposing that the world will be saved by an army of
child poets. Rather, the goal is for poets to rediscover—and disseminate—the innocent,
honest, and unmediated forms of experience accessible to children. Morante is optimistic
insofar as she believes this child-like perspective (what I am calling a mythic perspective)
can indeed be recaptured. She even goes so far as to suggest that, by using children as our
models, the revolution might actually be fun: “A questo punto, mi ricordo di quello che
disse il maestro di poesia Umberto Saba: che in ogni poeta c’è rimasto sempre un
267

“La Carulina, anche se aveva messo su famiglia, si manteneva più ragazzina ancora della sua età. […]
ancora leggeva, compitandole a alta voce, le storie a figurine e i giornaletti per i piccoli; e si divertiva a
giocare a acchiapparella e nascondarella coi guaglioni e i ragazzini del posto. Però, bastava un minimo
lamento o protesta di Rosa, o di Celeste, per vederla accorrere preoccupata, con gli occhi spalancati e
protesi come due fari d’automobile, nella direzione della sua prole” (183).
268
“S’intuiva che, dinnanzi alla sua pretesa di ragazzino, le Patrie, i Duci e l’intero teatro del mondo, si
riduceva tutto a una commedia, la quale aveva valore soltanto perché si prestava alla sua smania di
esistere” (102).
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bambino, il quale adesso convive con l’adulto, e si meraviglia di quello che succede
all’adulto. Se ne meraviglia, ma anche, io mi permetto di aggiungere, ci si diverte. Per
sua fortuna, anche in questo suo pazzo e disperato combattimento col drago, lui un poco
si diverte” (Pro or contro 116, italics mine).

Panning Gold from Disappointment
Despite conflicting claims that La Storia was both too pessimistic and too naïve, I
maintain that it was neither. To a certain degree, this confused reception is
understandable. Morante’s “philosophy” (to the extent we can call it that) is best
characterized as negative utopianism; to superficial observers, the “negative” half of this
moniker manifested itself as pessimism, the “utopianism” as naïveté. However, the
convergence of the two terms creates something else entirely.
The “negative” outcomes in La Storia are undeniable; Nino and Useppe are killed
in quick succession; Ida goes mad; Davide, his political hopes crushed, dies of an
overdose; even Bella, the dog who acts as a sort of surrogate mother to Useppe, is put
down by the police. In her analysis of the novel, Della Coletta acknowledges that, “for
Morante no salvation is possible. A somber beginning only foreshadows an even sadder
ending” (147). Yet, despite these sad endings for individual characters, she maintains
that:
A positive history can exist. It emerges in the text as the projection of the
narrator’s desires in a proleptic form. It lies outside the text’s chronological
framework and calls forth a utopian dimension that ideally reverses the grim
determinism of the plot and counterbalances the cynical assumption that ‘History
is a curse.’ In this way, La Storia corrects the deterministic framework of
conventional historical accounts. (147)
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Boscagli concurs, claiming that, though no redemption is possible within the time of
human experience, “Redemption for Morante is possible at a different level, on another
plane of existence, signified exactly by what history does not have the tools to deal with,
the many other marginal textualities, voices, and language that Morante includes in her
writing” (176). In short, Morante eschews naïve (and impossible) happy endings; instead,
hope emerges in the counter-history that the novel proposes, a history that creates a space
for previously marginalized voices and posits the possibility of difference in an
unspecified future.
Utopianism can be understood as a form of hope, and in the midst of the anni di
piombo, there were many who dismissed hope as childish or detached from reality. Yet
Ernst Bloch makes clear that “hope is the opposite of security. It is the opposite of naïve
optimism. The category of danger is always within it. This hope is not confidence” (qtd.
in Zipes 16). Gert Ueding, one of Bloch’s foremost interpreters, expands on this notion:
Utopia […] does not withdraw from the reality principle merely to place an
ethereal and empty realm of freedom in place of the oppressive realm of necessity.
Rather it does this intentionally to test human possibilities, to conserve human
demands for happiness and playfully to anticipate what in reality has not at all
been produced but what dreams and religious or profane wish-images of humans
are full of. (qtd. in Zipes xxxiii)
Utopian longing thus fully acknowledges the deprivations of reality. Negative utopianism
in particular is motivated by these deprivations; rather than positing an idealized utopia
(in the tradition of Plato or Thomas More), negative utopianism focuses on critique of the
present in the name of cherished yet tenuous beliefs, like freedom, equality, and justice.
“The negative utopians sought to pan gold from disappointment, to find veins of hope in
even the most barren ground” (Kaufmann). They refuse to depict political redemption,
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yet nonetheless articulate a future-oriented longing that projects individuals out of their
present hopelessness.
Thus, despite the tragic fates to which Morante’s characters are subjected, the
novel’s final epigraph leaves us with a (literal) seed of hope. Quoting Gramsci’s prison
notebooks, Morante writes: “Tutti i semi sono falliti eccettuato uno, che non so cosa sia,
ma che probabilmente è un fiore e non un’erbaccia” (657). Useppe’s brief moments of
euphoria may prove unsustainable, but at the very least he reveals the possibility of
integration, community, and resurrected tradition—which is more than the supposed
revolutionaries could offer. As Della Coletta explains, “This final opening toward a
potential turning point sketches the utopian dimension of a positive future already
inscribed (albeit repressed) within a present and a past that remain tragically dystopian”
(151).
Despite the ways in which the term “utopia” has been depreciated—and this is
even truer now than during Morante’s life—Russell Jacoby makes a persuasive case for
the political utility of utopian thinking in an age of permanent emergencies: “more than
ever we have become narrow utilitarians dedicated to fixing, not reinventing, the here and
now. Yet the case can be made for writing against the grain of history, for writing under
the impetus not of this but of a different period. In an era of intellectual triage, I attend
the utopian esprit of another day” (ix). Perhaps utopias are anachronistic, but the
imaginative power that allows thinkers to conceive of the world as other than it is is
desperately needed. Rather than dismissing utopianism as naïve, perhaps we should look
back to the “buoyant idealism and robust social enterprise” of another age, rather than
giving in to despair (Jacoby ix). I argue that this was precisely Morante’s motivation for
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weaving utopian threads into La Storia at a moment when intellectuals like Hannah
Arendt, Karl Popper, and Isaiah Berlin, among others, were leading the charge against
utopianism, claiming that it was too closely entwined with totalitarianism. Utopianism
may seem to keep its distance from the daily to-and-fro of political life; however,
“utopian thinking consists of more than daydreams and doodles. It emerges out of and
returns to contemporary political realities. As I see it, this contradiction defines the
utopian project: it partakes at once of the limited choices of the day and the unlimited
possibilities of the morrow. It straddles two time zones: the one we inhabit now and the
one that might exist in the future” (Jacoby 145-46). Thus, the labels “committed” and
“utopian” are not at all incompatible.

The Myth of Utopia
Jews have always been motivated by the myth of
utopia.
−Ernst Bloch
How, then, does utopianism tie back into the notion of myth, the organizing term
of this project? As it turns out, utopianism, like myth, is closely linked to the principles of
imagination, childhood, community, and orality (or poetry). As previously discussed,
imagination was of central importance for Morante; she blamed everything from the
concentration camps to the atomic bomb on a lack of imagination. Imagination is also the
source of utopian speculation; thus, it makes sense that an age without imagination would
also be an age without utopias. As Horkheimer writes, “The modern make-up of society
sees to it that the utopian dreams of childhood are cut short in earliest youth” (277).
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Indeed, if imagination sustains utopian thinking, childhood in turn sustains imagination.
Thus, it is unsurprising that children are such key figures in Morante’s novels—
quintessentially mythic, they serve as pint-sized heralds of a utopian future. Furthermore,
the goal of negative utopianism is not the creation or a new state or political organization,
but a renewal of human relations. Martin Buber, for example, associates utopianism with
real fellowship and community. As I’ve discussed at length, this sense of true communion
with others is likewise a key component of mythical thinking.
Yet another link between negative utopianism and myth is the emphasis on poetry
and oral traditions. As Jacoby writes, many utopian thinkers felt that utopia “escaped the
confines of the written language. Words imperfectly conveyed human desires and
thoughts; they could hardly express utopian impulses. The written language belongs to
the world of domination and control” (102). Thus, poetry and music are favored as more
properly liberating arts. This resistance to the written word is clearly expressed in La
Storia—most notably through Useppe’s illiteracy, but also through the novel’s dedication
to the illiterate and the positive portrayal of oral traditions that characters like the
Marroccos attempt to sustain even in a ruined Rome.
To those skeptical of Morante’s utopianism due to the absence of a clearly
mapped out utopian future, Jacoby responds that: “Clues, fragments, and whispers—not
blueprints—sustain hope. […] The unseen is neither unreal nor inessential” (143-44). He
concludes his discussion of utopia by reminding readers that, “utopianism demands
boldness and audacity in dreaming. This is an aptitude that does not automatically emerge
in an individual. Rather, utopian dreaming is a fragile plant, which is prey to the
prevailing weather. It needs protection, cultivation, and warmth” (148). In this context,
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Gramsci’s botanical epigraph is even more fitting; Morante sought to cultivate the one
remaining utopian seed amidst a storm of mechanistic Marxist thinking.

Not with a Bang, But a Whimper
Though I have defended Morante against accusations of anachronism and
disengagement, those who considered her use of myths, fairy tales, and utopias
hopelessly outdated were, to a certain extent, correct; Italy in 1974 was hardly a
hospitable environment for such genres, which were rapidly being replaced with avantgarde experimentation and/or capitalistic technocratic fantasies. However, this is
precisely why her use of myth is so important—and so politically radical. Yet even
Morante was forced to acknowledge the limitations of this methodology in the face of
such massive machineries of oppression. Reading the essays in Pro o contro la bomba
atomica chronologically reveals an undeniable dip in optimism as time went on.269 If La
Storia condemned its characters to some less-than-desirable fates, Aracoeli, her final
novel, is even less kind. As Bérard explains, “By this stage we know that heroes, like
Superman, can die and that the Messiah can fail: the luminous Arturo has left for the war,
Davide Segre has turned into a suicidal executioner, Manuel Munoz Munoz has died
without glory and without redemption in spite of the ‘cartolina dal Paradiso’ and the
promise of Christ on the cross—all of these signs have proved bewitching and false”
(“Morante and Weil” 158).
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In both “Sul romanzo” (1959) and “Pro o contro la bomb atomica” (1965), she compares the writer to a
solar protagonist who battles a nocturnal dragon in order to liberate a terrorized city. However, in the later
essay, she immediately follows the image with a discussion of why pessimism, not optimism, is the proper
tone for great art.
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Manuel, the protagonist of Aracoeli, ventures into the desert in search of his
deceased mother. Yet, having arrived at the end of the desert, he discovers that it is
neither the predestined passage towards a Promised Land, nor the location of the
historical adventure, of the salvific regeneration of a people, but rather the
apocalyptic land of extermination, madness, death, and of the absence of an
omnipotent father God: in his place one finds, instead, emptiness, the
inconceivable and incommunicable mystery of a love exposed in its nudity, its
uselessness, and the gratuitousness of suffering without compensation and without
resurrection. (Bérard, “Morante and Weil” 145-6)
With a little work, it might still be possible to recover a hint of hopefulness even in this
miserable locale; perhaps Manuel is merely assenting to life to the point of death, as
Bataille advocated. For Bataille, this “gratuitousness of suffering without compensation
and without resurrection” is precisely what leads to ecstasy and communion. However,
much as I would like to locate a lingering ember of revolutionary energy in her final
work, this seems a disingenuous reading of Morante. If myth still had some power against
the threat of atomic disintegration in La Storia, it was ultimately drowned by a wave of
postmodern irony and bourgeois apathy.
Morante, always reclusive, became increasingly isolated during the tail end of the
1970s, and in April 1983, she attempted suicide. The artists whom she had considered her
children—her beloved figures of utopian potential—were all dead: American painter Bill
Morrow committed suicide in 1962, and Pasolini was assassinated in 1975. The irony, of
course, is that the 1980s saw a resurgence of interest in so-called “traditional” novelistic
forms, and in Italy at least, Morante’s work was held up as an example to be imitated.
Serkowska insists that, “though one could hardly call Elsa Morante a postmodern writer
with her emphasis on the primacy of poetry, La Storia definitely paved the way for many
Italian (postmodern) historical novels of the eighties and nineties” (385). However,
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though these younger admirers counterbalanced the hostility of earlier critics, they
nonetheless fell victim to the same misreadings of Morante, who was always more
concerned with utopia and myth than with formal aesthetic structures. After decades of
vilification, the threat of the myth-politics nexus had finally dissipated—but so too had its
political vitality.
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Conclusion
The Death (and Resurrection?) of Myth
What do we gain by interrogating the intersection of myth and commitment in
postwar France and Italy? My contention is not that myth played some radical role in
postwar politics that was subsequently written out of history. If myth as a form of
political engagement is an understudied phenomenon, there are logical reasons for this;
figures like Sartre and Vittorini were simultaneously more vocal and more prolific in
their theorizations of committed literature, and their central place in the scholarship is
therefore understandable. Furthermore, the authors examined here are not necessarily
“mythic” or “committed” in any conventional sense of the word; to read them as such
requires a bit of theoretical gymnastics. Nonetheless, including Pavese, Bataille, Simon,
and Morante in conversations about engagement is doubly enriching: first, it forces a
reconsideration of their priorities, highlighting previously ignored facets of their social
and political identities; and second, it nuances the definition of committed literature,
expanding the concept to encompass the political potential of phenomena like myth.
What I have tried to demonstrate is that, while skepticism towards myth was
understandable in the postwar era, mythic novels nonetheless offered unique solutions to
the problems of postwar trauma and alienation. Combining tradition and innovation, they
modeled alternative methods of conceptualizing readers’ relationships with others, with
nature, with literature, and with politics.
Nonetheless, the circumstances that led Morante to question the efficacy of her
project are the same circumstances that compelled me to end this study of the political
potential of myth with the late 1970s. By the end of the decade, neoliberalism and late
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capitalism had almost entirely destroyed the dream of revolution; the radical leftists with
whom Morante had argued for so long, but who nonetheless shared some of her political
aims, were disillusioned by the compromises of party politics, the relentless violence of
terrorist groups on both the left and the right, and increasing economic instability. In
France, too, the mid-1970s saw a rejection of socialism, Marxism, and “the type of left,
philo-Communist politics which informed a belief that it was possible to build a radically
qualitatively better world” (Drake 159). The election of François Mitterand in 1981
marked the return of a leftist government after decades of center-right dominance; yet the
event was met not with celebration, but with silence.270 For most intellectuals, socialism
was considered “well past its sell-by date” (Drake 169). Furthermore, the fact that
Mitterand included four Communist ministers in his government did little to endear him
to an increasingly anti-totalitarian (and thus anti-Communist) intelligentsia. Some have
attributed this muted response to the deaths of several leading intellectuals around that
time, including Sartre (1980), Barthes (1980), Jacques Lacan (1981), and Louis Althusser
(who, though still alive, was interned in a mental hospital in 1980), but I believe the
reaction is indicative of a larger trend in French intellectual life—namely the decline of a
certain rapprochement between literature and politics and a loss of faith in tried and true
forms of engagement.
By 1980, literary priorities had likewise shifted. Realism and “traditional” novels
were making a comeback, as evidenced by the so-called retour du romanesque in France.
Even postmodern Italian masterpieces like Calvino’s Se una notte d’inverno un
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Drake refers to this moment as “le silence des intellectuels” (see Intellectual and Politics in Post-War
France, chapter 6).
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viaggiatore (1979) and Eco’s Il nome della rosa (1980) drew heavily from traditional
genre narratives.271 The trauma of World II still lingered, but representations of the
period had been normalized, which made it possible to view novels and films set during
the war as works of art rather than as didactic lessons in history. Papy fait de la
Résistance (1982), for example, is a cinematic farce that pays little heed to either wartime
heroism or the tragedy of collaboration, instead relying on irreverent slapstick gags. Yet,
significantly, this “irritating bit of fluff” aroused no protest from viewers (Rousso 236).
In such an environment, mythic representations of the war were likewise allowed to
circulate unimpeded—though their affective and social dimensions had effectively been
quashed. In general, concern with World War II had ceded to the more immediate
problems posed by post-colonialism, globalization, and late capitalism.
The late 1970s also saw a reconsideration of the function of writers and public
intellectuals. In France, the two intellectual models that Sartre had personified—the
classic, committed intellectual, and the revolutionary one—were abandoned in favor of
new roles, such as Foucault’s “specific intellectual.” In general, the focus shifted from
broad, revolutionary-utopian dreams to more limited, local interventions. The
intellectual’s purpose was now “to demystify not to preach” (Jennings 78). The
emergence of new media also played into these changes. In the days before television’s
hegemony, the printed word (especially journals like Les Temps modernes) was the
primary vehicle for intellectuals’ interventions. However, from the mid-1970s, the
“opening up” of television “provided a proliferation of new fora for French intellectuals”
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Stephen Benson dubs Calvino’s style a “quiet,” “discreet” experimentalism, as opposed to the more
radical literary experiments of the previous decade. See Cycles of Influence: Fiction, Folktale, Theory, p.
69.
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(Drake 163). Though theorists like Bourdieu and Régis Debray criticized television for
focusing on the individual, the sensational, and the scandalous, all at the expense of
thoughtful, intellectual discourse, they were powerless to impede the médiatisation of
philosophical inquiry. Increased media exposure, combined with the democratization and
professionalization of intellectual labor, had the paradoxical effect of diminishing
intellectuals’ influence on society at large. Jean-Francois Sirinelli refers to the second
half of the 1970s as a period of “profound destabilization of the intellectual milieu and
the loss of its reference points” (263).
Having dominated the French and Italian intellectual imagination for decades,
littérature engagée was now dead in the water—and so, too, was myth. The conditions
that had briefly kept myth alive after the war—the persistence of certain nonsynchronous
communities, along with their traditions and superstitions—had largely disappeared by
1980, quite literally steamrolled by the machines of industry. Myth no longer posed the
ideological threat it had in the past, but it was also reduced to a largely decorous status;
rather than serving as catalysts for social transformation, myths now operated as mere
entertainment. As early as 1968, Lévi-Strauss had warned that the novel, “born from the
exhaustion of myth,” would lead to myth’s degradation, and though the authors
considered here managed to forestall such a degradation in their own works, myth’s
demise did eventually arrive.272 This is not to say that questions regarding the relationship
between literature and politics have been settled; on the contrary, debates about the
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“The hero of the novel is the novel itself. It tells its own story, saying not only that it was born from the
exhaustion of myth, but also that it is nothing more than an exhausting pursuit of structure, always lagging
behind an evolutionary process that it keeps the closest watch on, without being able to rediscover, either
within or without, the secret of a forgotten freshness, except perhaps in a few havens of refuge where—
contrary to what happens in the novel—mythic creation still remains vigorous, but unconsciously so”
(131).
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“appropriate” configuration of these two realms are a beloved intellectual pastime and
continue in earnest to this day. Hannah Arendt goes so far as to suggest that the
unresolved tension between art and politics is an essential critical force within the public
sphere, and she therefore advocates keeping the conflict alive indefinitely.273 However,
the parameters of the debate have undeniably changed as a result of shifting definitions of
engagement and myth. The form of myth theorized in this project still retained traces of
sincerity and hope in the face of modern violence, alienation, and oppression. Such
sincerity has had a hard time finding traction amidst the disaffected irony of recent
decades.
Considering the role of cyclicity in my analysis of myth, it is perhaps fitting that
the relative popularity of myth and “realism” is likewise cyclical. Morante’s mythic
utopianism was deemed anachronistic, yet Russell Jacoby makes a compelling argument
for why we need negative utopias now more than ever: utopianism must be marshaled to
counter “the dwindling force of the modern imagination”—our passive acceptance of
things as they are (xiii). And indeed, if one were to cite a modern-day inheritor of myth,
science fiction (which comprises utopianism) might be a leading contender; as the genre
gains more traction in academic communities, debates about its political uses and abuses
proliferate, echoing many of the arguments about myth in the immediate postwar period.
Frederic Jameson’s Archaeologies of the Future (2005), for example, uses science fiction
to examine the opposing positions on utopia today and assess its political value in a postCommunist age. Through this study, he seeks to understand “how works that posit the
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See Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture” (1960). As David Carroll explains, “Culture attests to the possibility
of this [public] space, which is threatened, reduced, if not eliminated or privatized when either the political
or the aesthetic is leveled out through the neutralization of one of the two terms of the opposition” (50).
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end of history can offer usable historical impulses, how works which aim to resolve all
political differences can continue to be political, how works designed to overcome the
needs of the body can remain materialistic” (xiv)—the same operations I have tried to
highlight in relation to myth.
And yet, attacks against “irrational” and “escapist” (i.e. mythic) thinking
continue; a recent article from Jacobin attributes the horrors of the Trump Presidency to
the loss of faith in Enlightenment rationality and demands its return as the only effective
means of overcoming destructive strains of populism.274 Irrationalism and mysticism, the
article claims, enjoy a long historical association with anti-Semitism, and are thus the
tools of the alt-right (just as they had been the tools of Hitler and Mussolini).275 The
authors lament that, “criticizing Enlightenment thought has become fashionable across
the political spectrum”—to which I would reply that it’s been “fashionable,” off and on,
since at least the late eighteenth century. Is counter-Enlightenment thinking really to
blame for our current political woes? To answer such a question would require a second
dissertation; my point is simply that the tensions between rationalism and irrationalism,
history and myth, political engagement and escapism may sink from view for a time—but
like all good mythical creatures, they inevitably resurface.
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“If the Left wants to resist the alt-right’s growing power, it needs to return to the roots of Enlightenment
rationality, which insists on the equality of all people and provides a strong theoretical basis for social
transformation and universal emancipation” (Fluss and Frim).
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“The long historical association between irrationalism and anti-Judaism suggests that they emanate from
a common worldview. After all, the mystical, neo-pagan writings of Dietrich Eckart inspired much of the
Third Reich’s racial policy. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Hitler’s friend and mentor, proclaimed that
‘every Mystic is, whether he will or not, a born Anti-Semite’” (Fluss and Frim).
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